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ABSTRACT
Online markets are staggering in volume and variety. These online marketplaces are
transforming lifestyles, expanding the boundaries of conventional businesses, and re-
shaping labor force structures. To fully realize their potential, online marketplaces
must be designed carefully. However, this is a significant challenge. This dissertation
studies individual behavior and interactions in online marketplaces, and examines how
to enhance efficiency and outcomes of these online marketplaces by providing actionable
operational policy recommendations.
An important question in the context of open-ended innovative service marketplaces
is how to manage information when specifying design problems to achieve better out-
comes. Chapter 1 investigates this problem in the context of online crowdsourcing
contests where innovation seekers source innovative products (designs) from a crowd
of competing solvers (designers). We propose and empirically test a theoretical model
featuring different types of information in the problem specification (conceptual ob-
jectives, execution guidelines), and the corresponding impact on design processes and
submission qualities. We find that, to maximize the best solution quality in crowd-
sourced design problems, seekers should always provide more execution guidelines, and
only a moderate number of conceptual objectives.
Building on the same research setting, Chapter 2 looks into another important yet
challenging problem—how the innovation seeker should provide interim performance
feedback to the solvers in online service marketplaces where seekers and solvers can in-
teract dynamically. In particular, we study whether and when the seeker should provide
such interim performance feedback. We empirically examine these research questions
ix
using a dataset from a crowdsourcing platform. We develop and estimate a dynamic
structural model to understand contestants’ behavior, compare alternative feedback
policies using counter-factual simulations, and find providing feedback throughout the
contest may not be optimal. The late feedback policy, i.e., providing feedback only in
the second half of the contest, leads to a better overall contest outcome.
Moving to a wider application, Chapter 3 leverages consumer clickstream infor-
mation in e-commerce marketplaces to help market organizers improve demand es-
timation and pricing decisions. These decisions can be challenging, as e-commerce
marketplaces offer an astonishing variety of product choices and face extremely diver-
sified consumer decision journeys. We provide a novel solution to these challenges by
combining econometric and machine learning (Graphical Lasso) approaches, leverag-
ing customer clickstream information to learn the product correlation network, and
creating high-dimensional choice models that easily scale and allow for flexible substi-
tution patterns. Our model offers better in- and out-of-sample demand forecasts and
enhanced pricing recommendations in various synthetic datasets and in a real-world
empirical setting.
x
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Online markets are staggering in volume and variety: In 2019, $1.7 trillion was spent
globally in major online marketplaces, ranging from specialized online labor (e.g., Top-
coder and Mechanical Turk) to e-commerce (e.g., Amazon and Alibaba). By reducing
transaction costs and facilitating better matches between supply and demand, these on-
line marketplaces are transforming lifestyles, expanding the boundaries of conventional
businesses, and reshaping labor force structures. To fully realize their potential, on-
line marketplaces must be designed carefully. However, this is a significant challenge.
Newly emerging online marketplaces create unprecedented market structures, these
structures affect the decisions of both demand- and supply-side market participants,
and these intricate and complex interactions in turn determine market outcomes.
To improve the design of online marketplaces, I use novel large-scale datasets (e.g.,
from crowdsourcing graphic design platforms and e-commerce marketplaces) and study
individual behavior and interactions in these marketplaces. My goal is to improve
marketplace designs by providing actionable operational policy recommendations to
enhance the efficiency and outcomes of online marketplaces. In particular, I study
the following problems in my dissertation: how seekers should optimally specify their
“problem statement” at a crowdsourcing contest’s outset (Chapter 1), how seekers
should provide interim performance feedback to participants during the contest (Chap-
ter 2), and how consumer clickstream information can help e-commerce marketplaces
improve demand estimation and pricing decisions across a very large number of prod-
ucts (Chapter 3).
Online service marketplaces connect seekers and solvers. These online service mar-
ketplaces have been expanding from supplying basic labor to solving more open-ended
problems, such as logo design, algorithm design, web design, etc. An important ques-
tion in the context of open-ended innovative service marketplaces is how to manage
information when specifying design problems to achieve better outcomes. In Chapter
1
1, I study this problem from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, in the
context of online crowdsourcing contests (also known as open innovation contests),
where innovation seekers source innovative products (designs) from a crowd of com-
peting solvers (designers). To understand how information impacts designer behavior
in online marketplaces, I build a novel model to capture the design process based
on qualitative theories in the design literature. To ensure that the observations and
recommendations are realistic, I combine my game-theoretic model with economet-
ric analysis and textual analysis, and I leverage a unique quasi-natural experiment
to strengthen the causality arguments. I show theoretically and validate empirically
that a very highly specified design problem statement may not be optimal, and that
different types of information (e.g., conceptual objectives and executional guidance)
may have significantly different impacts on designer behavior and should be managed
differently. These findings can improve current marketplace practices, as the platforms
now often encourage seekers to pack as much information as possible into their problem
specification when describing the design they want. This is the first paper to study
the role of different types of information in problem specifications in crowdsourcing
contests, and the first to bring insights from the design research field into the study of
crowdsourcing innovation contests.
Building on the same research setting as Chapter 1, I look into another important
yet challenging problem— how the innovation seeker should provide interim perfor-
mance feedback to the solvers (e.g., in the form of ratings) in online service mar-
ketplaces where seekers and solvers can interact dynamically. In Chapter 2, I study
whether and when the seeker should provide such interim performance feedback. To
answer this important research question, I take a structural modeling empirical ap-
proach in the context of graphic logo design contests. My structural empirical model
features endogenous entries by new designers throughout the contest, exploitation and
exploration behaviors by existing designers, and the designers’ strategic choices among
these decisions in a dynamic game. Using real-world contest data, I estimate the
parameters governing designers’ participation behavior. In particular, to distinguish
between designers’ exploratory and exploitative strategies, I use the computer vision
Scale-Invariant Feature Transform algorithm to quantify the similarity between pairs
of logo submissions. Based on these understandings of solver behavior, I conduct pol-
icy simulations to assess the contest outcomes under alternative feedback policies. My
findings offer important insights for crowdsourcing platforms. In practice, most online
platforms for crowdsourcing contests strongly encourage seekers to provide feedback
throughout the contests. My findings underscore the value of providing feedback, but
2
surprisingly they also suggest that the platform’s current recommendation that “the
more frequently the seeker provides feedback the better” may be misguided, depending
on the seeker’s objectives. If the seeker’s objective is to maximize the number of high
performers or the total number of designers in the contest, the late feedback policy
(providing feedback only late in the contest) is the best option. This is one of the first
studies to investigate the impact of feedback on the outcome of crowdsourcing contests,
and the first study to propose a structural model to empirically analyze the impact.
Moving to a wider application, I investigate how information from online market-
places can improve more conventional operational decisions. In Chapter 3, I leverage
consumer clickstream information in e-commerce marketplaces to help market orga-
nizers improve demand estimation and pricing decisions. These decisions can be chal-
lenging, as e-commerce marketplaces offer an astonishing variety of product choices
and face extremely diversified consumer decision journeys. I provide a novel solution
to these challenges by combining econometric and machine learning (Graphical Lasso)
approaches, leveraging customer clickstream information to learn the product correla-
tion network, and creating high-dimensional choice models that easily scale and allow
for flexible substitution patterns. Partnering with a leading international online retail
marketplace organizer, I demonstrate significant value of incorporating clickstream in-
formation when making conventional operational decisions: Our model offers better
in- and out-of-sample demand forecasts in various synthetic datasets in this real-world
empirical setting. Based on these estimated substitution patterns, my model can pro-
vide better pricing recommendations for the marketplace organizer, boosting profit
and revenue relative to current pricing practices. My model can be applied to different
settings with large choice sets, and it can help with a variety of operational decisions,
such as pricing, assortment, and inventory planning. This is one of the first studies to
leverage clickstream data in choice models to help identify substitution patterns, and
one of the first to introduce Graphical Lasso to the choice model framework.
In summary, my research generates new insights into how participants behave in
and interact with online marketplaces, and it offers actionable policy recommendations
for better designs of these online marketplaces.
3
CHAPTER 2
The Role of Problem Specification in
Crowdsourcing Contests for Design Problems: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.
2.1 Introduction
Online crowdsourcing has become a popular channel for sourcing design (creative)
products. A widely used form of organizing the crowdsourced innovation process is
the Crowdsourcing Contest, used for products ranging from web to interior design.
Compared with traditional innovation sourcing approaches, crowdsourcing contests
allow seekers to access a large pool of designers, solicit a larger number of solutions
from which to choose, and pay for only the most satisfying solutions. A typical
crowdsourcing contest starts with a seeker specifying a design problem and associated
award(s), based on which designers generate solutions, and compete for the award(s).
We focus on the seeker’s problem specification: how the seeker specifies his design
problem at the launch of his crowdsourcing contest. In the problem specification, a
seeker can state his problem (e.g., he needs a logo for a real estate company), and
communicate what he would like the solutions to achieve (e.g., the logo should convey
professionalism and reliability; blue color and sharp edges are preferred). The infor-
mation provided in the problem specification defines what constitutes a “high-quality”
solution in the focal contest, which can potentially affect designer behavior and contest
outcomes. Hence, it is important to understand the role of problem specifications in
crowdsourcing contests.
Yet, the best approach to problem specification is not obvious. At first sight, one
may think seekers should specify their problems in the most thorough manner possible.
A detailed problem specification clarifies what the seeker is looking for. Without
it, designers may miss important points when generating solutions, and they may
4
also face increased uncertainty about how closely their solutions match the seeker’s
objectives. However, an overly specified problem may backfire, especially when the
seeker is not careful about the types of information he provides. By taking a closer
look at seekers’ problem specifications, we find that problem specifications can contain
multiple types of information, which are likely to affect designers’ behavior differently.
For example, a problem specification with a long list of objectives can overwhelm
designers. Designers have to spend more time digesting the list, clarifying design
objectives, and creating designs satisfying multiple objectives; consequently, designers
may choose to not incorporate all of the design objectives, or even choose not to
participate.
In this paper, we aim to address the following research questions: (1) provided
with different types of information in a seeker’s problem specification, how do designers
decide whether to join the contest or not, and if so, how do they reflect information
from the problem specification in their design solutions; and (2) how should seekers
optimally specify their design problems?
To answer these questions, we first construct a game-theoretical model to capture
designers’ behavior given a problem specification. Our model distinguishes different
types of information provided in problem specifications (“professionalism” and “relia-
bility” can be considered as conceptual objectives that the seeker wants design solutions
to achieve, whereas “blue color” and “sharp edges” as execution guidance that conveys
the seeker’s instructions for design details). To assess how such information influence
decisions in designers’ design processes, our model features distinct stages in design
processes (i.e., design problem framing, design concept formulating and design trials
generating), which are based upon an established framework in the qualitative design
research literature (e.g., Scho¨n (1984, 1988); Cross (2011)). Our theoretical model pre-
dicts that the number of participating designers in a contest eventually decreases with
more conceptual objectives disclosed in the problem specification. In addition, partic-
ipants’ trial effort provision increases with more execution guidelines provided in the
problem specification. We also offer insights on how seekers can optimize their prob-
lem specifications to maximize the quality of the best design: more execution guidance
is always beneficial; however, seekers should not always disclose all their conceptual
objectives.
The theoretical predictions of our model are empirically tested against a dataset of
logo design contests from a major crowdsourcing platform. In addition, we avail our-
selves of a recent “quasi-natural experiment” opportunity that arose on the platform,
wherein changes were made to the platform problem specification template. This anal-
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ysis further strengthens the reliability of our empirical results, directionally confirms
our recommendations for the provision of information in problem specifications, and
generates additional nuanced insights into the implementation of these recommenda-
tions.
Our study makes several contributions. First, it is one of the first papers studying
the role of problem specifications in crowdsourcing contests, which holds great prac-
tical relevance. Second, we theoretically and empirically distinguish between different
types of information contained in problem specifications, i.e., conceptual objectives and
execution guidelines, and highlight their differential effects on designers’ participation
behavior and solution quality. Third, we bring findings from the design research field
into the study of crowdsourcing innovation contests. In particular, we borrow from the
qualitative design research literature, and formulate a mathematical model to capture
three distinct stages in design processes. The incorporation of the first two stages, the
design problem framing and design concept formulating stages, which are often omitted
in theoretical models of crowdsourcing contests, is crucial for capturing a more com-
plete picture of the designers’ design process and the impact of information provided in
problem specification on this process. Finally, we offer empirical evidence from the field
to support the predictions and recommendations from our theoretical model, linking
the theoretical and empirical research of crowdsourcing innovation contests.
2.2 Literature Review
Crowdsourcing contests have attracted interest from operations management re-
searchers. Existing operations literature on the design of crowdsourcing contests has
looked at the impact of award structure, contest size, open/closed entry, contest du-
ration, and the presence of competing contests on the outcome of crowdsourcing con-
tests. (See Chen et al. (2018) for a review of this literature.) There is also an emerging
literature examining the role of information in crowdsourcing contests. A few recent
studies investigate the impact of the disclosure of intermediate solutions (Boudreau and
Lakhani, 2015; Wooten and Ulrich, 2017a; Bockstedt et al., 2016) and interim feed-
back (Jiang et al., 2016; Wooten and Ulrich, 2017b; Bimpikis et al., 2017; Mihm and
Schlapp, 2018) on contest dynamics and outcomes. The present paper and Jiang et al.
(2016) employ similar data from a crowdsourcing logo design platform. Jiang et al.
(2016) utilizes a structural modeling approach to capture the dynamics of feedback
during a contest, while the present paper introduces an analytical model motivated by
the design literature, to mathematically frame the design process and incorporate it
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into an analytical exploration of innovation contests, and then empirically examines the
analytical predictions and policy recommendations so derived; the research questions,
methodology, contribution and insights are quite different across the two papers.
Another important occasion where seekers disclose information to solvers is prob-
lem specification. The information in a problem specification is a major part of what
“defines” the contest, and as such can have a significant impact on participants’ be-
havior and contest outcomes. Besides the present paper, to the best of our knowledge
the only other study that looks at problem specification in crowdsourcing contests is
Erat and Krishnan (2012). In that paper, the authors study contests where the seeker
starts with a well-defined problem, and solvers choose from a set of known approaches.
They focus on how the completeness of problem specifications helps provide a more
precise valuation of those approaches, which narrows down the solvers’ search by re-
vealing which of the known solutions are more likely to be successful. By contrast,
we study open-ended creative contests, where the seeker describes the problem, the
“approach(es)” to solving it are generated by each expert designer, and a longer list
of specifications may make it more difficult to find a suitable approach. Moreover, we
study how different types of information disclosed in the problem specification affect
designers’ entry, design concept formation and design solution generation behavior.
Not surprisingly, with our different model/setting and research focus, we arrive at dif-
ferent managerial insights. Erat and Krishnan (2012) find that the seeker may not want
to fully specify their problem, in order to increase ambiguity that in turn increases the
breadth of search that the solvers undertake within a set of known solution approaches.
By contrast, we model two types of information, and show that the seeker always wants
divulge all his execution guidelines, but might not want to divulge all his conceptual
objectives because an overly long set of objectives may discourage creators from partic-
ipating. Furthermore, we use real-world data to empirically test the predictions of our
theoretical model, which not only helps ensure the validity of the theoretical model,
but contributes to the empirical literature of crowdsourcing contests.
An innovation in our theoretical model of crowdsourcing contests is that our model
borrows from the classic literature in design research and explicitly captures various
stages of designers’ solution generation process. The design research literature (e.g.,
French et al. (1985); Pahl and Beitz (1988); Hubka (1989); Roozenburg and Cross
(1991)) often portrays the design process as a sequence of activities, which can be
grouped into phases of design problem framing (clarifying objectives), design concept
formulating (generating and refining design concepts), and design trial generating (em-
bodying designs and detailing designs). The last phase, which corresponds to the stage
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where a designer generates actual solutions, is often the focus of analytical models
of crowdsourcing contests in the operations and economics literature. The first two
phases are often overlooked, possibly because they are less visible and more abstract.
Researchers in design research realize the importance of these two phases in the design
process, and call for attention to them (Scho¨n, 1984, 1988; Pahl and Beitz, 1988; Cross,
2011). For example, Scho¨n (1988) suggests that design problems are often “ill-defined”,
in that “in a design project it is often not at all clear what ‘the problem’ is”; hence,
in order to solve those problems, “the designer must frame a problematic design sit-
uation”, in which “the goal is set at a high level with clear objectives”. Cross (2011)
continues to stress the importance of the design concept formulating stage: “a clear
concept of how to reach this goal is devised, ... and the solution details then cascade
from the concept”. In this stage, “designers select features of the problem space to
which they choose to attend, and identify areas of the solution space in which they
choose to explore” (Cross, 2001). The model to be presented in the next section reflects
all these important stages of the design process, and captures how information in the
problem specification influence designers’ decisions in each of these stages.
2.3 Theoretical Model
In this section, we construct a theoretical model that characterizes seekers’ and de-
signers’ decisions in a crowdsourcing design contest. Consider a situation where a
seeker (“he”) wishes to source solutions to a design problem from a group of designers
through a crowdsourcing contest. The seeker has some conceptual objectives in mind
(e.g., the design should convey reliability and helpfulness); each conceptual objective
included in a design gives an equal, incremental quality w. (In Online Appendix EC.7.2
we consider an alternative model in which the conceptual objectives have diminishing
weights.) Apart from the conceptual objectives, the seeker can also provide execution
guidelines (e.g. what color or shape is/is not desired, etc.). Unlike conceptual objec-
tives which the designer has to interpret, execution guidelines are more straightforward
— e.g., “don’t use the color red”. (See Online Appendix EC.1 for several examples of
conceptual objectives and execution guidelines in our data.) The sets of all the con-
ceptual objectives and execution guidelines the seeker has in mind are denoted as Sr
and Sg respectively, with the size of the two sets being |Sr| := Sr and |Sg| := Sg. Given
Sr and Sg, the seeker decides which conceptual objectives and execution guidelines to
disclose in his problem specification. (Note that we do not study how seekers come up
with Sr and Sg in the first place.) The sequence of events in this contest is as follows:
8
• The seeker posts his design request, in which he announces the award amount
(A) for the contest winner (we consider “single-winner” contests as those are
the most common type of contests in our empirical setting), and specifies his
design problem. In this problem specification, the seeker can specify some or
all of his conceptual objectives and execution guidelines. The sets of disclosed
conceptual objectives and execution guidelines are denoted as Sr (⊆ Sr) and Sg
(⊆ Sg) respectively, with the sizes of the two sets being Sr (≤ Sr) and Sg (≤ Sg).
• Given the design request, designers (“she”) first decide whether to enter the
contest or not, based on their assessment of the expected net payoff they will
receive if they join the contest. Those who decide to enter the contest then go
through a design process (to be explained in Section 2.3.1) to develop their design
submissions, and submit them to the seeker.
• Finally, the seeker evaluates all the submitted designs, claims the best-quality
design among those submissions, and gives the award to the designer of the
winning design.
As is common in the crowdsourcing literature (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Erat and
Krishnan, 2012; Ko¨rpeog˘lu et al., 2017), we model designers simultaneously making
participation and other design decisions. Below we present a mathematical model
reflecting a typical design process, drawing on the design research literature. Using
this model, we analyze designers’ behavior in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Designers’ Three-Stage Design Process
In the design literature, design processes are often considered to consist of several cog-
nitive steps, which can be broadly classified into three stages: design problem framing,
design concept formulating and design trial generating (van den Kroonenberg, 1986;
Cross, 2001, 2011). To mathematically represent these three distinct stages, we for-
mulate a stylized model, with simple functional forms, that tractably captures the key
features of our setting; simplification by assuming functional forms, to ensure tractabil-
ity, is an approach widely used in previous theoretical research on crowdsourcing or
open innovation contests (Ales et al., 2017b; Korpeoglu et al., 2017; Mihm and Schlapp,
2018). Next we provide modeling details for each of the three stages in the design pro-
cess.
Design Stage (I) — Framing the Design Problem. Design problems are nearly
always “not all clear” and “may have been only loosely defined by the client (seeker)”
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(Cross (2001) p.81). Hence, a key aspect of the design process lies in digesting and
understanding the conceptual objectives (Sr) in seekers’ problem specifications. This
stage is referred to as the design problem framing stage.
Framing the design problem is effort-consuming (Cross, 2001). In reality, concep-
tual objectives in a problem statement are often embedded in sentences or paragraphs,
as seekers endeavor to communicate what they are looking for in a design. Design-
ers need to exert efforts to understand the problem statement text and extract and
comprehend the conceptual objectives conveyed. In general, the more conceptual ob-
jectives (Sr) are embedded in the problem specification, the higher effort cost a solver
has to incur in the design problem framing stage. We model this cost as c1Sr. On
the other hand, when problem specifications contain too little information about the
seeker’s conceptual objectives, solvers need to incur a different form of problem fram-
ing cost – they may need to “guess” at the seeker’s possible conceptual objectives. We
assume that, to guess each conceptual objective, the solver incurs a cost cg, and this
unit cost of “guessing” possible objectives is higher than the cost of “understanding”
disclosed objective (cg > c1). We also assume that the marginal quality improvement
by incorporating a “guessed” conceptual objective is not as high as a disclosed one,
represented by νw where ν ∈ (0, 1). Note that we assume the problem framing cost
changes only with conceptual objectives but not with execution guidelines in problem
specifications, as execution guidelines are mostly objective instructions in standard-
ized design terms, and are therefore more straightforward for designers to understand.
(Empirical evidence for this assumption is provided in Online Appendix EC.5.)
Design Stage (II) — Formulating the Design Concept. After framing the prob-
lem, participating designers “select features of the problem space to which they choose
to attend”, and then “identify areas in the solution space where they choose to ex-
plore” (Cross, 2001). We form a mathematical model for these two steps: (1) designer
i chooses Dr,i to incorporate into her design(s), with the number of incorporated ob-
jectives being ri := |Dr,i|; (2) designer i searches for a design concept satisfying all
conceptual objectives in Dr,i.
We model the cost associated with step (2) as follows. Consider a potential de-
sign concept to be a “sample” (random draw). The probability that a sampled design
concept satisfies any particular conceptual objective is p ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming the objec-
tives are independent (we consider an extension capturing the level of overlap across
objectives in Online Appendix EC.7.1), the probability of a sampled design concept
being “successful”, i.e., satisfying all ri targeted objectives, is p
ri . Hence, in expec-
tation, designer i has to attempt (1
p
)ri design concepts until she finds a “successful”
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one. If the cost associated with each attempt is c2, the expected cost of the design
concept formulating stage is c2(
1
p
)ri . Note that this cost increases exponentially with
the number of objectives designer i incorporates (ri), which captures the fact that it
gets increasingly more challenging to find a design concept that simultaneously satisfies
more objectives.
Design Stage (III) — Generating Design Trials. In the final stage, based on
the design concept identified in Stage II, designers generate design trials, which are
submitted to the seeker. (Hereafter, we use submissions, solutions, and trials inter-
changeably.) We assume designers incur a cost of c3 to come up with a design trial —
in this stage, designers need to figure out the execution details, such as shape, color,
font, etc., which is effort-consuming. If the seeker provides execution guidelines, (i.e.,
recommends designers what fonts, colors, shapes, etc. to use), it will save designers’
time and effort in determining such details. Hence, we expect the cost of each design
trial (c3) decreases with more execution guidelines (Sg). Correspondingly, in our model,
we assume c3 = h(Sg), where h(·) is a decreasing function. (We provide empirical evi-
dence for this assumption in Section 2.5.) Given c3, designer i who decides to generate
mi design trials incurs a cost of c3mi in the design trial generating stage.
For focal designer i, the quality of each trial τ (= 1, 2, ...,mi), denoted as Viτ , is
assumed to be the baseline value of designer i’s design concept (vi), plus a quality
random shock (iτ ) (i.e., Viτ = vi + iτ ). The baseline quality of designer i’s design
concept (vi) is the sum of weights associated with all its satisfied conceptual objec-
tives. The uncertainty captured by iτ may come from seeker taste uncertainty (the
perceived quality is often subject to the taste of the seeker) and trial quality shock
(the uncertainty associated with the execution of the design concept). Like Terwiesch
and Xu (2008), we model trial shocks, iτ ’s, as Gumbel distributed with mean zero and
scale parameter µ, i.i.d across design trials.
2.3.2 Designers’ Problem
Combining the three design stages discussed above, when participating designer i in-
corporates ri conceptual objectives and generates mi design trials, her overall expected
cost is:
Ci(ri,mi) = cg · (ri − Sr)+ + c1 · Sr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Design Stage (I)
+ c2 · (1/p)ri︸ ︷︷ ︸
Design Stage (II)
+ c3 ·mi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Design Stage (III)
, where c3 = h(Sg);
(2.1)
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and the quality of designer i’s best design is:
Vi(ri,mi) = max
τ=1,...,mi
Viτ =
{
riw + max
τ=1,...,mi
iτ , ri ≤ Sr (without guessing);
Srw + (ri − Sr) νw + max
τ=1,...,mi
iτ , ri > Sr (with guessing).
(2.2)
We are modeling a single-winner contest; therefore, if a designer submits multiple
designs, only her highest-quality design matters. Note that because guessing is costly,
designer i would only guess the minimum number of concepts needed to reach ri, i.e.,
(ri−Sr)+. Note that we do not explicitly consider designers’ choices on the amount of
execution guidance to follow, because this decision is trivial: designers would always
follow all the execution guidance to lower their design trial generation cost. This is
captured by setting c3 = h(Sg).
We now analyze designers’ entry decision, design concept formation and trial effort
provision in a crowdsourcing contest. Consider a focal designer i facing a contest with
award A, Sr conceptual objectives, and Sg execution guidelines. Let j = 1, ..., N( 6= i)
index the other designers who would be i’s opponents participating in the contest, where
rj is the number of conceptual objectives j will incorporate and mj is the number of
design trials j will generate. Focal designer i makes the following decisions: whether
to join the contest or not (i.e., a binary entry decision, denoted by di), how many
conceptual objectives to incorporate in the design concept formulating stage (i.e., a
concept formation decision, denoted by ri), how many trials to generate in the design
trial generating stage (i.e., a trial effort decision, denoted by mi). Designer i makes
those decisions to maximize her expected utility (her expected compensation minus
her expect costs):
max
di,ri,mi
Ui(di, ri,mi) = Idi=1 · [Pr(i wins) · A− Ci(ri,mi)] + Idi=0 · s,
where Pr(i wins) = Pr(Vi > Vj|j=1,...,N(6=i)) = Pr(Vi(ri,mi) > max{Vj|j=1,...,N(6=i)(rj,mj)}).
(2.3)
If designer i decides not to join (di = 0), she earns utility s from choosing her outside
option. (In other words, we consider s to be the opportunity cost of joining a contest.)
If designer i’s best design provides the highest value to the seeker (i.e. Vi > Vj,∀j 6= i),
she wins the contest and receives the award A; otherwise, she does not receive anything.
2.3.3 Designers’ Equilibrium Behavior
Utilizing Equation (2.3), we solve for designers’ equilibrium behavior. As is common
in the crowdsourcing literature (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Erat and Krishnan, 2012;
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Ko¨rpeog˘lu et al., 2017; Ales et al., 2017b), we focus on symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium throughout the paper. In our analysis, we assume that the number of
potential participants is sufficiently large that participants will enter the contest as
long as it is profitable to do so. That is, the size of a contest is never limited by a lack
of potential participants. (This assumption is natural in crowdsourcing contests — for
example, in our dataset, on any given day, the average number of active designers (i.e.,
potential participants) on the platform is around 300, while the average number of
participants in a contest is around 26; see Table 2.1.) Theorem 2.3.1 characterizes the
equilibrium number of participants (N∗) in a crowdsourcing contest, the equilibrium
number of objectives each participating designer incorporates (r∗), and the equilibrium
number of design trials each participating designer generates (m∗). See Appendix A.1
for the proof. For simplicity, in our analysis we allow N∗, r∗, and m∗ to be non-integer
numbers; and to avoid trivial solutions, we confine our attention to problem parameters
for which can assume N∗ > 1, m∗ > 0, seekers wish to disclose at least some conceptual
objectives (i.e., w is not trivially small), and the seeker is able to induce designers to
incorporate all disclosed conceptual objectives by disclosing sufficiently few conceptual
objectives in the problem statement (i.e., r∗ ≥ Sr if Sr is sufficiently small).
Theorem 2.3.1 In a crowdsourcing contest, where the equilibrium number of par-
ticipating designers equals N∗, the unique symmetric equilibrium for r∗ and m∗
are as follows. The equilibrium number of objectives a designer incorporates is
r∗ =
{
rg if Sr<rg
Sr if rg≤Sr≤r
r if Sr>r
, where rg =
ln(N
∗−1
(N∗)2
νw
µ
A
c2
1
ln(1/p)
− cg
c2
1
ln(1/p)
)
ln(1/p)
and r =
ln(N
∗−1
(N∗)2
w
µ
A
c2
1
ln(1/p)
)
ln(1/p)
;
and the equilibrium number of design trials each designer generates is m∗ =
A(N∗−1)
(N∗)2c3
, where c3 = h(Sg).
The equilibrium number of participating designers (N∗) first increases (when Sr <
rg) and then decreases (when Sr ≥ rg) with more disclosed conceptual objectives Sr;
but N∗ does not change with the amount of execution guidance Sg. (The exact formula
for N∗ is provided in Appendix A.1.)
Theorem 2.3.1 reveals that when there are very few conceptual objectives disclosed
(Sr < r
g), designers find it optimal to guess and incorporate additional conceptual
objectives beyond those that have been disclosed, i.e., r∗ = rg (> Sr). As more
conceptual objectives are disclosed (r ≤ Sr ≤ rg), designers are going to incorporate all
and only the disclosed conceptual objectives, i.e., r∗ = Sr. As the number of disclosed
conceptual objectives further increases (Sr > r), designers are no longer willing to
incorporate all the disclosed objectives; they only incorporate a subset of the disclosed
objectives, i.e., r∗ = r (< Sr).
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Designers’ equilibrium trial effort (m∗) increases with more execution guidance
(larger Sg), because (per Section 2.3.1) this lowers the designers’ cost of generating
each design trial (c3). Since designers tailor their equilibrium number of design trials
(m∗) to the size of c3 (or associated Sg), the size of c3 (Sg) ends up not affecting the
designers’ entry decision.
Theorem 2.3.1 also characterizes the equilibrium number of participants. When
there are few conceptual objectives disclosed (Sr < r
g), designers are willing to “guess”
and incorporate undisclosed objectives. In this case where designers are “guessing”,
as Sr increases, more designers will join a contest. The reason is that “guessing” is
relatively more effort-consuming than “comprehending” (cg > c1), and more disclosed
conceptual objectives save designers from guessing some conceptual objectives. How-
ever, when there are enough conceptual objectives disclosed (Sr ≥ rg), designers no
longer “guess” but instead just incorporate all or some the disclosed conceptual objec-
tives. In these cases, the relationship between Sr and N
∗ reverses – fewer designers will
join a contest as the seeker discloses even more conceptual objectives. The intuition is
as follows. With more disclosed conceptual objectives, designers have to spend more
time comprehending them, and more effort searching for design concepts that satisfy
those objectives simultaneously, which leads to a higher participation cost (i.e., the
total cost a designer incurs throughout the three stages of the design process). This
is true even in cases where designers choose to only select a subset of the disclosed
objectives to incorporate (i.e., the number of disclosed objectives Sr is larger than the
number of objectives designers are willing to incorporate r¯), because although design-
ers’ design concept formation cost does not increase when Sr exceeds r¯, they would still
need to spend more time understanding and digesting all disclosed objectives to frame
the design problem at the beginning of the design process. Thus, the participation cost
always increases when more conceptual objectives are disclosed, which leads to a lower
equilibrium expected profit under the same level of competition, and correspondingly
a smaller number of participants in equilibrium.
2.3.4 Seeker’s Problem
In this section we analyze how seekers should provide information in their problem
specification to maximize their “profit” in crowdsourcing design contests. A seeker’s
profit (Πs) is defined as the expected highest quality among all the designs submitted
to his contest, i.e., Πs = E maxi V ∗i , where V ∗i is the equilibrium quality of designer i’s
best design, and the expectation is taken over the vector of all participating designers’
design trials’ quality shocks . (For simplicity, the “profit” ignores the cost of the
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award A, as we are focusing on how the seeker optimizes the problem specification
given an award size A.) The seeker maximizes Πs by choosing the number of conceptual
objectives to disclose (Sr) and the amount of execution guidance to provide (Sg). We
define the seeker’s problem as:
max
Sr≤Sr,Sg≤Sg
Πs(Sr, Sg) = max
Sr≤Sr,Sg≤Sg
[
E max
i=1...N∗
V ∗i (r
∗,m∗)
]
, (2.4)
where N∗ is the equilibrium number of participating designers, and r∗ and m∗ are the
equilibrium design concept formation and trial generation strategies of participating
designers. Problem (2.4) is a joint problem in both Sr and Sg. From Theorem 2.3.1,
we know the impacts from Sr and Sg can be separated: N
∗ and r∗ are only affected by
Sr but not by Sg; and given N
∗, m∗ is only affected by Sg but not by Sr. So, we can
rewrite Problem (2.4) as the following problem separable in Sr and Sg (see Appendix
A.2 for the proof):
Lemma 2.3.1 xxx
max
Sr≤Sr,Sg≤Sg
Πs(Sr, Sg) = max
Sr≤Sr
[
w · r∗(Sr) + µ lnAN∗(Sr)−1)N∗(Sr)
]
+ max
Sg≤Sg
[−µ ln(h(Sg))] .
(2.5)
With the seeker’s decisions on Sr and Sg being separable (Problem (2.5)), we next
discuss how the seeker should set Sr and Sg separately.
Seeker’s Decision on Number of Conceptual Objectives to Disclose. We first
consider the problem associated with the seeker’s optimal choice of Sr, the number of
conceptual objectives to disclose in the problem specification. The seeker’s objective
is to choose a Sr that maximizes the expected best design quality under any fixed Sg,
i.e., maxSr≤Sr Πs(Sr;Sg).
Proposition 2.3.1 Πs(Sr;Sg) decreases in Sr once Sr becomes sufficiently large, and
thus for sufficiently large S¯r, we have S
∗
r < S¯r. Proof is provided in Appendix A.3.
The seeker’s profit Πs is first increasing and eventually decreasing with Sr. The intu-
ition is as follows. Disclosing more conceptual objectives has two countervailing effects.
On the one hand, with more conceptual objectives being disclosed, designers are aware
of and thus can incorporate more objectives, which leads to a higher expected quality
of each design generated, positively affecting the best design quality Πs(Sr). We call
this effect the “quality effect”. On the other hand, with more disclosed objectives, the
designers’ participation cost increases (higher costs in the design problem framing and
design concept formulating stages), leading to fewer designers participating in the con-
test. We call this the “competition effect”. This competition effect negatively affects
the best design quality Πs(Sr), because Πs(Sr) is an extreme value of qualities of all
design submissions, which will decrease if there are fewer participating designers.
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As the seeker discloses more and more conceptual objectives (a larger Sr), the neg-
ative competition effect increases and eventually dominates the quality effect, because
with only a handful of designers in the contest, a small decrease in the number of
participating designers would have a severe impact on the extreme value Πs(Sr). As a
result, Πs(Sr) will decrease when the seeker discloses too many conceptual objectives.
Therefore, the seeker should not always disclose all the conceptual objectives he cares
about. For reasonable parameter ranges, simulation results suggest that the optimal
S∗r is relatively small (from 2 to 5); see Appendix A.3.
Seeker’s Decision on Number of Execution Guidelines to Provide. Next,
we consider the seeker’s problem of choosing a Sg that maximizes the expected best
design quality under any fixed Sr, i.e., maxSg≤Sg Πs(Sg;Sr). This problem is trivial,
since providing more execution guidelines (Sg) always increases best design quality.
Intuitively, as the seeker provides more execution guidelines (a larger Sg), it is easier
for designers to come up with design trials (a lower trial cost c3), because the execution
guidelines give directions for different aspects of design execution (such as color, shape,
etc.), which designers otherwise need to spend effort figuring out and deciding on.
Hence, with the lowered cost to generate each design trial, designers will come up
with more trials (a larger m∗), which then in turn leads to a higher extreme value in
submission quality (a higher Πs). Therefore, the seeker should disclose all his execution
guidelines (i.e., S∗g = Sg).
2.3.5 Summary of Key Takeaways and Model Extensions
Takeaway 1: The number of participating designers first increases and then decreases
with the number of conceptual objectives disclosed in the problem specification; it does
not change with the amount of execution guidance in the problem specification.
Takeaway 2: Given the equilibrium number of participating designers, more execution
guidance leads to a higher level of designer trial effort provision from each participating
designer. However, more conceptual objectives will not affect designers’ trial effort
provision.
Takeaway 3: The seeker should disclose as much execution guidance as possible, but
only a moderate number of conceptual objectives.
We keep our main model parsimonious and focus on capturing a complete picture
of designers’ design process. The results from this parsimonious model are robust to
alternative modeling assumptions and are supported by empirical data. We formally
derive theoretical results for two extensions, which we have alluded to in Section 2.3.1.
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(Details are in Online Appendix EC.7.) First, we consider overlaps among concep-
tual objectives (e.g., “friendly” and “welcoming” overlap more than “friendly” and
“professional” do). Second, we allow for diminishing weight/importance among con-
ceptual objectives (i.e., objectives are sorted in descending order in importance). In
both extensions, the qualitative findings, i.e., Takeaways 1, 2 and 3, remain intact.
2.4 Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical predictions (summarized in Section 2.3.5), we develop testable
hypotheses.
• Hypothesis 1a: When the number of disclosed conceptual objectives (Sr) is very
small, the number of participants (N∗) increases with Sr.
• Hypothesis 1b: When the number of disclosed conceptual objectives (Sr) is
moderate or large, the number of participants (N∗) decreases with the number of
conceptual objectives (Sr) specified in the problem specification.
• Hypothesis 1c: The number of participants (N∗) does not change with the
amount of execution guidance (Sg) provided in the problem specification.
• Hypothesis 2a: Given the number of participants (N∗), more execution guid-
ance (Sg) leads to more trial effort provision (m
∗) from each participating de-
signer.
• Hypothesis 2b: Given the number of participants (N∗), the number of concep-
tual objectives (Sr) does not affect the trial effort provision from each participating
designer (m∗).
We also wish to develop hypotheses related to our theoretical results on the rela-
tionship between problem specification and seeker profit – i.e., the best design quality.
Yet, design quality is difficult to measure empirically for the following reasons. First,
in design contests, the notion of quality is subjective – it is based on the matching
between designers’ submissions and seekers’ private taste. Second, the quality of each
design is not directly observable in our empirical setting. As we will explain in Sec-
tion 2.5.5, seekers signal design quality using star ratings (on a scale of 1 to 5 star),
however one still cannot perfectly infer the best design quality because (1) the ratings
are truncated at 5-star, and quality differences among 5-star designs are not observed;
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(2) the ratings are not completely comparable across different contests, because some
seekers might be more strict in giving high ratings than others.
To proceed, we formulate hypotheses in terms of the number of submissions rated
as 5-star by the seeker (instead of seekers’ profit). Ignoring the in-comparability issue
of ratings across contests mentioned above, a contest that receives more 5-star designs
is likely to have a higher best design quality. Though not conclusive, testing this
set of hypotheses can provide data evidence on our theoretical results for the seeker’s
problem.
• Hypothesis 3a: The number of designs rated as 5-star eventually decreases with
the number of conceptual objectives (Sr).
• Hypothesis 3b: The number of designs rated as 5-star increases with the amount
of execution guidance (Sg).
2.5 Empirical Analyses
2.5.1 Empirical Context and Data Description
The dataset we use for the empirical analysis is collected from a major online plat-
form for crowdsourcing creative services in various areas, such as custom logo design,
Web design, and writing services. We focus on logo design contests because it is a
representative form of open-ended creative contests; it is also the largest category on
the platform both in terms of the number of completed contests and the number of
designers participating in the category.
A typical logo design contest on this platform proceeds as follows. First, a seeker
in need of a design posts a design request, where he specifies the design problem by
answering five questions:
• Q1: What is the exact name you would like in your logo?
• Q2: What is your industry?
• Q3: What are the top 3 things you would like to communicate through your
logo?
• Q4: What logo styles do you like (image + text, image only, text only, etc.)?
• Q5: Do you have any other info or links you want to share?
18
The seeker also announces the award structure (e.g., the number of winners, and the
award(s) for the winner(s)). Based on the seeker specified information, designers on
the platform can join the contest and submit design(s). Finally, the seeker picks his
favorite submission(s) and gives the pre-announced award to its (their) author(s). Note
that, although the platform asks the seeker to list the “top 3 things” (in Q3), there is
no hard limit on seekers’ answers to this question. As can be seen from the illustrative
example in Figure 3.1a on page 40 (and the additional examples in Online Appendix
EC.1), some seekers specify more than “3 things” in their problem specification. The
summary statistics to be shown in Table 2.1 reveal substantial variation in the length
of seekers’ answers to Q3 across different contests.
The main advantages of our data include the fact that (i) different types of infor-
mation, namely, conceptual objectives (Q3) and execution guidelines (Q4 and Q5) are
already separated by questions in a problem specification (the categorization is self-
explanatory with how the questions are raised); (ii) the number of submissions made
by each designer is available, which allows us to quantify the designers’ trial efforts
(often-unobserved in other contexts); (iii) the exact problem specification (textual in-
formation) provided in each contest is available, from which we can extract conceptual
objectives and execution guidelines using either manual coding or natural language
processing.
We collect data of “public-gallery” logo-design contests on this crowdsourcing plat-
form from March, 2012 to November, 2014. For each contest, we record the seeker’s
problem specification and participating designers’ submission activities. To facilitate
the empirical analysis, we focus on 7-day contests where the design seekers promise
to award $200 to one and only one final winner. This is because it has been docu-
mented that the contest length and award structure can affect designers’ behavior and
contest outcomes; since the objective of this study is to examine the effect of problem
specification and to find the optimal way to specify a design problem, we purposefully
minimize the heterogeneity among the contests in these other dimensions. The con-
tests included in our sample are representative contests on the platform — 97% of the
contests held on the platform have a single award, 61% are “assured”, $200 is the most
common award level, and 7-day is the most common length among all contests. The
final working sample consists of 441 contests and 11,757 contest-designer combinations.
In the main empirical analyses, the measures for the amounts of different types of
information provided in the problem specification are constructed using textual analysis
and manual coding. Specifically, we use textual analysis to count the keywords related
to each aspect of execution guidance (e.g., colors, fonts, usages, shapes, and styles)
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in the problem specification. For example, we count words such as “green”, “round”,
“shining”, etc., and use the total number of such keywords (No.GuideWords)q as
the measure for the amount of execution guidance. However, it is challenging to
apply this approach (textual analysis based on keywords) to extract conceptual ob-
jectives, because conceptual objectives are much less structured and involve a wide
range of concepts, which are often embedded in sentences and sometimes implicitly
mentioned. Hence, we hire 3 coders with design backgrounds, and ask each of them to
independently read the problem specifications in our dataset and manually list down
the conceptual objectives mentioned in the problem specification for each contest. (The
complete coding instructions and resulting data are available upon request.) By then
averaging the number of conceptual objectives identified across coders, we arrive at
our measure for the number of conceptual objectives ((No.Concepts)q) for each prob-
lem specification. The average inter-rater reliability (assessed using Weighted Kappa)
is 0.91, which is considered very good, indicating strong agreement among different
coders’ assessments (Cohen, 1968). To make sure that our empirical results are robust
and are not significantly affected by potential human or machine coding errors, we use
the word-count of the seeker’s answer(s) to Q3 (Q4 and Q5) as an alternative measure
for the amount of conceptual objectives (execution guidance), and then as a robustness
check we test our hypotheses using use these alternate measures (see Section 2.5.3 for
details). Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of these contest-level characteristics.
Table 2.1 also reports summary statistics for variables characterizing the fol-
lowing: designers’ behavior, including their entry (No.Designers) and effort
(Avg.SubPerDesigner) decisions in each contest, the outcome of each contest, includ-
ing the numbers of 5-star submissions and design styles ((No. 5-Star Submission)q
and (No. 5-Star DesignStyle)q) (these two variables are explained in Section 2.5.5),
and the percentage of submissions rated by the seeker ((Rated Ratio)q). We observe
considerable variation in these variables across different contests. Our empirical anal-
ysis explores the relationship between characteristics of problem specifications and
outcomes of the contest (including designers’ participation and seekers’ profit).
2.5.2 Empirical Evidence for Designer Behavior (Hypotheses
1-2)
We estimate Equation (??) (where q indexes contests) to test Hypotheses 1a-1b, which
examines the effect of number of conceptual objective (measured by (No.Concepts)q)
on the number of participants ((No.Designers)q) in contests with few vs. many concep-
tual objectives. To do that, we use 3 as the cutoff (i.e., IShortCcptq = I{(No.Concepts)q ≤
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Min Pcl(25) Med Pcl(75) Max
(No.Concepts)q 5.741 3.850 1 3 4 7 30
Concept Similarity 0.179 0.075 0.000 0.136 0.172 0.210 0.510
(lenQ3/No. Concept)q 3.507 3.648 0.625 1.250 2.000 4.000 28.909
(No.GuideWords)q 6.515 4.494 0 3 6 9 26
Length. Q 3 25.376 34.564 2 5 11 33 317
Length. Q 4 20.701 31.604 2 4 9 27 442
Length. Q 5 44.723 48.080 2 12 30 64 346
Avg. Sub Per Designer 3.512 1.138 1.600 2.727 3.294 3.963 9.429
No.Designers 26.533 10.485 7 19 26 33 57
No. Submissions 71.998 36.624 14 48 65 88 385
(Rated Ratio)q 0.544 0.313 0 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.0
(No. 5-Star Submission)q 3.358 6.151 0 0 1 4 57
(No. 5-Star DesignStyle)q 2.450 3.550 0 0 1 3 33
3}), and separately measure the impact from (No.Concepts)q when it is no more than
3 or above 3 concept keywords. (We tried alternative cutoffs and the qualitative results
remain unchanged.) (2.6)
In the regression, we control for the degree of overlap among the manually coded
conceptual objectives. (We compute the semantic similarity of coded objectives based
on Wordnet, and use the average pairwise similarity (Concept Similarity; on a scale of
1-100) to account for the level of overlap among conceptual objectives.) Additionally,
we control for the ratio (lenQ3/No. Concept)q, a proxy for the seeker’s (lack of) con-
ciseness, as well as the number of times the seeker updates the problem specification
((No.Updates)q) during contest q. We include the industry fixed effect (i.e., the seeker’s
answer to Q2) to control for the possibility that different industries might have differ-
ent levels of attractiveness to designers (seekers categorize themselves using 16 industry
categories, including advertising and marketing, consulting and professional services,
education and universities, etc.); we also include year dummies, day-of-week dummies
and month fixed effects to control for possible seasonality effects or contemporaneous
unobservables.
The estimation results for Equation (??) are presented in Column (1) of Table
2.2: the coefficient of (No.Concepts)q is significantly negative, and the coefficient
of the interaction term (No.Concepts)q ∗ IShortCcptq is not significant, indicating that
(No.Designers)q decreases with more disclosed conceptual objectives, in both con-
tests with short and contests with long lists of disclosed conceptual objectives, and the
speed of decrease is similar in contests with few and many disclosed objectives. These
findings do not support Hypothesis 1a. This indicates a lack of empirical evidence
that designers “guess” and incorporate undisclosed objectives in our empirical setting,
which makes sense for the following reasons: (1) in open-ended design problems, de-
signers might be less motivated to “guess”: it could be that “guessing” a subjective
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design concepts can be relatively difficult (cg is large), and the “guessed” objectives
might not substantially improve design quality (ν is small); (2) the contests we focus
on have “guaranteed” awards – the seeker must award a winner, regardless of design
qualities, so only the designers’ relative performance matters; (3) since in our empirical
setting there are very few contests with a very small number of conceptual objectives,
we might not be able to observe the “guessing” region where Sr < r¯
g. (Note that that
these reasons are mutually consistent; e.g., a large cg implies a small r¯
g.)
We now discuss Hypothesis 1b. In the paragraph above we learned that
(No.Designers)q decreases with more disclosed conceptual objectives; this supports
Hypothesis 1b. Moreover, we learned that dividing the data into contests with short
and long lists of disclosed conceptual objectives made no difference as far as this effect
is concerned; therefore, as an additional test we remove the “short conceptual list”
variables (IShortCcptq and (No.Concepts)q ∗ IShortCcptq ) — thereby pooling contests with
few and many conceptual objectives together — and re-run the regression in Equation
(2.7). The updated estimation results are reported in Column (3) of Table 2.2, where
we once again see that (No.Designers)q is significantly negatively associated with the
measure of the number of conceptual objectives (No.Concepts)q. This again supports
Hypothesis 1b, and with a higher statistical significance due to the pooled data.
(No.Designers)q = β0 +
Effect of Conceptual objectives︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1(No.Concepts)q + β2Concept Similarity+
Effect of Execution Guidance︷ ︸︸ ︷
β3(No.GuideWords)q
+α1(No.Updates)q + α2(lenQ3/No. Concept)q + ωIndustry + φWeek Day + δMonth + µY ear.
(2.7)
It is also worth noting that (No.Designers)q is significantly positively associated
with Concept Similarity, which supports an additional theoretical result from the
extension (see Online Appendix EC.7.1) accounting for the overlap across conceptual
objectives — the number of participating designers increases with the overlap across
conceptual objectives, everything else equal.
Turning to Hypothesis 1c, Table 2.2’s Columns (1) and (3) reveal that the number
of participating designers in a contest ((No.Designers)q) is not significantly associated
with the amount of execution guidance (No.GuideWords)q. Thus we also find support
for Hypothesis 1c.
Next, we use Equation (2.8) to empirically test Hypotheses 2a-b. Designer i’s trial
effort in contest q is proxied by the number of submissions made by designer i to
contest q ((No.Submissions)i,q). (In Section 2.5.3, we consider alternative measures
of designers’ trial efforts.) We regress (No.Submissions)i,q on the amounts of different
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types of information in the problem specification (measured by (No.Concepts)q and
(No.GuideWords)q) in contest q. We control for No.Designersq, (No.Updates)q, and
include industry dummies, day-of-week dummies, month dummies, year dummies and
designer-specific dummies.
(No.Submissions)i,q = ρ0 +
Effect of Conceptual objectives︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ1(No.Concepts)q + ρ2Concept Similar+
Effect of Execution Guidance︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ3(No.GuideWords)q
+ζ1(No.Updates)q + ζ2(No.Designers)q + υIndustry + χDesigner + ηWeek Day + ιMonth + ψY ear.
(2.8)
The estimation results for Equation (2.8) are presented in Column (5) of Table
2.2. These results show that (No.Submissions)i,q is significantly positively correlated
with the amount of seeker execution guidance ((No.GuideWords)q). This supports
Hypothesis 2a — more seeker execution guidance leads to more submissions per de-
signer. Moreover, (No.Submissions)i,q is not significantly associated with the number
of conceptual objectives ((No.Concepts)q), supporting Hypothesis 2b.
Table 2.2: Regression Results of Equations (4) (5) (6) (Including Alternative
Measures)
Dependent Variable: (No.Designers)q (No. Submission)i,q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conceptual Objectives
(No.Concepts)q −0.357∗ (0.143) −0.578∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.013 (0.010)
Concept Similarity 0.154∗ (0.069) 0.198∗∗ (0.064) 0.002 (0.005)
log(lenQ3 + 1)q −2.281∗∗ (0.695) −1.833∗∗∗ (0.499) 0.082 (0.049)
Very Short Objectives
(No.Concepts)q ∗ IShortCcptq −2.077 (2.236)
log(lenQ3 + 1)q ∗ IShortCcptq −6.079 (8.641)
IShortCcptq 9.587 (6.522) 8.677 (14.560)
Execution Guidance
(No.GuideWords)q −0.015 (0.104) −0.035 (0.105) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.008)
log(lenQ4 + 1)q −0.365 (0.512) −0.369 (0.512) 0.113∗∗ (0.039)
log(lenQ5 + 1)q −0.212 (0.426) −0.198 (0.425) 0.191∗∗∗ (0.032)
Control Variables
(No.Designers)q −0.009∗ (0.004) −0.008∗ (0.004)
(lenQ3/No.Concept)q −0.008 (0.133) 0.004 (0.131)
(No.Updatesq) 0.014 (0.428) −0.156 (0.439) 0.011 (0.432) −0.163 (0.438) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.194∗∗∗ (0.034)
Day-of-Week Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Creator Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 441 441 441 441 11,757 11,757
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.271 (0.196) 0.220 (0.142) 0.253 (0.180) 0.217 (0.143) 0.479 (0.304) 0.480 (0.304)
Residual Std. Error 9.403 (df = 399) 9.711 (df = 400) 9.494 (df = 401) 9.706 (df = 402) 3.318 (df = 8796) 3.316 (df = 8796)
F Statistic 3.610∗∗∗ 2.822∗∗∗ 3.476∗∗∗ 2.932∗∗∗ 2.732∗∗∗ 2.738∗∗∗
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: (1) The qualitative results in this table remain unchanged with the inclusion of additional controls (including a dummy indicating
whether a seeker describes himself in the problem specification as “open-minded” or not (I(OpenMind)q), as well as the
likelihood of the seeker giving out ratings to submissions she receives (%Ratedq)) or negative binomial count specifications.
(2) F-tests suggest that variables characterizing the problem specifications are important in explaining the contest outcomes
(i.e., (No.Designers)q and (No.Submissions)i,q).
(3) We conducted power analyses to ensure our tests have adequate statistical power to detect any significant variables. For the
models represented in Columns (1)-(4) (in Columns (5)-(6)), our sample of 441 contests (11757 contest-designer combinations)
can achieve a power that is above 0.95.
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2.5.3 Robustness Checks (Hypotheses 1-2)
We perform a number of robustness checks to ensure the robustness of our empirical
results for Hypotheses 1-2 with respect to the choices of measure, sample and model
specification.
Alternative Measures for Conceptual Objectives and Execution Guidance:
In our main empirical analyses, we use manual- and machine-coded keywords to mea-
sure the number of conceptual objectives and the amount of execution guidance in
seekers’ problem specifications. One may worry that there may be human and ma-
chine errors in the coding process, which can potentially affect the estimation results.
To ensure our empirical results are robust to the measures of the main independent
variables used, we consider an alternative measure, word-count, that does not suffer
human or machine coding errors. In particular, we use the logarithm of length of the
Q3 answer (log(lenQ3 + 1)q) to proxy for the number of conceptual objectives, and the
logarithm of length of the Q4 and Q5 answers (log(lenQ4 + 1)q and log(lenQ5 + 1)q)
to proxy for the amount of execution guidance. (Note that the log-transformation is
applied to reduce the skewness of the distribution of the word count of seekers’ answers
to Q3/4/5 observed in the data, since some seekers are much more verbose in describ-
ing their conceptual objectives than others.) We then replace the original measure of
conceptual objectives ((No.Concepts)q) with log(lenQ3 + 1)q, and the original measure
of execution guidance ((No.GuideWords)q) with log(lenQ4 + 1)q and log(lenQ5 + 1)q.
With these alternative measures, we re-estimate Equations (??)(2.7)(2.8) (the estima-
tion results are reported in Columns (2)(4)(6) in Table 2.2, respectively), and find that
all qualitative results remain unchanged.
Alternative Measures for Designer Trial Efforts: In this set of robustness
checks, we construct two additional measures for a designer’s trial effort in Equa-
tion (2.8): the number of distinct design styles submitted by designer i in contest q
((No.DesignStyle)i,q), and the average number of minor variations designer i submits
for each of her design styles in contest q ((V ariations/Style)i,q). The former represents
the amount of designer efforts in creating designs of substantially different styles, and
the latter represents the level of designer efforts in creating small variations of each
distinct design style. (We classify designers’ submissions into “distinct designs” and
“variations” using an image comparison algorithm; see Online Appendix EC.2.) We re-
run Regression (2.8) using (No.DesignStyle)i,q and (V ariations/Style)i,q separately
as the dependent variable, and find our qualitative findings are unchanged; see Table
EC.6 in Online Appendix EC.5.
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Sub-sample Analysis Using Contests that Did Not Have Updates: One may
worry that the seeker’s updates to her problem specification might be simultaneously
correlated with the information provided in the initial problem specification and the
contest outcome. To ensure the empirical results are not affected by this possibility,
we estimate Equations (??)-(2.8) using a subsample containing only contests that had
no updates, and find that the qualitative results remain unchanged; see Table EC.7 in
Online Appendix EC.5.
Seemingly Unrelated Regression System: We further consider the possibility
that certain contest-specific unobservables can affect both designer entry and trial
effort decisions. If this indeed happens, the errors in Equation (??) or (2.7) and those
in Equation (2.8) might be correlated. We model and estimate the SUR, and find that
the results are almost the same as OLS regression results.
2.5.4 Additional Analyses (Hypotheses 1-2)
We further examine the differential effects of common (e.g., “experience” and “fun”)
and rare (e.g., “astrology” and “anti-mosquito”) keywords for conceptual objectives and
the differential effects of different categories of execution guidance (e.g., colors, logo
styles, shapes. (See Online Appendix EC.4 for details of these analyses.) The results
reveal that rare keywords are relatively less discouraging for designers’ participation
than common keywords, possibly because rare keywords are associated with clear and
distinct definitions, whereas common keywords may be too vague and too general.
This indicates that seekers should not be afraid to list specialty keywords. In addition,
providing execution guidelines on “color”, “shape”, “art style”, “usage” is more helpful
in increasing the number of submissions by each designer, compared with providing
execution guidelines on other aspects (such as “font” and “logo style”).
We also explore whether the benefit (encouraging more submissions from each par-
ticipating designer) from providing execution guidance is mostly coming from offering
more categories of execution guidance, or from offering more detailed guidance in each
category. We separate these two effects – (1) the number of categories and (2) the
average number of keywords that fall into each category – and find that, it is provid-
ing execution guidance in various categories, rather than providing detailed execution
guidance within each category, that helps reduce designers’ trial costs and increase
designers’ trial efforts. (See Online Appendix EC.4 for details.)
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2.5.5 Empirical Evidence for Seeker’s Problem (Hypothesis
3)
Recall that we cannot directly observe seeker profit (i.e., the quality of the best design
submitted), and therefore, Hypothesis 3 is about the relationship between the charac-
teristics of the problem specification and the number of submissions the seeker rates
as 5-star. As mentioned in Section 2.4, the seeker’s rating (on a scale of 1 to 5 star)
for each design is an imperfect signal of the quality of that design. Under the assump-
tion that seeker rating behavior in different contests is relatively consistent and thus
ratings in different contests are comparable (which is a fairly strong assumption), the
more 5-star designs there are in a contest, the higher the expected “true” best design
quality is likely to be. Therefore, any empirical evidence that supports Hypothesis 3
can also serve as indirect empirical support for the analytical findings about seeker
information provision in problem specification presented in Section 2.3.4 (i.e., seekers
should provide as many execution guidelines as possible, but only a moderate num-
ber of conceptual objectives). We first use the number of 5-star submissions in each
contest (No. 5-Star Submission)q as the dependent variable in the empirical model
to test Hypothesis 3. (In our sample, in only 0.25% of the contests, a design wins the
contest without getting any rating, suggesting that non-rated submissions are typically
of lower quality than 5-star submissions. Thus, the existence of submissions without
ratings does not compromise our ability to measure contest-level quality by focusing
only on 5-star submissions.)
First we examine contests with more than a moderate number of conceptual objec-
tives ((No.Concepts)q ≥ 4). Based on the analytical model, we expect that in those
contests, fewer conceptual objectives and longer execution guidance would lead to more
5-star submissions in contests. To test that, we regress (No. 5-Star Submission)q
on the numbers of conceptual objectives ((No.Concepts)q) and execution guide-
lines ((No.GuideWords)q), along with the same control variables used in Table
2.2. The estimation results (reported in the first column of Table 2.3) sug-
gest that (No. 5-Star Submission)q is negatively and significantly associated with
(No.Concepts)q, and is positively and significantly associated with (No.GuideWords)q;
these empirical results provide support for our analytically-driven recommendation
that seekers should provide extensive execution guidance but not too many conceptual
objectives. For completeness, we perform the same analysis on contests with few con-
ceptual objectives (no more than 4 conceptual keywords), and find that the best design
quality is not decreasing with more (No.Concepts)q (reported in the third column of
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Table 2.3).
Robustness Check (Hypotheses 3). To account for the possibility that mul-
tiple submissions that are small variations of the same design may not meaning-
fully contribute to the best design quality, we also consider an alternative depen-
dent variable – the number of distinctive design styles with 5-stars in the contest
(No.5-StarDesignStyle)q. (Online Appendix EC.2 explains how we identify distinctive
design styles.) We re-run the aforementioned tests using (No.5-StarDesignStyle)q,
and report the results in Columns 2 and 4 in Table 2.3. As can be seen from the
results, the qualitative findings remain the same under this new dependent variable.
Although they should be interpreted with due caution (as mentioned in Section 2.4),
these empirical results provide suggestive evidence supporting our theoretical findings
on the seeker’s problem. While these findings on quality focus on the contest-level
outcome, as this is what seekers ultimately care about, we also conducted an analogous
analysis at the individual-level and again found empirical support (this additional
analysis is omitted here).
Table 2.3: Best Design Quality with Problem Specification
Long Sample ((No.Concepts)q ≥ 4) Short Sample ((No.Concepts)q ≤ 4)
Dependent Variable: (No. 5-Star Submission)q (No. 5-Star DesignStyle)q (No. 5-Star Submission)q (No. 5-Star DesignStyle)q
Conceptual Objectives
(No.Concepts)q −0.213∗ (0.108) −0.155∗ (0.070) 0.157 (1.224) 0.523 (0.696)
Concept Similarity −0.125 (0.086) −0.025 (0.056) 0.025 (0.086) 0.032 (0.049)
Execution Guidance
(No.GuideWords)q 0.217∗∗ (0.083) 0.178∗∗ (0.054) 0.177 (0.144) 0.083 (0.082)
Control Variables
(lenQ3/No.Concepts)q 0.901
∗∗ (0.270) 0.606∗∗∗ (0.176) 1.259∗ (0.580) 0.853∗ (0.330)
(No.Updates)q 0.411 (0.388) −0.093 (0.252) 0.805 (0.654) 0.180 (0.372)
(Rated Ratio)q 6.498∗∗∗ (1.745) 3.007∗∗ (1.135) 9.799∗∗∗ (2.649) 5.005∗∗ (1.507)
DoW, Month, Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 230 230 175 175
R2 0.309 0.300 0.355 0.329
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.151 0.169 0.135
Residual Std. Error 5.445 (df = 189) 3.540 (df = 189) 7.475 (df = 135) 4.251 (df = 135)
F Statistic 2.117∗∗∗ 2.022∗∗∗ 1.908∗∗ 1.697∗
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: We exclude contests with less than 20% submissions rated ((Rated Ratio)q ≤ 0.20), since in those contests, the (No. 5-Star Submission)q
is not a good a measure for the best design quality. We also exclude 3 contests with extremely inconcise Q3 (lenQ3/No.Concepts)q > 15).
2.6 Further Evidence from the Field
In this section, we discuss a recent change to the crowdsourcing platform we collect
data from: the template for seekers’ problem specifications was updated. This update,
as to be shown below, not only validates our earlier recommendations on how seekers
should provide information in problem specifications, but also introduces an exogenous
shock to seeker problem specification behavior on the platform and thus provides an
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opportunity for us to further identify the effects of disclosing conceptual objectives and
execution guidelines on designers’ behavior.
The update took place on August 31, 2017. Figure 2.1b is a screenshot of the prob-
lem specification template after the website update; the original problem specification
template is shown in Figure 3.1a. The update involves two major adjustments. First,
the platform provided an example when prompting the seeker to specify conceptual
objectives (i.e., “top 3 things to communicate”). As can be seen from the screenshot
(Figure 2.1c), the example only includes three keywords: “modernity, professionalism,
strength”. Potentially, this short three-keyword example can lead seekers to shorten
their list of conceptual objectives. Second, the updated template changed the way the
seeker provides execution guidelines. Instead of providing a short text answer to the
“what logo styles do you like” question in a text box, seekers are asked to answer four
multiple-choice questions, including logo usage (e.g. screen/digital, clothing), preferred
logo style (e.g. image+text, image only), preferred fonts (e.g. sans-serif, mono), colors
to explore (e.g. aqua, green).
Since this update does not affect how seekers answer Question 5 (Q5) much, we
do not consider Q5 in the following analysis. Besides the two main changes described
above, we also observe that the platform added a new area called “vision” in the tem-
plate. This new area is located below the “top 3 things” box, providing additional
space for the seeker to elaborate what message he envisions a logo to convey. We find
that most of the time, content provided in the “vision” area does not involve introduc-
ing additional conceptual objectives. In the manual coding of conceptual objectives
for contests that took place after the website update, we incorporate the occasional
additional objectives that are mentioned in the “vision” area.
This update shows that the platform recognizes problem specification as a crucial
design element for crowdsourcing design contests, and distinguishes among different
types of information conveyed through the problem specification, i.e., conceptual ob-
jectives and execution guidelines. Moreover, the example the platform provides for
specifying the “top 3 things” (Figure 2.1c) is also aligned with our recommendation
not to specify too many conceptual objectives.
In addition, the website update provides an exogenous shock to how seekers specify
their problems. In the empirical analysis presented in Section 2.5, the identification of
the effects of disclosed conceptual objectives and execution guidelines relies on cross-
contest variations in the amounts of these two types of information provided under the
same website layout. One may argue that these variations could be driven by seekers’
unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics, and if those seeker characteristics can also af-
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(a) A Problem Specification (Before Update) (b) A Problem Specification (After Update)
(c) The Platform’s Prompt for Conceptual objectives
(After Update)
Figure 2.1: Screen-shots for Problem Specifications Before and After the
Platform’s Update on Template
fect designers’ participation behavior, then the regression models presented earlier may
suffer from an endogeneity problem. The update to the problem specification template
imposes an exogenous shock on the number of conceptual objectives and execution
guidelines, which is unlikely to be correlated with seekers’ idiosyncratic characteristics,
allowing us to better identify the effects of them on designers’ participation behavior.
Specifically, we collect additional data on all logo design contests that took place
on the platform from June 01, 2017 to December 01, 2017 (three months before and
three months after the update). As in the empirical analysis presented in Section 2.5,
we focus on contests where the design seekers promise to give a $200 award to one and
only one winner in 7-day contests. The contests that took place during the transition
of the platform website (i.e., 10 days before and after August 31, 2017) are excluded.
This new sample consists of 102 contests (2,819 contest-designer combinations). Below,
we first establish how the template update affects the numbers of conceptual objectives
and execution guidelines seekers provide in their problem specification, and then study
how these changes in seekers’ problem specification affect designers’ entry and trial
effort decisions.
Conceptual objectives: We first test whether the number of conceptual objectives
decreases, as expected, after the website update. Specifically, we compare the number
of manually coded conceptual objectives before and after the update: the average
number of conceptual keywords before the update ((No.Concept)preq ) is 5.924, and the
number after the update ((No.Concept)postq ) is 2.806, and the difference is statistically
significant (p-value<0.001). Note that, in the manual coding process, the coders report
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the total number of conceptual keywords mentioned in both the “top 3 things” and
“vision” areas. These results suggest that seekers indeed provide fewer conceptual
objectives after the update.
Next we examine how fewer disclosed conceptual objectives affect designer behav-
iors. Specifically, we regress the number of designers in each contest on the dummy
variable I(post-update)q, which indicates whether the focal contest took place after the
website update. We include day-of-week and industry dummies in the regression as con-
trol variables. The estimation results for this regression are shown in the first column of
Table 2.4. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable I(post-update)q is positive
and significant, indicating that after the update, the number of participating designers
increases. This result, combined with the finding that after the website update, seekers
disclose fewer conceptual objectives, is again consistent with Hypothesis 1b. To make
sure the increase in (No.Designers)q after the website update is indeed due to the
decrease in the number of disclosed conceptual objectives, but not other concurrent
changes to the platform, we conduct the following analysis. We regress the number of
participants in each contest on not only I(post-update)q, but also (No.Concepts)q and
I(post-update)q ∗ (No.Concepts)q. The estimation results are reported in the second
column of Table 2.4. After controlling for (No.Concepts)q, I(post-update)q no longer
correlates with (No.Designers)q, indicating that the increase in (No.Designers)q is ex-
plained entirely by the change in the number of disclosed objectives ((No.Concepts)q).
In addition, the interaction term I(post-update)q ∗ (No.Concepts)q is not significantly
associated with (No.Designers)q, suggesting that the effect of conceptual objectives
on participation is not significantly different before and after the platform update.
Table 2.4: Regression Results for the Update’s Impacts on Contests’ Out-
comes
Dependent Variable (No.Designers)q (No.Submission)i,q (No.5-StarSubmission)q
Overal Changes
I(post-update)q 6.795∗ (3.090) 8.454 (5.283) −1.310∗∗ (0.479) 0.094 (0.859)
Conceptual Objectives
(No.Concepts)q −0.879∗ (0.412)
I(post-update)q ∗ (No.Concepts)q −1.208 (1.399)
Execution Guidance
I(short Q4)q ∗ I(pre-update)q −0.058 (0.177)
I(long Q4)q ∗ I(pre-update)q 0.692∗∗ (0.251)
Control Variables
(No.Designers)q 0.002 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Designer Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 102 102 2,819 2,819 102
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.467 (0.263) 0.515 (0.309) 0.425 (0.257) 0.426 (0.259) 0.452 (0.241)
Residual Std. Error 12.059 (df = 73) 11.669 (df = 71) 2.827 (df = 2182) 2.824 (df = 2181) 3.354 (df = 73)
F Statistic 1.546 2.284∗∗ 2.532∗∗∗ 2.545∗∗∗ 2.146∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Execution Guidelines: Since the platform updated the form of execution guidelines
from open-ended descriptions to multiple-choice questions, we cannot directly measure
the change in the number of execution guidelines; however, we notice some changes
in the information provided. Prior to the update, the number of guidelines provided
varies a lot from seeker to seeker — some seekers provide extremely detailed execu-
tion guidelines, including suggestions for shape, color, and pattern (e.g., “Please use
variations of red, black, silver and gold (matte, not shiny). Make sure that the logo
doesn’t rely on silver and gold effects, need a color palette that is easily translatable to
web.”), whereas others provide very brief guidelines (e.g., “image+text”). After the
update, this seeker heterogeneity no longer exists, because all seekers are now required
to answer the exact same set of multiple-choice questions.
We regress the number of submissions per designer on I(post-update)q and report
the results in the third column of Table 2.4. Quite surprisingly, the coefficient of
I(post-update)q turns out to be negative and significant, suggesting that on average
each designer submits fewer designs after the update. Why is this the case? One pos-
sible explanation is that, as mentioned previously, the template update removes seeker
heterogeneity in execution guideline provision. Prior to the update, some seekers are
willing to provide detailed guidelines, and others are not. For seekers who would provide
few execution guidelines in the open-ended Q4 template, the switch to the standard-
ized questionnaire may have increased the number of guidelines they provide; whereas
for seekers who would provide detailed guidelines in the open-ended Q4 template, the
switch in fact limits the amount of execution guidance they can provide. An average
negative effect reflected in the negative estimated coefficient of I(post-update)q seems
to suggest that more seekers suffer the negative effect of the switch to the standardized
questionnaire format than those who benefit from it. The test reported in the fourth
column of Table (2.4), where we separately evaluate the difference in the number of
submissions per designer between the post-update contests and pre-update contests
with short (I(short Q4)q) vs. long (I(long Q4)q) execution guidelines, supports this
explanation.
To fully understand the mechanism driving the effect of the format change for
execution guidelines, we compare the aspects of the execution guidelines seekers provide
before and after the update. Recall in Section 2.5.4, we explore the importance of
seven categories of execution guidelines (colors, logo styles, shapes, font, usage, art
styles, and resources). We now examine whether the multiple-choice questions after
the platform update include the important categories. The comparisons reported in
Table EC.2 in Online Appendix EC.4 generate several interesting observations. (1)
31
Providing guidelines for “font” and “logo style”, two of the four categories included
in the new multiple-choice format, is not very helpful in increasing the designer trial
effort. (2) Providing guidelines for “shape” and “art style”, categories that are not
included in the new multiple-choice format, has a significant positive effect on the
designer trial effort. (3) The multiple-choice format limits the amount of information
the seeker can provide for each category. Consider “usage” as an example. After the
update, the seeker can only choose from the five options provided (outdoor, clothing,
screen/digital, print, signature); whereas, prior to the update, seekers could, and in
fact did provide more detailed information about logo usage (e.g. embroidery, building,
banner, sticker, letterhead, device, t-shirt, vest, uniform, hat, etc.). All these results
suggest that the new multiple-choice format appears to be less effective for execution
guideline provision than the old open-ended format, and therefore, this change may
have increased designers trial cost (c3 in our analytical model), which then leads to the
decrease in the number of submissions per participant we observe in the data. This
result further supports Hypothesis 2a.
We also examine whether the number of submissions rated as 5-star changes after
the template update, and find that it does not (see the last columns of Table 2.4). This
is not surprising: as discussed above, the update effects an increase in the number of
participants, and a decrease in the number of submissions per participant, influencing
the best design quality in opposite directions.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we combine analytical and empirical methods to examine the effects of
different types of information provided in seekers’ problem specifications — namely,
conceptual objectives and execution guidance — on designers’ participation behavior
and contest outcomes, and prescribe recommendations for optimal information provi-
sion in problem specifications.
Our study provides the following novel insights. First, our theoretical analysis
suggests — and our empirical analysis confirms — that the number of participating
designers in a contest eventually decreases with more conceptual objectives provided in
the problem specification, that the trial effort provision increases with more execution
guidance provided in the problem specification, and that providing more execution
guidelines increases the quality of the best design sourced from the contest, whereas
specifying too many conceptual objectives can negatively affect the best design quality.
Further, we exploit a “quasi-natural experiment” (involving an update to the platform’s
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problem specification template) to strengthen the reliability of our empirical results. In
addition, the update made by the platform directionally supports our recommendations
for seekers’ problem specifications, and our detailed textual analysis provides further
insights into what types of execution guidelines are more helpful in reducing designers’
cost to come up with design trials.
Like any research, our study has a few limitations. First, our empirical analyses are
based on data collected from a single crowdsourcing platform. Although we believe that
contests on this platform are representative, as it is one of the largest crowdsourcing
platforms for creative services, further empirical analysis of data collected from other
crowdsourcing platforms would be helpful in establishing the external validity of our
findings. Second, we focus on how the initial problem specification affects the contest
outcome, and do not consider the updates to the problem specification that might take
place during the contest period. Such updates are relatively rare in our data, but in
other settings where updates to specifications are more prevalent, the effects of the
problem specification updates may require special attention. Third, because analyzing
a model with both the agent’s output uncertainty and heterogeneity is considered
intractable in the innovation-contest literature (e.g., Terwiesch and Xu (2008), Ales
et al. (2017a), Korpeoglu et al. (2017)), we assume homogeneous designers and focus
on the impact of the designers’ solution uncertainty.
Despite these limitations, our study offers rich empirical evidence from the field to
support the predictions and recommendations from our theoretical model, linking the
theoretical and empirical research of crowdsourcing contests. This study also proposes
a novel theoretical model building upon the design literature to characterize designers’
design process, which allows us to examine the role of information in distinct stages of
this design process and its impact on contest outcome. This theoretical modeling frame-
work can be used to study other design problems in the context of open design/creative
contests. As one of the first papers studying problem specification in crowdsourcing
contests, this study contributes to the academic literature of crowdsourcing contests. It
also provides rich managerial implications, especially for individuals or organizations
that are using crowdsourcing contests to source creative solutions or products (i.e.,
seekers in crowdsourcing creative contests).
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CHAPTER 3
The Role of Feedback in Dynamic Crowdsourcing
Contests: A Structural Empirical Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing contests have become a popular way for organizations to source innova-
tions. Compared to traditional innovation sourcing approaches, crowdsourcing contests
allow an innovation seeker to access and interact with a much larger pool of innovators,
to choose from a large number of submissions, and to pay only for the successful ones.
This new way of sourcing innovation increases the variety and novelty of innovations,
and lowers the risk of innovation failure.
To perform well, crowdsourcing contests must be designed well. Researchers have
studied the performance effects of award structure, competition size, problem specifica-
tion, etc. Another important, but somewhat overlooked design element is the feedback
disclosure policy. The feedback disclosure policy is important in dynamic crowdsourc-
ing contests. Such contests are used in many application contexts, including algorithm
design, web-design, logo designs, etc. In these dynamic crowdsourcing contests, solvers
can enter a contest at any time before the contest ends; incumbent solvers (those who
have already made submissions) can submit additional submissions that exploit their
existing ideas or explore new ideas, and these two strategies require different levels
of effort and produce different distributions of quality improvement; and there exist
uncertainties in the relationship between effort level and performance.
By disclosing feedback, the seeker resolves uncertainty about solvers’ performance.
For example, Kaggle contests provide public leader boards displaying rankings based on
the performance of submitted algorithms on a holdout data set. Many crowdsourcing
design platforms allow design-seekers to rate submitted designs using a rating system,
and the rating distribution is publicly viewable; such platforms typically strongly en-
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courage seekers to provide feedback to solvers throughout the contest (for example, the
FAQ site of one platform states “the more feedback you can give, the better!” and “be
sure to score EVERY entry”). The intuition behind providing performance feedback
in innovation contests is that feedback can guide solvers’ submissions towards better
performance.
However, the effect of performance feedback in crowdsourcing contests is likely to
be more complicated than that. In addition to informing solvers of how well they them-
selves are performing, feedback also discloses the current status of the competition, and
thus may affect existing and potential solvers’ participation decisions. Dating back to
Fudenberg et al. (1983), theoretical literature on feedback in small-scale (mostly two-
player) contests has generally concluded that the revealed performance gap will lead to
both the low performer and the high performer reducing their efforts due to decreased
competition. But this conclusion may not hold in dynamic crowdsourcing contests,
because such contests are large-scale; new entrants can join dynamically; incumbent
solvers can dynamically choose between exploitative and exploratory strategies; and
there exist uncertainties in the relationship between effort level and performance (e.g.,
in algorithm contests, how well the algorithm will perform on the holdout data; in
design contests, how well the seeker will like a design). In the presence of these unique
features, revealing performance gaps may encourage solvers to exert effort: new en-
trants are encouraged to join the contest when the feedback indicates a low level of
competition; top performers want to secure their leading position as there are often mul-
tiple high performers competing against each other; and low performers may endeavor
to catch up – due to the performance uncertainties, solvers whose current submissions
fall far behind have the option of submitting a completely new innovation, which gives
them a chance to leapfrog the competition.
Given the co-existence of all these effects, there is no easy answer to the impor-
tant question of whether (and if so when) to release performance feedback during
dynamic crowdsourcing contests. The goal of this study is to examine this compli-
cated process and disentangle the intertwining effects that feedback may have on the
outcome of such contests. More specifically, this study attempts to address the follow-
ing research questions: (1) How does performance feedback affect incumbent solvers’
exploitation/exploration actions and potential entrants’ entry decisions? (2) What is
the impact of the availability of feedback on the contest outcome, in terms of the total
number of solvers participating in the contest, the highest quality achieved by their
submissions, and the number of top performers/submissions? Does the timing of the
feedback availability matter or not? (3) What is the value (disvalue) of providing
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feedback in crowdsourcing contests?
We take a structural modeling approach to answer these questions. The dynamic
structural model we create explicitly captures how potential entrants decide whether
to join an on-going contest, and how incumbents decide whether to make additional
submissions, and if so, how to choose between the exploratory and exploitative strate-
gies. We apply the structural model to a data set collected from a major platform for
crowdsourced custom logo designs. (A generalizability discussion is provided in Section
3.7 paragraphs 4-6.) In order to classify observed incumbents’ follow-up submissions
into exploratory action (redesign) and exploitative action (revision), we employ the
computer vision Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) algorithm to quantify the
similarity between each pair of submissions made by the same creator. We estimate
parameters governing solvers’ participation behavior, including solvers’ entry costs,
the cost associated with exploratory actions (redesigns), and the cost associated with
exploitative actions (revisions).
Using the estimated parameters, we conduct counterfactual simulations to compare
contest outcomes across four feedback policies: full/early/late/no feedback, where the
seeker provides feedback throughout/only early/only late/not at all in the contest.
In brief, the simulation results reveal that if all that the seeker cares about is the
maximum quality achieved, both the full feedback policy and the late feedback policy
perform quite well. Moreover, if the seeker’s objective is to maximize the number of
high performers, or the total number of participants in the contest, the late feedback
policy is the best option. These findings underscore the value of providing feedback,
but also suggest that the aphorism, “the more frequently the seeker provides feedback
the better”, may be misleading depending on the seeker’s objectives.
Our study makes several contributions. First, to our knowledge, this is the one of
the first studies to investigate the impact of feedback on the outcome of crowdsourc-
ing contests, and the first study that that proposes a structural model to empirically
analyze this impact. Second, the structural model presented in this paper is one of
the most comprehensive models of crowdsourcing contests, as it explicitly models mul-
tiple stages, endogenous entry, and solvers’ exploitation and exploration innovation
strategies, unique features of crowdsourcing contests that, to our knowledge, have not
been all incorporated in the existing literature. Third, our policy simulations provide
rich managerial insights into whether, and if so, when should feedback be revealed,
depending on the objective(s) that the seeker wants to achieve.
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3.2 Literature Review
Emerging large-scale online markets have attracted increasing academic interest from
the operations management community (see Chen et al. (2019) for a summary of recent
papers, which cover a wide range of application contexts). The focus of this paper is
the crowdsourcing design contest (Girotra et al., 2010), in which a large crowd of
innovators/designers compete to solve design problems.
Crowdsourcing contests have been examined as platforms for sourcing innovation
(Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). Existing literature on the design of crowdsourcing contests
has looked at the impact of award structure (Ales et al., 2017b); competition size and
open/closed entry (Boudreau et al., 2011, 2016; Ales et al., 2017a; Ko¨rpeog˘lu and Cho,
2017); problem specification (Erat and Krishnan, 2012); solvers’ choices among coex-
isting contests (Ko¨rpeog˘lu et al., 2017); and the disclosure of intermediate solutions
(Boudreau and Lakhani, 2015; Bockstedt et al., 2016; Wooten and Ulrich, 2017a) on
the outcome (both the quality and quantity of the crowdsourced solutions) of crowd-
sourcing contests. Most of the previous research studies crowdsourcing contests as
static problems; however, in reality, many crowdsourcing contests are dynamic in na-
ture (Korpeoglu et al., 2017; Hu and Wang, 2017). Our paper explicitly models the
dynamics of crowdsourcing contests, and focuses specifically on an important but less
explored design element – feedback. To our knowledge, the only published study that
looks at the role of feedback in crowdsourcing contest is Wooten and Ulrich (2017b),
in which the authors conduct a field experiment to compare the effects of three dif-
ferent feedback treatments – no feedback, random feedback, and truthful feedback.
However, their paper does not explicitly model the contest dynamics, nor study the
detailed mechanisms driving participants’ behavior. They run field experiments with
six contests, and do not examine the impact of the timing of performance feedback
on contest outcomes; getting sufficient observations on contest outcomes would require
many more contests to be run, which would be prohibitively difficult using field ex-
periments. Instead, in our paper we employ a structural estimation approach whereby
we simulate contest outcomes under different feedback policies using an empirically
estimated structural model.
Feedback in a different but related context, tournaments/contests, has been studied
in the economics literature. The theoretical research focuses on small-scale contests,
and until recently, most studies in this stream of research conclude that performance
feedback reduces contestants’ effort. A few recent papers (e.g., Aoyagi 2010; Golts-
man and Mukherjee 2011) extend the literature by showing that the optimal feedback
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mechanism depends on the curvature of the agents’ cost function, complementarity
between effort and ability, complementarity between contestants’ effort, etc. There
are also laboratory experimental studies evaluating the role of feedback in contests.
These studies have mixed results in terms of whether and how feedback will affect top-
performing and low-performing contestants’ effort provision in various experimental
settings (see Dechenaux et al. (2015) for a detailed summary of this literature). There
has been very little work featuring feedback in contests for innovation. To our knowl-
edge, there are only a few recent game-theoretic papers on this topic. Bimpikis et al.
(2017) and Halac et al. (2017) both study “innovation races” and consider technical
uncertainties in innovation races – namely whether it is feasible to solve the problem
at all. They illustrate that feedback on the one hand exposes a discouraging perfor-
mance gap, but on the other hand updates contestants’ perceptions of the feasibility
of solving the problem. Mihm and Schlapp (2018) evaluates the average design quality
and the best design quality under no feedback, public feedback and private feedback
scenarios. They find that the best feedback strategy depends on the contest uncer-
tainty and the contest holder’s interest in average design quality or the best design
quality. A recent work by Gross (2017) is one of the few papers that use field data
to examine the effect of feedback on small-scale, fixed-size innovation contests. Con-
currently but independently from our work, using a crowdsourcing data set similar
to ours, the author estimates how feedback affects contestants’ participation and the
quality of their subsequent submissions, in a model that treats each submission by the
same participant as an independent trial. Then the author uses the estimated model
to simulate the dynamics of a three-player, sequential-play contest, under alternative
feedback policies, including the public, private and partial feedback policies. The sim-
ulation results suggest that the net effect of feedback on the number of high-quality
submissions is positive; therefore, the author concludes that feedback is desirable for a
principal seeking innovation.
Our work considers a similar principal decision (feedback), but in a different setting
– crowdsourcing contests held on large-scale online markets. The crowdsourcing con-
tests we study differ from small-scale fixed-size contests in the following crucial aspects:
(1) the size of the participant pool is large; (2) crowdsourcing contests allow endogenous
entries of new participants throughout the contest; and (3) there is large uncertainty
in the relationship between effort and solution quality. The last feature gives rise to
exploration- and exploitation-type strategies; indeed, sourcing the best solution to an
innovation problem has been modeled as a search process (Girotra et al., 2010; Kornish
and Ulrich, 2011; Erat and Krishnan, 2012), where independent trials (exploration) and
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sequential trials (exploitation) contribute differently to the contest outcomes. In the
presence of these unique features, we expect that the role of feedback will be quite
different in crowdsourcing contests, and that findings in the literature about the role of
feedback in traditional contests may not hold in the context of crowdsourcing contests.
The model we propose in this paper captures these unique features of crowdsourc-
ing contests by explicitly modeling potential entrants’ entry decisions and incumbents’
choices between exploratory and exploitative strategies in this highly uncertain environ-
ment, and, as a result, provides novel insights into the role of feedback in crowdsourcing
contests. In addition, our study contributes to the limited empirical literature on the
design of crowdsourcing contests and on the sourcing of innovative products. Using a
structural modeling approach, we are able to recover the parameters governing contest
participants’ behavior from real-world data and conduct counterfactual simulations to
evaluate alternative feedback disclosure structures. Although the focus of our study is
the role of feedback, our structural model of contest participants’ behavior can be used
to study other features of crowdsourcing contests and other large-scale online open
platforms.
Methodologically, our paper is based on the dynamic game structural estimation
literature (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) for a detailed review). The most closely
related papers are Sweeting (2009), and Igami (2016), each of which estimates a dy-
namic game using the nested fixed-point approach (NFXP) initially proposed by Rust
(1987), as opposed to the two-step approach (Hotz and Miller, 1993). Our modeling
and estimation approach diverges from the more conventional framework where the
market is assumed to be in a stationary environment and the competition has an in-
finite horizon. Specifically, we embed discrete choice with private information into a
non-stationary, finite-horizon dynamic game, focusing on type-symmetric strategies to
avoid multiple equilibria. Our work also contributes to the growing empirical operations
management literature that employs structural modeling to examine operations-related
questions (e.g., Lu et al. (2013), Moon et al. (2016), Zheng (2016)).
3.3 Research Context and Data
The data we use for the empirical analysis is from crowdsourced creative contests hosted
on an online platform. We focus on logo design contests, which are the largest category
on the platform both in terms of the number of completed contests and the number
of active solvers (hereafter we refer to solvers as “creators” in this context of graphic
design contests). A typical logo design contest proceeds as follows. First, a seeker
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(“he”) in need of a design posts a design request. In the posting, he describes what he
needs, specifies when he needs it (i.e., the contest’s start date and end date), chooses
whether he wants to make all existing submissions publicly viewable, and announces
the award structure (i.e., whether the award is guaranteed by the seeker, the number
of winners, and the award(s) for the winner(s)). Once a contest is posted, all creators
(“she”) on the platform can join the contest and submit design(s) at any time before the
contest ends; additional submissions by a creator do not replace her earlier submissions.
The seeker can rate each submission based on a 5-star system.1 A submission’s rating
is visible to its author. All ratings are summarized in a table, (Figure 3.1), which is
accessible to all participating and potential creators.2 At the end of the contest, the
seeker picks his favorite submission(s) and gives the pre-announced award to its (their)
author(s).
(a) Design Request (b) Project Stats
Figure 3.1: Illustrative Screenshots of the Design Request and Project Stats
Note: “Buyer Assured”, “Public-gallery”, “Award”, “Start-date and End-date”
and “Project length” are labeled on the contest list page and on a project’s header.
We collect data of logo-design contests with publicly viewable submissions on this
crowdsourcing platform from March 2012 to November 2014. For each contest, we
record all participants’ activities (including creators’ submissions and the seeker’s rat-
1In contests for creative products, the seeker is likely to discover new options after seeing more
submissions. This is captured by our model. That said, our model cannot capture the possibility of
seekers’ preferences changing as they see more submissions (e.g., his evaluation of the same design
changes as he sees more submissions); however, we found little support in the data for this possibility
(please see Online Appendix B.2.3 for details).
2The platform strenuously polices copyright violations to prevent creators from copying each
other’s designs. As a result, we found little evidence in the data that creators copy each others’
designs (see Figure B.2 in Online Appendix B.2.2), suggesting that the platform’s anti-copying efforts
are successful.
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ings) with corresponding time stamps. To facilitate the empirical analysis, we focus
on 7-day contests where the design seekers promise to reward one and only one final
winner, because it has been documented (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Liu et al., 2014)
that the contest length and award structure can affect creators’ behavior and contest
outcomes; since the objective of this study is to examine the role of feedback, we pur-
posefully minimize the heterogeneity among the contests in these other dimensions.
The contests included in our sample are representative contests on the platform – 97%
of the contests held on the platform have a single award, 61% are guaranteed award,
and 7-day is the most common length among all contests. The final working sample
consists of 810 contests, 26,367 contest-creator combinations, 75,572 design images and
45,999 ratings. Table 3.1 reports key summary statistics of contest-level characteristics;
to save space in the body of the paper, additional descriptive statistics are provided in
Online Appendix B.2.2.
Table 3.1: Contest-Level Summary Statistics
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Award ($) 260.84 97.57 200 200 200 300 1,000
No. Submissions 93.30 73.39 14 56 77 109 1,221
No. Creators 32.55 19.81 6 20 29 39 233
No. Submissions with Ratings 56.79 63.13 0 19 43 73 927
No. 1-Star Submissions 7.14 21.78 0 0 1 6 411
No. 2-Star Submissions 10.82 17.03 0 1 6 14 240
No. 3-Star Submissions 17.10 22.85 0 4 11 23 347
No. 4-Star Submissions 11.00 13.37 0 3 7 15 141
No. 5-Star Submissions 3.16 5.74 0 0 1 4 48
3.3.1 Classifying Creators’ Actions
When exploring creators’ submission patterns in our data, an existing creator’s follow-
up submissions are sometimes similar to her previous submissions, while other times
very different. The former type of follow-up submissions can be considered “revisions”
of a creator’s previous submissions, akin to an “exploitative” innovation strategy; by
contrast the latter type involves creating design(s) that are significantly different from
any of the creator’s existing designs (later defined as “redesigns”), corresponding to an
“exploratory” innovation strategy.3
3There are also a small number of cases where a follow-up submission is almost identical to one
of the creator’s previous submissions. We classify these submissions as replications, and in the later
analysis, replications are not counted as follow-up submissions and are removed from the data, since
we assume “replicating” an existing design incurs very little cost, and does not benefit the design
seeker very much.
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Both types of follow-up submissions are “new” submissions in that they do not
replace existing submissions, but distinguishing one type (“revision”) from the other
(“redesign”) is important. For the seeker, these different submission types contribute
differently to the pool of designs seekers can choose from – a “revision” may result in an
incremental quality difference relative to prior designs, whereas a brand-new “redesign”
may impart greater quality differences relative to previous designs and increases the
variety of the submission portfolio. From a creator’s standpoint, it could cost them
different amounts of effort to make these two types of submissions: tweaking an exist-
ing design for a “revision” is likely to require less effort, while creating a brand-new
“redesign” will possibly require much more effort.
To systematically classify creators’ follow-up submissions observed in the data into
“revisions” (exploitative) and “redesigns” (exploratory) on a large scale, we employ
Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT), an algorithm used to detect and describe
local features in images proposed by Lowe (1999). Our approach consists of four steps
(details with examples are provided in Online Appendix B.1). First, from a pair of
design images (A and B), we extract descriptors of the key points by identifying SIFT
feature vectors in scale space, which robustly capture the structural properties of the
images. Second, we match SIFT feature vectors by calculating and comparing the
Euclidean distance between each of the SIFT feature vectors in image A and image
B. Third, using the obtained matched feature-vector pairs, we then calculate the Sim-
ilarity Ratio (the percentage of matched SIFT features relative to the total number of
SIFT features in images A and B). Finally, we classify the image pair (image A and
image B) as either similar or different based on the Similarity Ratio. The higher the
ratio is, the more similar the two images are. In our empirical analysis, we classify a
pair of submissions as similar if the Similarity Ratio is greater or equal to 0.4.4 Corre-
spondingly, if a creator’s new submission is very similar to any of her prior submissions
(the similarity score between the two submissions is above 0.4), we classify the new
submission as a “revision”; otherwise, we consider the new submission as a “redesign”.
To facilitate our empirical analysis, we will divide the contest time horizon in the
data into discrete intervals, or periods. (Details for discretizing the contest time horizon
will be provided in Section 3.5.1.2.) Then based on a creator’s submissions (there could
be several) in a period being only “redesigns”, only “revisions”, or both “revisions” and
“redesigns”, we define her follow-up action within that period as redesign, revise, or
4 We choose 0.4 as the cutoff for the main analysis because the distribution of the Similarity Ratio
is roughly bimodal and 0.4 is its median. To ensure our results are robust to this cutoff choice, we
estimate our model using a series of alternative cutoffs; see Section B.10.5.
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do-both (revise-and-redesign), respectively. If she submitted nothing during the period,
her action is do-nothing.5
3.3.2 Descriptive Regressions
Before constructing our structural model, we use regression to explore how disclosed
ratings are associated with creators’ participation behavior. We do not seek to derive
causal inferences from this analysis; we seek only preliminary insights that we can
later build upon using a more sophisticated and powerful structural analysis. We
divide creators into “new entrants” and “incumbents”, and test separately whether the
number of new entrants or incumbents’ follow-up actions are affected by the ratings that
the seeker has disclosed by the end of the previous day. The details of the regression
analysis are provided in Online Appendix B.2.1; highlights are provided below.
Descriptive Observation I – Feedback’s Effect on Entries: A larger number
of high ratings (5-star) disclosed in previous periods is associated with fewer entries,
whereas a larger number of low ratings (1-star and 2-star) is associated with more en-
tries. In addition, the number of existing participants is negatively correlated with the
number of entries, which suggests that when a contest is already “crowded”, potential
entrants are discouraged from joining the contest.
Descriptive Observation II – Feedback’s Effect on Incumbents’ Follow-up
Actions: Incumbents’ own best rating is positively correlated with the probabilities
of them choosing the redesign, revise and do-both actions (non-null actions), and this
correlation is the highest with the revise action. Additionally, once we control for the
focal incumbent’s best rating, neither her average rating nor her second-best rating
is significantly associated with any of the action probabilities. Further, when there
are fewer creators or fewer existing submissions in the contest, and when there are
more low ratings and fewer high ratings disclosed, the focal incumbent is more likely
to follow-up with a non-null action.
The regression insights discussed above provide evidence for the correlation between
performance feedback and the participation behavior of entrants and incumbents. How-
ever, reduced-form regressions alone are insufficient to address our research questions
about the effect of performance feedback on contest outcomes. First, in the data there
is not enough variation in the feedback disclosure policy to allow us to directly compare
5 We do not granularize the actions further to capture the exact number of redesign and revision
submissions in a period, which would increase the action space dramatically and render the model
intractable without generating additional insight: In the data, there is not large variation in the
number of designs a creator submits in each period, and submitting more revisions and/or more
redesigns within one period does not significantly increase the quality improvement.
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the outcome of contests with different feedback disclosure policies; this is because seek-
ers in most contests follow the platform’s suggestion and provide feedback throughout
the entire contest. Second, from the regression results described above which pertain
to individual creators’ actions, it is difficult to infer what the overall contest-level im-
pact would be from different feedback policies. For example, the above results suggest
that revealing high ratings can encourage the authors of those highly-rated designs to
improve upon their own submissions; but on the other hand, it discourages other partic-
ipants’ submission activities and entries. We cannot directly compare the magnitudes
in the regression coefficients to see which effect dominates another.
Given the above, the approach we take is to build and estimate a structural model:
We explicitly model the underlying decision-making mechanism, and estimate decision
primitives which are likely to remain the same in different contest designs; doing so
enables us to evaluate alternative feedback disclosure policies and measure their effects
on contest dynamics and outcomes. The next section describes our structural model.
3.4 The Structural Model
We build a finite-horizon dynamic game model to capture creators’ behavioral dynam-
ics in a crowdsourcing design contest. Since in the data most seekers (¿70%) follow
the platform’s advice to provide full feedback (i.e., provide feedback throughout the
contest), the model that we build for now assumes that seekers provide full feedback.
In Section 3.5 we use this model to estimate parameters that govern creators’ behaviors
in design contests. We then use these estimates in Section 3.6 to run counterfactual
simulations to study other feedback policies.
Our model divides time into periods indexed by t. In period t, the set of potential
entrants who may choose to join the contest and the set of incumbents are denoted
as Mt and Nt respectively.
6 We index potential entrants by j, and incumbents by
i. We also attach superscript e to potential entrants’ utility/response/etc. functions
to distinguish them from incumbents’ functions. In our model, the seeker provides
his feedback at the end of each period; this reflects the reality that the seeker is not
immediately able to give feedback on a one-for-one basis as each individual submission
rolls in. The timing of the model is as follows (also illustrated in Figure 3.2):
1. The contest begins with the seeker posting a design request and announcing the
award (R).
6We assume the pool of potential entrants is renewed every period.
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2. In the first period (t = 1), potential entrants (M1) arrive at the contest, and
decide whether to join the contest by submitting their first design(s). Potential
entrants’ decision in each period (including the first period and periods 2, ..., T ) is
a binary choice, denoted as dj,t ∈ {enter, not-enter} := D. The seeker evaluates
the submitted designs, and at the end of the period, discloses the ratings. The
rating is on the scale of 1-5 stars; if a design is not rated, we use “NA” to denote
its rating.
3. At the beginning of each of the subsequent periods (t = 2, ..., T ), incumbents
(Nt) and potential entrants (Mt) observe all existing ratings. Based on this
information, they make the following decisions simultaneously: potential entrants
decide whether to join the contest (dj,t defined above), and incumbents choose
their follow-up action ai,t ∈ {do-nothing, redesign, revise, do-both} := A, where,
ai,t = do-nothing, if incumbent i decides not to do anything in period t; ai,t =
redesign, if she creates one or more new designs that are significantly different
from any of her existing designs; ai,t = revise, if she submits one or more designs
that are similar to one or more of her existing designs; ai,t = do-both, if she both
revises and redesigns.
4. In period T + 1, the creator of the best quality design wins the contest and
receives the prize (R). In this terminal period, no entry is allowed, incumbents
have no chance to take any action.7
Since the competition is quality-based and ratings reflect submissions’ quality, ex-
isting ratings can be considered as state variables in our model, which not only capture
the current status of the contest, affect creators’ current and future utility, but also
evolve as a function of creators’ actions in each period. However, in reality, it is dif-
ficult for creators to track the ratings of each one of their own submissions and their
competitors’ submissions; as we learned from the descriptive regressions results, an
incumbent’s best rating significantly affects her follow-up actions, but once we control
for the focal incumbent’s best rating, neither her average rating nor her second-best
rating is significantly associated with her follow-up actions. Moreover, incorporating
all submissions’ ratings and their evolution will make the model unmanageable. Hence,
we define the individual-level state variable at time t (denoted as xi,t) as the highest
rating received by an incumbent i up to the beginning of period t.8 Correspondingly,
7We add an arbitrary period T + 1 at the end of the model to represent the time when the winner
is announced.
8We use a creator’s best rating observed on a 5-star scale as her individual-level state variable for
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Figure 3.2: Timeline for Actions
we define the vector st = {st(x)}x∈{NA,1,2,3,4,5} as the contest-level state variable, where
st(x) is the number of incumbents whose individual state takes value x in period t.
The state variables xi,t and st evolve as follows. A contest starts with zero in-
cumbents and a contest state s1 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}. At the beginning of each period
t where t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, potential entrants arrive and make entry decisions. If a po-
tential entrant j enters the contest in period t, she will become an incumbent from
t+ 1, and the best rating her submitted design(s) receives in period t will become her
individual state at the beginning of the next period (xj,t+1), which is a random draw
from the probability distribution pe(xj,t+1). For any incumbent i, her state variable xi,t
evolves as a function of her action ai,t. The action-specific transition probability of the
state variable for an incumbent creator is then p(xi,t+1|xi,t; ai,t). (Note that a creator’s
state transition is dependent on the contest-level state st, but we capture it through
the creator’s action choice ai,t.
9) The contest-level state variable, st, will evolve cor-
respondingly, which can be expressed as p(st+1|st; at, dt), where at is the stack of all
incumbents’ actions in period t, and dt is the stack of all potential entrants’ entry deci-
sions in period t. Note that pe(·), p(·|·), and st are common knowledge for all creators
(Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010).
now. One potential problem with this definition is that the ratings are truncated at 5. If a creator
already has a 5-star design but revises her design, her best rating cannot be improved any further.
To deal with this problem, we slightly alter the definition of the individual-level state variable, which
will be explained later in Section 3.4.4.
9 Specifically, creator i chooses her action ai,t upon seeing the opponent states. Given this action
choice, we then model the action-specific transition probabilities as independent of opponent states
(i.e., p(xi,t+1|xi,t; st, ai,t) = p(xi,t+1|xi,t; ai,t)); empirical support for this assumption is provided in
Online Appendix B.2.4 Table B.4.
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3.4.1 Single Period Utility
As there are finitely many of periods in each contest, the per-period utility is t-
dependent. We first explain the per-period utility in the terminal period T + 1. In
period T + 1, no creator action is allowed; the creator with the best quality design is
announced as the winner and receives award R; everyone else receives nothing. Given
creator i’s state xi,T+1 and the contest-level state sT+1 from the seeker ratings, creator
i’s expected per-period utility in period T + 1 can be expressed as
Ui,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) = αR · Pr(i wins|xi,T+1, sT+1), (3.1)
where α is the marginal utility of money (or the number of utils a creator re-
ceives from getting an additional dollar of award). We will explain how to calculate
Pr(i wins|xi,T+1, sT+1), the probability that creator i wins a contest, later in this sec-
tion.
In periods t = 1, ..., T , incumbent i’s per-period utility can be expressed as
Ui,t(i,t; ai,t) = −c(ai,t) + i,t(ai,t), ai,t ∈ A, (3.2)
where c(ai,t) represents the cost associated with action ai,t, and i,t(ai,t) represents the
individual-level choice-specific random shock. Likewise, potential entrant j’s per-period
utility can be expressed as
U ej,t(εj,t; dj,t) = −cet (dj,t) + εj,t(dj,t), dj,t ∈ D, (3.3)
where cet (dj,t) represents the cost associated with action dj,t in period t. c
e
t (dit = enter)
may include the costs of becoming aware of the contest, understanding the problem
specifications, and coming up with the first design(s), and thus can be different across
periods.10 For normalization purposes, c(ai,t = do-nothing) and c
e
t (dj,t = not-enter) are
assumed to be zero. The shocks i,t(ai,t) (εj,t(dj,t)) is private information observable
to incumbent i (potential entrant j) in period t before she chooses which action to
take, but are unobservable to other creators and the researchers. In addition, the
shocks i,t(ai,t) and εj,t(dj,t) are assumed to be zero-mean, and i.i.d. with respect to
individual, time and choice. i,t = {i,t(ai,t)|ai,t ∈ A} follows a distribution whose
probability density function is p, and Ei,t is the corresponding state space; εj,t =
{εj,t(dj,t)|dj,t ∈ D} follows a distribution whose probability density function is pε, and
10Notice that we assume the cost associated with incumbents’ actions (c(ai,t)) to be time invariant,
but allow entry cost (cet (dj,t)) to vary across periods, due to the fact that the crowdsourcing platform
displays contests nearing their end higher on the contest list webpage, and as a result the cost of
discovering a contest may decrease over time.
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Ej,t is the corresponding state space.
3.4.2 Creators’ Decisions
In every period t, incumbents decide on follow-up actions, and potential entrants make
entry decisions. Creators are forward-looking and take into account the implications of
their decisions on future utilities and on the expected future reaction of competitors.
Specifically, creators make these decisions to maximize expected discounted lifetime
utility.
We assume creators play Markov strategies.11 Formally, a Markov strategy for
incumbent i in period t is a function ρi,t : Xi,t × St × Ei,t → A. Likewise, a Markov
strategy for potential entrant j in period t is a function λj,t : St × Ej,t → D. Let
σt = {ρt, λt} summarize all existing incumbents’ and potential entrants’ strategies in
period t, where ρt = {ρi,t}i∈Nt and λt = {λj,t}j∈Mt . σ = {σt}t=1,...,T then summarizes
all periods’ strategies. Note that the strategies are time-varying because the contest
has a finite horizon. Let V σi,t(xi,t, st, i,t) represent the value function for an incumbent
i given that the other creators behave according to their respective strategies in σ, and
given that incumbent i uses her best response strategy. That is,
V σi,t(xi,t, st, i,t) =
max
ai,t
E
{[
T∑
τ=t
βτ−tUi,τ (i,τ ; ai,τ ) + βT+1−tUi,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1)
] ∣∣∣∣xi,t, st, i,t;σ
}
.
(3.4)
The expectation is taken over current-period private shocks of other contestants, as well
as future values of the state variables and private shocks.12 According to Bellman’s
principle of optimality, we can write V σi,t(xi,t, st, i,t) recursively as:
V σi,t(xi,t, st, i,t) =maxai,t
{
Ui,t(i,t; ai,t) + βE[V σi,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1, i,t+1)|ai,t]
}
if t ∈ 1, 2, ..., T,
Ui,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) if t = T + 1;
(3.5)
11That is, potential entrant j’s decision depends only on the current contest-level state st and her
current private utility shock εj,t; incumbent i’s behavior depends only on the current contest-level
state st, her current own state xi,t and her current private utility shock i,t.
12These value functions and their corresponding strategies are also dependent on the award level.
As we will discuss in the next section, the variation in the award level enables the identification of α.
In this section, we suppress the award level (R) and focus on how creators make decisions under a
given award level.
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and for potential entrants (in t = 1, ..., T ),
V e,σj,t (st, εj,t) = max
dj,t
{
U ej,t(εj,t; dj,t) + I(dj,t = Enter) · βEV σj,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1, j,t+1)
}
.
(3.6)
The expectations in Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are taken over other creators’ actions in
the current period, values of the next period individual- and contest-state variables, as
well as the next period private shocks.
3.4.3 Equilibrium Concept
We solve this finite-horizon dynamic discrete game with private information for a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in type-symmetric pure strategies. For the pro-
posed structural model, a strategy σ∗ = {ρ∗, λ∗} represents a MPE if, at any t, given
everyone else is playing σ∗, an incumbent’s and a potential entrant’s best response are
ρ∗ and λ∗, respectively.
Following Milgrom and Weber (1985), we represent a MPE in probability space. We
denote the conditional choice probability (CCP) corresponding to the MPE strategy σ∗
as P∗, in which the tth element, P∗t , characterizes creator strategies in the t
th period.
Equilibrium probabilities are a fixed point P∗ = Γ(P∗), where the function Γ is the
creators’ best response probability function. Assuming both the incumbents’ private
shock (i,t) and potential entrants’ private shock (εj,t) follow the Type I extreme value
distribution (Rust, 1987), we then get that in equilibrium incumbent i follows
P∗i,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) = Γi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st; P∗ \ P∗i,t) =
exp(vP
∗
i,t (xi,t, st; ai,t))∑
a′i,t
exp(vP
∗
i,t (xi,t, st; a
′
i,t))
, (3.7)
and potential entrant j follows
P∗j,t(dj,t|st) = Γej,t(dj,t|st; P∗ \ P∗j,t) =
exp(ve,P
∗
j,t (st; dj,t))∑
d′j,t
exp(ve,P
∗
j,t (st; d
′
j,t))
, (3.8)
where vP
∗
i,t and v
e,P∗
j,t are incumbent and potential entrants’ choice specific value func-
tions: vP
∗
i,t (xi,t, st; ai,t) = −c(ai,t)+βE[V˜ P∗i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1|ai,t)]; ve,P
∗
j,t (st; dj,t) = −ce(dj,t)+
I(dj,t = Enter) · βE[V˜ P∗j,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1)|dj,t], in which V˜ Pi,t+1 is the ex ante value func-
tion: V˜ Pi,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1) :=
∫
V σi,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1, i,t+1)p(i,t+1)di,t+1. The derivation de-
tails are provided in Online Appendix B.3.
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3.4.4 Winning Probability
The last element of our structural model to be explained is how creator i’s winning
probability (Pr(i wins|xi,T+1, sT+1)) in period T + 1 is calculated. Generally speaking,
the creator who submits the highest quality design wins. So far, the quality of a
design has been measured by its rating, which is observed in our data. One potential
problem with this measure is that the observed ratings are truncated at 5-star – no
matter how high a design’s “true” quality is, the seeker can at most rate it as 5-star.
If we neglect this problem, our model would fail to capture some important aspects
of creator behavior observed in the data. For example, the model would predict that
a creator whose current best rating is 5-star would have no incentive to make any
additional submissions, as doing so only incurs cost but provides no benefit. However,
in the data, we observe many cases where creators make additional submissions after
receiving a 5-star rating; moreover, among creators who have received a 5-star rating,
those who remain active in revising their design(s) or submitting new design(s) have a
higher probability of winning the contest than those who become inactive (details are
presented in Online Appendix B.5).
To resolve this problem and recover the underlying “true” quality (which we denote
as xtruei,t ) of a creator’s best design, we redefine the individual-level state as x˜i,t =
(xi,t,$i,t), with xi,t still denoting the best rating that creator i has received, and an
additional variable $i,t recording the actions creator i has taken up to period t after
receiving her first 5-star rating, if she has ever received any 5-star rating. $i,t is a vector
of three elements, respectively representing the number of times that the “redesign”,
“revise” or “do-both” action has been taken by creator i since she received her first
5-star rating (excluding the action that results in the first 5-star rating). There are
then two scenarios:
1. When xi,t ∈ {NA, 1, 2, 3, 4}, i.e., creator i’s current best score has not reached
5-star:
x˜i,t = (xi,t,$i,t), where $i,t = (0, 0, 0);
2. When xi,τ+1 = ... = xi,t = 5, xi,τ < 5, i.e., creator i has her first 5-star in
period τ + 1: x˜i,t = (5,$i,t), where $i,t = ($i,t,redesign, $i,t,revise, $i,t,do-both), with
$i,t,a =
∑t
l=τ+1 I(ai,l = a).
The contest-level state is then redefined as s˜t, which summarizes the number of creators
whose individual-level state is x˜i,t for all possible values of x˜i,t. x˜i,t transitions in
the following way: xi,t still transitions in the same way as discussed in the previous
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subsection; $it transitions deterministically as a function of the action creator i takes
in period t: $i,t+1,a = $i,t,a + I(ai,t = a), where a ∈ {redesign, revise, do-both}. With
this newly-constructed state variable x˜i,t, we can recover the true quality of a creator’s
best design (xtruei,t ). We assume that the first time creator i receives a 5-star rating, the
true quality of that 5-star design is 5 + max(0, ξ0), where ξ0 ∈ R and max(0, ξ0) is the
part of quality that gets truncated by the integer rating of 5. After receiving a 5-star
rating, every time a creator takes a non-null action ai,t ∈ {redesign, revise, do-both},
there will be a corresponding stochastic improvement (max(0, ξai,t)), where ξai,t ∈ R.
Hence, the mapping between a creator’s state variable (x˜i,t = (xi,t,$i,t)) and the
quality of her best design (xtruei,t ) is as follows:
xtruei,t =xi,t , if xi,t < 5; (3.9a)
xtruei,t =5 + max(0, ξ0) +
∑
a∈{redesign,revise,do-both}
$i,t,a∑
n=1
max(0, ξ(n)a ) , if xi,t = 5. (3.9b)
where max(0, ξ
(n)
a ) is the nth realization of the stochastic improvement, with the max
operator reflecting the fact that the focal creator’s new submissions do not replace
her existing submissions so the quality rating of her best design can stay the same or
increase, but never decreases.
We can now compute the probability of winning using the “true” quality in the
terminal period T + 1. Let x¯trueT+1 = maxi∈NT+1(x
true
i,T+1) denote the maximum quality
achieved by all creators in the game in period T+1, then creator i’s winning probability
can be expressed as:
Pr(i wins|{xtruek,T+1}∀k∈NT+1) = I(xtruei,T+1 = x¯trueT+1)
1∑
k∈NT+1 I(x
true
k,T+1 = x¯
true
T+1)
. (3.10)
Notice that Equation (3.10) implies two cases. (i) When x¯trueT+1 > 5, x¯
true
T+1 is a continuous
variable. In this case, a tie is impossible – the designer of the highest-quality design
wins the contest; (ii) when x¯trueT+1 ≤ 5, ties are possible. In case of ties, each creator
whose best rating is x¯trueT+1 wins the contest with an equal chance.
13 In the data, the
majority of the contests fall into the case (i).
13Here we assume in cases of ties, each creator has an equal chance, rather than each submission
has an equal chance, to win the contest. The reason is that, when a creator decides to revise her
existing submission(s), she typically picks her best performing style to revise; when a creator decides
to redesign, she typically creates a new design style and abandons old design styles if this new design
style is rated higher. Therefore, in period T + 1, we effectively assume that each creator has one
design, i.e., the best among her submissions, in the seeker’s consideration set.
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In the next section we describe our estimation strategy and results. We esti-
mate non-parametrically all transition probabilities of the individual-level state vari-
able (xtruei,t ) within 1- to 4-star. By contrast, we use the particular functional form in
Equation (3.9b) only for estimating how xtruei,t transitions after the creator gets a 5-star
rating given $i,t; Online Appendix B.5 discusses robustness of our results to alternative
versions of Equation (3.9b).
3.5 Estimation and Results
3.5.1 Estimation Strategy
Our approach to estimate the structural model proceeds in two steps. In step 1, we
estimate the set of parameters that describe the action-specific state transition process
(θ1). In step 2, we embed the estimated action-specific state transition parameters into
the dynamic discrete game of creators’ entry and follow-up actions, and estimate the
parameters in creators’ utility function, denoted by θ2. These two sets of parameters
can be estimated separately under the conditional independence assumption.14,15 In-
tuitively, the action-specific state transition probabilities describe how a creator’s best
design quality improves conditional on the action she takes, which does not depend on
the cost parameters, because the action is already taken.
3.5.1.1 Step 1: Estimating Parameters for Action-Specific State Transi-
tions (θ1)
We estimate the rating transition probabilities pe(xj,t+1) and p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t) using
the frequency estimator (denoted as θ11). Since x
true
i,t = xi,t when xi,t < 5, p
e(xtruej,t+1) =
pe(xj,t+1) when xj,t+1 < 5, and p(x
true
i,t+1|xtruei,t , ai,t) = p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t) when xi,t+1 < 5.
14Under the conditional independence assumption (i.e., p(xi,t+1|xi,t; ai,t) and ξ’s are indepen-
dent of p(i,t), p
e(xj,t+1) and ξ’s are independent of pε(εi,t)), the transition probability functions
p(xi,t+1|xi,t; ai,t), pe(xj,t+1), and ξ’s can be estimated from the transition data using a standard
maximum likelihood method without solving for the game equilibrium; further discussion on this
assumption is included in Online Appendix B.4.
15In the main estimation, we set β = 0.9, the number of potential entrants |Mt| = 300,∀t to get
results in Table 3.2. β’s identification is known to be impractical (Rust, 1987), so we do not intend
to estimate the discount factor. For the number of potential entrants, it cannot be identified together
with entry costs. Therefore, we fix it to be the number of total active creators on the platform at any
given time – the average is around 300. We conducted sensitivity analyses on β and |Mt|, and find
that the qualitative nature of our estimation results do not change; see Section B.10.5.
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It is more challenging to estimate the parameters governing the unobserved quality
that gets truncated at 5-star when a creator receives her first 5-star rating and makes
further submissions, because we do not directly observe the quality state beyond 5-star.
Yet, we can infer the distribution of the quality state from the observed probability of
winning (Pr(i win)) given the combination of actions each creator takes after receiving
her first 5-star rating, as follows. As discussed in Section 3.4.4 we introduce a series
of random variables, ξ = {ξ0, ξredesign, ξrevise, ξdo-both} to account for the rating system’s
truncation at 5 stars. Here we further parametrize the unobserved quality transition
process and assume that ξ. follows a normal distribution, ξ. ∼ N(µ., σ.2). The param-
eter vector {µ0, σ20, µredesign, σ2redesign, µrevise, σ2revise, µdo-both, σ2do-both} := θ12 can then be
estimated by maximizing the following likelihood:
L2(θ12) =
Q∏
q=1
||Nq,T+1||∏
i=1
{
Pr(i wins|{x˜k,T+1}k∈Nq,T+1 ; θ12)I(i wins)
[1− Pr(i wins|{x˜k,T+1}k∈Nq,T+1 ; θ12)][1−I(i wins)]
}
, (3.11)
where Q represents the number of contests in our estimation sample, and ||Nq,T+1|| is
the total number of creators that submitted designs to contest q.
3.5.1.2 Step 2: Estimating Parameters for Creators’ Utility Function (θ2)
Once we obtain a consistent estimate of θ1 = {θ11, θ12}, denoted as θˆ1, we can plug
these estimated state transition probabilities into the dynamic discrete game model and
estimate the parameters in creators’ utility function. We use the following notation:
c(ai,t=a) := ca, a ∈ {re-design, revision, and do-both} , and cet (dj,t=enter) := cet , for
t ≤ T . These six parameters – cre-design, crevision, cdo-both, ce1, ce2, ce3 – along with α, are
the parameters in creators’ utility function (θ2) to be estimated. At a high-level, our
step 2 estimation procedure contains four sub-steps:
(2.a) Fix a candidate vector of parameters θ2, and start the numerical search on
θ2’s parameter space.
(2.b) Given this candidate parameter vector, solve the dynamic game for the
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) and compute the creators’ conditional
choice probabilities in MPE.
(2.c) Based on the equilibrium choice probabilities from the previous step,
we compute the log likelihood of observing the actual creator en-
try/revision/redesign/do-both choices in the data.
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(2.d) Using the nested fixed-point (NFXP) algorithm, iterate the first three steps
in the parameter space, and obtain the maximum simulated likelihood (MSL)
estimate of the parameters, θˆ2, which best rationalizes the observed creator
choices.
In step (2.b), we solve the dynamic game for the MPE, using the “best response map-
ping (BRM)” method, which solves an inter-related system of dynamic programs for
the strategic interactions among creators: Given all other creator’ strategies (in the
form of conditional choice probabilities), we compute each creator’s most favorable
strategy; this process iterates, until a fixed point is found. This fixed point is a repre-
sentation of MPE in the space of creator choice probabilities. (Online Appendix B.6
contains details about the BRM algorithm.)
Using BRM for a contest with a large number of players involves solving dynamic
programs in an extremely large state space, which grows exponentially with the number
of periods.16 To ensure tractability we divide each 7-day contest into three periods –
Period 1 (Days 1-2), Period 2 (Days 3-5), and Period 3 (Days 6-7).17 In a so-defined
three-period contest, the seeker can give feedback at the end of the first and the second
periods (the feedback after the last period will not be able to affect creator behaviors).
Dividing contests into three periods significantly reduces the computational burden,
yet still allows us to capture not only the full feedback and the no feedback scenarios,
but also the early feedback and the late feedback scenarios. However, the number of
(xi,t, st) combinations is still extremely large in a three-period contest (see Footnote
16). To further reduce the computational burden, we employ Keane and Wolpin (1994)
(KW) interpolation to expedite the calculation of BRM.18
For a candidate vector θ2, we denote the equilibrium creator choice probabil-
ities computed in step (2.b) as Pr(djt|st; θ2, θˆ1) (djt ∈ D) for potential entrant
j and Pr(ait|xit, st; θ2, θˆ1) (ait ∈ A) for incumbent i. In step (2.c), the likeli-
hood of observing mqt out of ||Mqt|| potential entrants joining the contest q in
period t is: f e(mqt|sqt; θ2, θˆ1) =
(||Mqt||
mqt
)
Pr(dqt = enter|sqt; θ2, θˆ1)mqt(1 − Pr(dqt =
16 For example, in a three-period contest with 30 participants, the number of possible values for
xi,t is 5 +
(
3−1+4−1
4−1
)
= 15, and the number of possible combinations of st=3 is therefore
(
30+15−1
15−1
)
=
1.15× 1011; whereas in a seven-period contest with 30 participants, the number of possible values for
xi,t is 5+
(
7−1+4−1
4−1
)
= 89, and the number of possible combinations of st=7 is
(
30+89−1
89−1
)
= 9.52×1027.
17We also try two alternative ways of dividing a contest into three periods: (i) Period 1 = Days 1-3,
Period 2 = Days 4-5, and Period 3 = Days 6-7; (ii) Period 1 = Days 1-2, Period 2 = Days 3-4, and
Period 3 = Days 5-7. The observed conditional choice probabilities and choice-specific state transition
probabilities exhibit little sensitivity to how we define the periods.
18KW preserves the strategic interactions among creators in the dynamic game; please refer to
Online Appendix B.6.2 for details.
54
enter|sqt; θ2, θˆ1))||Mqt||−mqt ,19 and the likelihood of an incumbent i choosing follow-up
action aqit ∈ A in period t of contest q is: f(aqit|xqit, sqt; θ2, θˆ1) =
∏
a∈A Pr(aqit =
a|xqit, sqt; θ2, θˆ1)I(aqit=a). The joint likelihood to be maximized in step (2.d) is then:
L1(θ2, θˆ1) =
Q∏
q=1
T∏
t=1
[
f e(mqt|sqt;θ2, θˆ1) ·
||Nqt||∏
i=1
f(aqit|xqit, sqt; θ2, θˆ1)
]
, (3.12)
where ||Nqt|| is the number of incumbents in contest q up to period t. The maximum
simulated likelihood estimator of θ2 is θˆ2 =θ2 logL1(θ2, θˆ1).
3.5.1.3 Identification
We discuss the sources of identification. For step 1, θ11 is identified directly from the
frequencies observed in the data; θ12 is identified from the variation in the winning
probability resulting from different combinations of follow-up actions taken by creators
after receiving their first 5-star rating (details are provided in Online Appendix B.7.4).
These state transition processes, together with variations in award levels across con-
tests and the observed entry and follow-up action choices in the panel data of creator
activities, constitute the inputs for identifying the utility parameters in the second
step.
For step 2, we discuss identification of the parameters in creators’ utility func-
tions (θ2), starting from how the cost parameters are identified given a specific value
of αR (the product of α and R). For simplicity, we suppress in the utility and
value functions the dependence of these functions on αR for now. We can rewrite
incumbents’ (potential entrants’) per-period utility function as the sum of a deter-
ministic component and a random component, i.e., Ui,t(ai,t, i,t) = u(ai,t) + i,t(ai,t)
(U ej,t(di,t, εj,t) = u
e(dj,t) + εj,t(dj,t)). Our model does not contain creator-specific cost-
shifters. Initially it may seem that our model is under-identified, as cost-/payoff-shifters
are usually needed when estimating a dynamic discrete game with a generic period pay-
off function ui,t(ai,t, a-i,t, st) + (ai,t) (e.g., Bajari et al. (2010), Bajari et al. (2015)).
However, in our setting, opponents’ actions (new entries and incumbents’ follow-up
actions) only affect the evolution of their own state and the contest-level state and
do not directly enter the focal creator’s current period utility. This is because, prior
to the rewarding stage T + 1, the single-period utility is just the negative cost of the
action plus the individual-level choice-specific random shock; the award only occurs in
19We cannot observe each potential new entrant j’s decision; rather, we can only observe the
number of potential entrants who join the contest in each period.
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the terminal stage T + 1 (at which time there are no new actions taken). Formally,
ui,t(ai,t, a−i,t, st) = ui,t(ai,t, st); see Equations (3.2)-(3.3). Per Section 3.5 of Bajari et al.
(2015) (part of the argument leading up to their Theorem 2, appropriately adapted for
a finite-horizon game), we can identify ui,t(ai,t, st), as long as the conditional choice
probabilities Pi,t′(ai,t′|st′) (t′ ≥ t) are observed in the data. Thus, we do not need
cost-shifters to identify the model.
In brief, identification of θ2 is achieved as follows. (Please see Online Appendix
B.7 the formal identification proof.) For the award period, we observe in the data
the realized sT+1 and xi,T+1, and who wins the contest. With this information, we
can calculate the value function of the very last period V˜i,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) (in partic-
ular, V˜i,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) = αR · Pr(i winning in period T+1|xi,T+1, sT+1)). With the
last-period value function calculated, we can start performing backward induction to
identify the per-period utility for periods t ≤ T , leveraging the fact that this utility can
be decoupled from the (discounted) future period value function. Once current-period
utility is identified, we can further identify the costs of actions, because in our setting
the current period utility (u(xi,t, st; ai,t = k)) is only a function of i’s own action ai,t,
but not opponents’ actions a−i,t. (Note that opponents’ actions a−i,t only enter the
discounted expected future period value function by influencing the opponents’ state
transition.) Finally, the identification of α is enabled by variation in the award level in
the data. Creators’ behavior (more specifically their conditional choice probabilities)
varies with the award amount (R), and the degree of this variation helps us identify
α. Intuitively, if in the data, the probability of entry and the probability of follow-up
submissions are not sensitive to changes in the award level, then α is small; otherwise,
α is large.
3.5.2 Estimation Results
Estimates of Parameters for State Transitions (θ1).
Here we highlight a few observations of the state transition probability estimates (rel-
egated to Online Appendix B.8 to save space in the body). As might be expected, the
state transition probability estimates reveal that do-both is the most effective in im-
proving individuals’ highest design rating, leading to on average larger improvements
than redesign and revision do; however, the variation of the improvements from do-both
is also high. In addition, for creators with low ratings (below or equal to 3-Star), re-
design results in on average bigger, but more variable improvements than revision. For
creators who have already received relatively high ratings (4-Star or 5-star), revision
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leads to on average slightly larger improvements than redesign.
Estimates of Parameters for Creators’ Utility Function (θ2).
Table 3.2 reports the estimation results for the parameters in creators’ utility function.
The estimates are generally consistent with intuition. Regarding period-specific entry
costs, we have two observations. First, the estimated entry costs are always higher
than costs associated with incumbents’ follow-up actions. This is expected, because
in addition to the effort required to submit a design, the entrant also spends effort
discovering the contest, understanding the problem specification, etc. Second, the entry
cost is decreasing over time. One plausible explanation is that, by default, contests
that are closing soon rank higher on the site’s contest list. A higher position makes it
easier for creators to discover the contest, which reduces one component of the entry
cost discussed above.
As might be expected, among incumbents’ follow-up actions, the estimated cost
associated with the redesign action is higher than the estimated cost associated with
the revise action. Also, the cost of the do-both action is higher than the cost of redesign
only or revise only, but lower than the sum of doing both separately. Notice that these
cost numbers are not “per-submission costs”; rather, the costs should be interpreted as
the cost of employing only the exploration strategy, only the exploitation strategy, and
both strategies in one period. Each strategy can possibly involve multiple submissions.
Finally, the marginal utility of money (α), or the number of utils a creator receives
from getting an additional dollar of award, is estimated to be 0.034.
In summary, the parameter estimates show some interesting patterns. They are
also generally aligned with our intuition, which could serve as a check to make sure
our model generates reasonable results. In Section 3.6 we use the estimated structural
model to perform counterfactural simulations, to address our key research questions
about the effect of performance feedback on contest outcomes.
Table 3.2: Estimates for θ2, Parameters in Creators’ Utility Function
Parameter Description Estimate Standard Error
α Marginal Utility of Money 0.034 (0.002)
c(ai,t = redesign) Cost of Redesign 2.790 (0.010)
c(ai,t = revise) Cost of Revision 2.205 (0.021)
c(ai,t = do-both) Cost of Doing Both 3.319 (0.031)
ce1(di,t = enter) Period 1 Entry Cost 4.958 (0.028)
ce2(di,t = enter) Period 2 Entry Cost 4.326 (0.043)
ce3(di,t = enter) Period 3 Entry Cost 3.599 (0.014)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors, calculated with bootstrapping.
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3.5.3 Model Performance
Below we show the performance of our model in predicting the overall probabilities of
potential entrants’ entry and incumbents’ taking each follow-up action, and the contest
outcomes. Such aggregate measures are commonly used to demostrate the performance
of structural econometric models, especially for dynamic game models (e.g., Aksin et al.
(2013); Collard-Wexler (2013); Takahashi (2015); Igami (2017)).
Cross-Validation on Contestant Actions: We partition the data randomly into
four subsets and perform four rounds of cross-validation for all actions: new entry,
revise, redesign, do-both, and do-nothing (Online Appendix B.9 details the cross-
validation process). Table 3.3 reports prediction errors averaged across the four rounds.
These errors are small, suggesting that our model performs well in predicting individ-
uals’ actions. (Note that because the absolute frequency of redesign actions is small,
a small prediction error is magnified by the smaller denominator in the calculation of
the relative error.)
Out-of-Sample Prediction of Contestant Actions: Next, we perform an out-
of-sample test to illustrate the accuracy of the estimated model in predicting creators
actions in a hold-out sample. We consider a hold-out sample of 418 contests and 11,578
contest-creator combinations.20 We use the hold-out sample to test the out-of-sample
prediction accuracy of the estimated model, and report the results for different actions
in Table 3.4. As can be seen in table, the model estimated using the in-sample data
produces fairly accurate predictions for the actions observed in the hold-out data –
the values of the relative errors and absolute errors are small. Note that because the
absolute frequency of redesign actions is small, a small absolute prediction error can
lead to a large relative error (due to the small denominator). Hence, although the
relative error may seem high in the case of the redesign action, the corresponding
absolute error is small.
Performance on Predicting Contest Outcome: Apart from evaluating our model
performance in predicting creators’ actions, it is crucial to ensure our model performs
well in predicting the contest outcomes, because the purpose of this paper is to shed
light on how seekers should provide performance feedback to achieve better contest
outcomes (e.g., more high-quality design submissions, a higher best-design quality,
etc.). To test the model performance in predicting contest outcomes, we use the same
hold-out sample as in the previous out-of-sample prediction analysis of creator actions.
20The contests in the hold-out sample are similar to those in the sample used for the estimation in
terms of the award level, and are all with guaranteed award, single-winner, public and 7 days long.
Additionally, the seeker in all the 418 contests provided feedback throughout the contest horizon.
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We simulate the competition dynamics and contest-level outcomes for the 418 hold-out
contests using the estimated structural model. For each contest, we draw 50,000 sample
paths, and calculate the average numbers of creators whose highest rating at the end
of the contest is NA, 1-star,..., and 5-star, respectively, across the 50,000 simulations,
as the “simulated” numbers of NA, 1-star,..., and 5-star creators for that contest. In
Figure 3.3, black columns represent the average simulated number of creators whose
best rating is NA, 1-star,..., or 5-star at the end of each contest across the 418 contests.
The grey columns represent the actual average numbers of creators whose best rating is
NA, 1-star,..., and 5-star across the 418 contests observed in the data. Figure 3.3 shows
that the actual numbers observed in the data closely match the simulated numbers.
Thus, we conclude that our model performs well in predicting contest outcomes in the
holdout sample.
Figure 3.3: Model
Performance
Table 3.3: Performance of Cross-Validation for
All Actions
Incumbent Entrant
Do-nothing Redesign Revision Do-both Entry
Relative Err 0.56% 9.85% 2.91% 3.40% 2.66%
Absolute Err 0.43% 0.60% 0.34% 0.17% 0.08%
Table 3.4: Out-of-Sample Testing of the Model
With All Actions
Incumbent Entrant
Do-nothing Redesign Revision Do-both Entry
Relative Err 1.13% 9.22% 11.68% 4.54% 5.53%
Absolute Err 0.87% 0.63% 1.33% 0.24% 0.17%
3.5.4 Robustness Checks
We designed our main model to be parsimonious but effective. To ensure that our
empirical results are robust to our modeling choices and assumptions, we conduct a
series of robustness checks, including: (1) considering and estimating two alternative
“myopic” models of creator behavior; (2) considering and estimating an alternative
model that accounts for potential entrants’ strategic waiting behavior; (3) providing
a stratified sample test and reduced-form evidence to support our assumption that
creators are ex-ante homogeneous (in particular, we consider two most likely types
of creator heterogeneity — heterogeneity in creator ability/experience and interest in
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the contest); (4) re-estimating the model allowing creators to receive a non-monetary
reward from participating in the contest; (5) testing the sensitivity of the estimation
results with respect to the choices of the discount factor β, the number of potential
entrants ||Mt||, and the SIFT cutoff. Overall, the results from the robustness checks
either support our modeling assumptions, or suggest that the qualitative nature of the
empirical results are the same under alternative assumptions. The details of each of
the robustness checks are provided in Online Appendix B.10.
3.6 Counterfactual Simulations
Most crowdsourcing platforms suggest that seekers provide feedback throughout the
contest horizon. One of these platforms even uses the maxim “give feedback early -
give feedback often”. Following the platform’s suggestion, more than 70% of contest
seekers provide feedback throughout the contest horizon in our data.
To assess this common practice and quantify the impact of feedback on the contest
outcome, in this section we utilize the estimation results of our structural model to
conduct policy simulations. Specifically, we experiment with four alternative feedback
disclosure policies: (1) the seeker provides feedback throughout the contest (full feed-
back), (2) the seeker does not provide feedback at all (no feedback), (3) the seeker
provides feedback only in the first half of the contest (early feedback), and (4) the
seeker provides feedback only in the second half of the contest (late feedback).
Our policy simulations aim at studying the impact of feedback in the steady state
after the feedback policy change, holding everything else equal. Thus, we vary only the
feedback disclosure policy to examine its impact on creators’ equilibrium choices, while
fixing the action-specific quality transition parameters (θ1) and the number of potential
entrants in each period (||Mt||). Doing so, our policy simulations correspond more
closely to situations where (1) all seekers on the platform shift to an alternative policy
and thus the policy change does not affect some contest holders (seekers) favorably
and others adversely in attracting creators, and (2) seekers commit to the alternative
feedback policy, and creators are informed of when they will receive feedback and
make decisions based on their beliefs about the rating distribution in periods in which
feedback is not available.
Each of the four policies above requires its own model; the policies differ in
the feedback scheme the seeker commits to and follows, and accordingly the cre-
ators’ information set is different under each policy’s model. Note that the infor-
mation creators have (about their own and their competitors’ submission quality)
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is the only way that the feedback policies differ; other model primitives (param-
eters in the utility functions and action-specific state transition probabilities) stay
the same across all alternative feedback policies.21 It is also important to note
that, the overall quality transition probabilities (with action integrated out, i.e.,
p(xi,t+1|xi,t, st) =
∑
ai,t
Prt(ai,t|xi,t, st) · p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t)) will be different across the
feedback scenarios — (1) we model the quality-transition probabilities as being de-
pendent on creators’ actions ; (2) our counterfactual simulations capture the change in
quality-transition probabilities via the equilibrium action choices (i.e., Prt(ai,t|xi,t, st)),
which depend on the feedback policy (see Online Appendix B.12.2). Here is how we
incorporate the information differences. For full feedback, we utilize the model already
defined in Section 3.4, where state variables are based on directly leveraging the ob-
served ratings (note that ratings are truncated at 5-star, so as discussed in Section
3.4.4, a creator’s “true” quality xtruei,t is recovered also based on the number of actions
she has taken after receiving her first 5-star rating). In contrast, under the alterna-
tive feedback policies we experiment with (i.e., late feedback, early feedback, and no
feedback), creators can no longer observe the ratings throughout the contest horizon.
Hence, we model creator behavior in these alternative feedback scenarios with different
information structures, as follows. We assume that under the alternative feedback poli-
cies, creators track not only their own and their competitors’ realized ratings (if they
can see any), but also their own and their competitors’ actions in periods where cre-
ators do not receive performance feedback, as these are the (only) information available
to creators in contests with publicly viewable submissions. Based on this information,
creators form rational beliefs about what the distribution of their own best rating and
their opponents’ best ratings might be in those periods. For example, in the no feed-
back scenario, if a potential entrant sees a lot of existing creators have made multiple
submissions in the contest, she might form the belief that her opponents’ best ratings
are relatively high and that her chance of winning is low, and thus decide not to join
the contest.
Operationally, the state variables are defined differently in different feedback sce-
narios based on the information structure in each particular case – early feedback:
xEFi,t and s
EF
t ; late feedback: x
LF
i,t and s
LF
t ; no feedback: x
NF
i,t and s
NF
t ; and in the full
21We assume the action-specific quality transition probabilities are structural parameters – creator i
chooses her action ai,t based on her individual and contest-level state variables; and given her action
choice, the action-specific quality-transition probabilities no longer depend on the contest-level state.
This is not surprising, because the differences in action-specific quality transition probabilities already
reflect the different levels of improvement each action could produce. Empirical evidence supporting
this argument is provided in Online Appendix B.2.4 Table B.4.
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feedback case, state variables are directly based on quality state variables, i.e., xtruei,t
and struet . These x
•
i,t and s
•
t are mapped to the quality states x
true
i,t and s
true
t , with
the assumption that creators have rational expectations. With this modification, we
can use the BRM algorithm described in Section 3.5.1.2 to solve for the equilibrium
conditional choice probabilities (i.e., P∗i,t(ai,t|x •i,t, s •t ), where ai,t ∈ {revision, redesign,
do-both, do-nothing}), for each combination of (x •i,t, s •t ) in each feedback scenario. We
detail how we model creator behavior under each policy in Online Appendix B.12.1. In
essence, for the four feedback disclosure policies, our counterfactual simulations involve
solving four different versions of dynamic game.
Based on the simulation results, we compare the feedback policy performance using
three metrics: (i) the quality of the best design, (ii) the number of top performers
(creators with at least one 5-star design), and (iii) the total number of creators partic-
ipating in the contest. To capture the possibility that the relative performance of the
four alternative policies may vary across different award levels, we conduct the simu-
lations at a series of award levels ranging from $200 to $400, with steps of $50. The
award levels of most contests on the platform fall in this range. Given an award level
and a feedback policy, we simulate 50,000 independent contest outcomes, and report
the average value of the performance metrics across the 50,000 simulation paths.
3.6.1 Performance Metric I – The Maximum Quality
We first consider the best quality achieved by all contest participants. As discussed
earlier, in contests with a single winner, the seeker is likely to care most about the
quality of the best design (the extreme value). In Figure 3.4a, we can see that the no
feedback policy is dominated by all the other three policies, confirming that giving feed-
back generally improves the contest outcome in terms of the maximum quality. This
is not surprising, because feedback reveals how much the seeker likes a creator’s ex-
isting submissions, and this information guides individual creators to choose the most
productive follow-up action to hone, or revamp, their future design submissions to-
wards the seeker’s favorable direction (recall that actions exhibit different effectiveness
conditional on different base-score; see Section 5.2).
To further visualize the value of providing feedback, we can set a target best quality,
and compare how much monetary incentive (award) the seeker should provide to achieve
the pre-specified target. For example, if a seeker wants to achieve a maximum quality of
5.6 (the horizontal line in Figure 3.4a), he can either (1) set the award at approximately
$360 and provide no feedback, or (2) set the award at around $230 and provide feedback
62
(a) Maximum Quality (b) Number of Top Performers
(c) Number of Participants
Figure 3.4: Different Performance Measures for Contest Outcomes under
Each Policy
throughout the contest, or only in the second half of the contest. In this example, giving
feedback throughout or only in the second half of the contest can save the seeker $130,
which is roughly one third of the award that the seeker has to pay if he decides not to
provide performance feedback at all.
However, should performance feedback be disclosed “as early as possible and as
frequently as possible” as suggested by crowdsourcing platforms? Not necessarily.
Although the full feedback policy performs best most of the time, our simulation results
also show that the late feedback policy performs as well as the full feedback policy at
nearly all award levels experimented with, and its performance even exceeds the full
feedback policy when the award is around $200 or $300.
3.6.2 Performance Metric II – The Number of Top Performers
In many cases, innovation seekers would also like to have a large number of top cre-
ators to provide a richer set of high-quality submissions. Therefore, we consider the
number of top creators as the second performance metric; see Figure 3.4b. It turns
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out that the late feedback policy performs best at all award levels experimented with.
This may sound counter-intuitive at first, but when we look closer at the mechanism
through which feedback affects creators’ activities, the result makes sense. Under the
full feedback policy, feedback is provided from early on when there are only a handful of
participants. Most incumbents (except the very few in the lead) are discouraged from
taking follow-up actions, and potential entrants are also discouraged from entering the
contest. In contrast, under the late feedback policy, the feedback is muted at the early
stage of the contest – no creator is revealed to be in an advantageous position. More
existing participants will remain active in making new submissions, and more poten-
tial entrants will be willing to join the contest. By the time when the performance
feedback is disclosed, there will be more creators having good-quality submissions, and
they will continue making submissions based on the guidance from the seeker’s feed-
back (which helps creators choose the “most effective” follow-up strategy) in the last
period. Hence, under the late feedback policy, there will be more top performers at
the end of the contest.
As we did for the first performance metric, we can visualize the value of providing
feedback on the second performance metric (the number of top performers), e.g., see
the horizontal line drawn halfway up the graph in Figure 3.4b.
3.6.3 Performance Metric III – The Number of Participants
The results of our counterfactual simulations also suggest that the late feedback policy
outperforms the other three policies in attracting creators to the contest at all award
levels experimented with (Figure 3.4c). The reason for this is similar to the reason
we provided in the previous subsection regarding the number of top performers – the
disclosure of high ratings can discourage entry. However, one may ask, if the disclosure
of the performance feedback always discourages the majority of the contest participants,
why don’t we always mute the performance feedback (choose the no feedback policy)?
The issue with the no feedback policy is that, without the ability to distinguish between
high-performers and low-performers, the expected probability for each person to win
the contest decreases with the number of participants. Consequently, as the contest
becomes more and more crowded, potential entrants are less willing to join the contest,
and existing participants are less willing to take costly follow-up actions as well. As
we did when analyzing the previous two performance metrics, we can also quantify the
value of releasing feedback with the objective of attracting more participants, e.g., see
the horizontal line drawn halfway up the graph in Figure 3.4c.
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In summary, Sections 3.6.1-3.6.3 show the efficacy of late feedback as it strikes a
balance between encouraging entries/incumbents’ follow-up actions and provision of
direction for creators.
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies how performance feedback policies affect the outcome of dynamic
crowdsourcing contests. In such contests, new solvers can enter the contest at any time
before the contest ends; incumbent solvers can submit additional submissions that ex-
ploit their existing ideas or explore new ideas, and these two strategies require different
levels of effort and produce different distributions of quality improvement; and there
exist uncertainties in the relationship between effort level and performance. The role
of interim performance feedback on the outcome of dynamic crowdsourcing contests is
an important, albeit somewhat understudied element of crowdsourcing contest design.
We address this research question with a structural empirical analysis.
We develop a dynamic structural model to capture the economic processes that
drive creators’ participation behavior and how existing contest participants and poten-
tial new entrants react to the disclosed performance feedback. Our structural model
explicitly considers potential entrants’ endogenous entry processes, and distinguishes
between incumbent creators’ exploratory and exploitative follow-up actions. We re-
cover the parameters in the structural model using a rich real-word data set on custom
logo design contests collected from a major crowdsourcing platform.
Using the estimated structural model, we run counterfactual policy simulations that
provide important insights into the role of feedback disclosure policy in crowdsourcing
contests – they not only compare contest outcomes under alternative feedback disclo-
sure policies, but also quantify the value of providing performance feedback on different
performance metrics. In particular, we show that if all that the seeker cares about is the
maximum quality achieved, both the full feedback policy and the late feedback policy
perform quite well. If the seeker’s objective is to maximize the number of high per-
formers, or the total number of participants in the contest, the late feedback policy is
the best option. Feedback helps guide creators’ exploration and exploitation decisions,
but can have a discouraging effect on entries and incumbents’ follow-up actions. The
late feedback policy attains the former benefit while mitigating the latter problem, by
only giving feedback after many creators have had a chance to enter. If one considers
the cost associated with monitoring submissions and providing performance feedback
in real time (which we did not include in our formal analysis), the late feedback policy
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would become even more attractive for seekers. Given the above, our study may help
seekers make better decisions about feedback policies in practice, by highlighting the
merits of the late feedback policy. In fact, this late feedback policy has been used in
some existing crowdsourcing contests. For example, programming contests organized
by Mathworks start with a so-called “darkness” period, where participants do not re-
ceive any information about the performance of their own or other players’ entries.
Participants are given access to the information about the status of the competition
in a later stage of the contests (Balogh et al., 2010). On Topcoder (a popular crowd-
sourcing platform for programming and data science projects), coders are encouraged
to first submit ‘test examples’ to assess whether the code is complete and generates
reasonable results, and then submit ‘full submissions’ to access performance evalua-
tions. Coders can only view their scores and rankings on the leaderboard, after making
the first verified full submission, which resembles our late feedback policy.
Many contests settings share key features of our model. Consider algorithm design
as an example. First, many algorithm contests allow participants to join the contest
at any time and make multiple submissions throughout the contest period. Second,
in algorithm contests, the notions of exploration (redesign) and exploration (revision)
are still applicable. A redesign in algorithm contests would correspond to the action of
abandoning the original algorithm and switching to a completely different approach,
whereas a revision would correspond to the action of keeping the original approach and
improving specific steps. Third, there is performance uncertainty: in some algorithm
contests (e.g., Netflix and Kaggle), participants must submit the predictions generated
by their algorithm onto the contest hosting platform to see the relative performance of
their algorithm on a set of holdout labels in the form of its ranking on the public leader
board. Since the holdout labels are not visible to algorithm contest participants, they
do not know how well their algorithm performs until they submit their algorithm’s
predictions online. Moreover, the winner is determined by the prediction accuracy of
participants’ algorithms on a final test set, but not on the holdout labels, and therefore,
the leader board ranking calculated based on the performance of submitted algorithms
on holdout labels during the contest is not always the same as the final ranking that
determines the winner.
In addition to algorithm design contests, other types of contests sharing the key
features of our setting include, for example, web-design contests, print-design (e.g.,
designing communication brochure covers) contests, etc. Our structural model can be
readily applied to such contests. In the logo design setting, our main result is that
the late feedback policy performs well. The reason is that it strikes a balance between
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the discouraging and the guidance (explore vs. exploit) effects of feedback; intuitively
this is a general principle, hence we would expect late feedback to perform well in the
other settings as well. One note of caution is that in the logo design setting we found
that full feedback and late feedback performed similarly along the dimension of highest
quality score; thus although highest quality with late feedback was a bit better in the
logo design setting, for other settings it would be worthwhile to run an empirical study
and to do so one could utilize our structural model.
As one of the first empirical studies of large-scale crowdsourcing contests, our pa-
per makes a number of important contributions but also has limitations. First, our
results cannot be generalized to static, single-submission crowdsourcing contests, con-
tests where the entry and effort decisions are made in separate stages; contests where
creators collaborate rather than compete with each other; contests where the award
is not guaranteed, etc. Second, in our current analysis, we assume the contests are
independent of each other, and have not considered the creators’ choices among con-
current on-going contests. A systematic analysis of what factors affect creators’ choices
of which contest to join could be a productive direction of future research. Third, sim-
ilar to many prior studies of innovation-contest (e.g., Terwiesch and Xu (2008), Ales
et al. (2017a), Korpeoglu et al. (2017)), we assume ex-ante homogeneous creators and
creators’ heterogeneity is captured by their realized interim submission ratings. We
provide evidence that not modeling ex-ante creator heterogeneity (in creator experi-
ence and interest) does not significantly affect the estimation results in our research
setting. However, this may not be true in other settings. It may be a fruitful future di-
rection to look at how ex-ante (observed or unobserved) heterogeneity affects creators’
activities in other types of crowdsourcing contests. Lastly, we focus on the role of
quantitative performance feedback (i.e., ratings), and have not considered qualitative
feedback, given through private messages, for two reasons: (1) qualitative feedback in
the form of private messages is inaccessible to us; and (2) based on an interview with
a marketing manager of a major online crowdsourcing platform, qualitative feedback
occurs much less frequently than quantitative performance feedback. However, in other
settings where the qualitative feedback is more prevalent and available to researchers,
the effects of qualitative feedback could be a fertile direction for future research.
Despite these limitations, our paper is the first to provide a comprehensive dynamic
structural framework to analyze creators’ behavior in crowdsourcing contests. With the
use of the structural model, we are able to disentangle intertwining effects of feedback
on the outcome of crowdsourcing contests, helping both practitioners and researchers
obtain a more comprehensive understanding of this increasingly popular new approach
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for sourcing innovation. Although the focus of our paper is the role of feedback,
the structural framework we propose can be used to analyze other design issues in
crowdsourcing contests. We hope that our work can pave the way for future research
in this area.
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CHAPTER 4
SKU Proliferation: High-Dimensional Choice
Model and Online Retailing
Digital transformation is taking over the retail space. Yet, just as online shopping
is becoming more and more convenient for consumers; it is also becoming more and
more complex for retailers to manage. Great effort is spent on pricing, inventory and
assortment decisions, as online retailers often offer an astonishing variety of choices.
Moreover, given the existence of various advertisement and distribution channels, the
online shopping environment is often complex, making consumer decision journey in-
creasingly challenging to analyze.
To improve pricing and assortment decisions for these online retailers, an important
first step is to achieve a realistic understanding of the substitution patterns (cross-
effects) among a large number of products offered in the complex online environment.
Although classic choice models offer an elegant framework for estimating substitution
patterns among competing options, they have limited applicability and performance in
settings with a large number of products. (We offer a review of classic choice models and
their limitations in Section 2, and detailed performance comparisons of our proposed
approach against alternative models in Section 4-6.)
We seek to provide a novel solution to address this problem, i.e., estimating flexible
substitution patterns in presence of large choice sets. Before formulating the solution,
we realize that there are three challenges in estimating flexible and realistic substitution
patterns: First, the space of all the important product features can be extremely large
(for example, Feldman et al. (2018) utilizes millions of features in recommendation
system at Alibaba); Second, many of these product features are difficult to quantify
(e.g., shape of the product, and color shades and patterns) or to observe (e.g., product
information/advertisement from other online retailers or search engine could affect
consumer purchasing decisions, but might not be available to the focal online retailer);
Third, being exposed to various advertisement and distribution channels, customers
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in the complex online environment might exhibit extremely complicated purchasing
behaviors, which is hard to capture based on researchers’ prior knowledge. Due to the
first two challenges, we often fail to use the observed product features to capture all
the important factors determining consumer choices and product substitution patterns,
which leaves unobserved/uncaptured features in error terms. Yet, the last challenge
makes it hard for researchers to impose structures on these error terms by making
assumptions a priori.
To tackle those challenges, we propose a high-dimensional choice model that allows
for flexible substitution patterns and carries few assumptions a priori. We first lever-
age customers’ clicking activities; based on the likelihood of products being clicked
together, we use econometric and machine learning methods (i.e., Graphical Lasso)
to estimate a product network which captures the conditional correlation among the
underlying utility shocks of products. Next, we take the estimated product network as
an informative initial guess for the structured precision matrix, in estimating a multi-
nomial Probit model, where we allow for a flexible precision matrix among products’
error terms in the utility specification. We support this method theoretically and show
its performance in simulations and in an empirical setting. This method allows us
to uncover product substitution patterns with improved accuracy, while maintaining
computational feasibility. Lastly, based on estimated substitution patterns, we provide
demand forecasts and pricing recommendations to online retailers.
We test the performance of our method on synthetic data under various scenarios
classified based on precision matrix density, signal-to-noise ratio, high-low clicking lev-
els, etc. Compared to classical multinomial Probit models with iid error terms (IID
Probit models) and random coefficient models, our method consistently offers better
in- and out-of-sample performances, and provides more accurate demand forecasts—
out-of-sample MAPE of our model (18.48%) is significantly lower than that of the
random coefficient model (45.31%) and the IID Probit model (46.44%), representing
59.21% and 60.21% reductions in demand forecasting errors, respectively. By doing so,
we are able to recommend better pricing decisions— in comparison with the IID Probit
model (the random coefficient Probit model), we provide an 13.47% (29.05%) increase
in total profit when maximizing profits, and an average 17.40% (8.72%) increase in
total revenue when maximizing revenues. We notice that our model does particularly
well in improving profits among slow-moving products. Finally, we apply our method
to an online retailing dataset. We show that, in this empirical setting, our method
continues offering better in- and out-of-sample performances, and providing more ac-
curate demand forecasts. Out-of-sample demand forecasts are improved by 41.44% on
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average in comparison with the random coefficient Probit model.
Our study makes several contributions. First, we offer an approach to estimate
flexible substitution patterns for large choice sets. Realistic and flexible substitution
patterns are inputs for making many retailing decisions. We demonstrate that our
method offers a more accurate and realistic substitution pattern, helps retailers make
better demand forecasting and pricing decisions, and could potentially be further gen-
eralized to many other retailing applications, including promotion and assortment de-
cisions. Second, we combine the state-of-art Graphical Lasso method from machine
learning to the choice modeling framework. By doing so, we contribute to a growing
literature attempting to combine machine learning methods with economic methods on
consumer choice. These growing attempts advance the traditional econometric models
in answering new data challenges with the recent digital transformations. Finally, this
paper also contributes to an emerging literature that leverages consumer clickstream
data in choice models to help identify substitution patterns. With more data available,
we can make fewer assumptions a priori, but let the data inform the modeling decisions.
4.1 Literature Review
Our paper proposes a novel method combining choice modeling and machine learning
methods, and demonstrates the method’s potential applications in dealing with large-
scale problems in revenue management. We discuss how we contribute to four streams
of literature: (1) classic choice models, (2) large-scale choice models, (3) the application
of machine learning methods in choice models, and (4) more broadly, empirical revenue
management.
Classic Choice models. Choice models with Logit form (i.e., multinomial logit
model, or MNL) are widely adopted in demand estimation and revenue management,
since the corresponding conditional choice probabilities enjoy the convenience of closed-
form specifications. However, this appeal of the MNL’s closed-form specification comes
at a cost for demand analysis—the MNL model exhibits the well-known independence
of irrelevant alternatives property (IIA) property, which can impose unrealistic sub-
stitution patterns in demand analysis. (For example, the IIA property implies that
a focal product with a lower price gains share from all other products in proportion
to their original shares, regardless of how similar they are to the focal product. More
examples summarized in Train (2009).) This is problematic especially when it comes
to revenue management, because obtaining optimal pricing strategy relies on realistic
substitution patterns.
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Two widely used solutions to achieve a non-IIA specification are (1) varying the
error components in the latent utility specification (e.g., the nested logit or the general-
ized extreme value distribution model), or (2) shifting to a random coefficient specifica-
tion (e.g., mixed logit/Probit model). However, both are with limitations. The nested
logit model requires pre-knowledge about the product nest structure. The random
coefficient model, though theoretically can approximate any random-utility model to
any desired degree of accuracy (McFadden and Train (1997), often fail to achieve ideal
performance in reality, due to the imperfect choice of explanatory variables and the dis-
tributions for the random parameters. (See Section 4-6 for demonstrations comparing
our model with these alternative models.)
To achieve a fully flexible and realistic substitution pattern, an ultimate solution is
to use multinomial Probit model (MNP) with the error term follows a normal distribu-
tion with a flexible covariance matrix (Train 2009 p.103). However, this classic model
is rarely applied, because the number of parameters in the model is quadratic in the
number of products, making it infeasible to be estimated in most practical settings.
Moreover, unless we have tremendous amount of customers’ purchasing observations,
we cannot achieve efficient estimates of these extremely flexible models. We offer a
solution to this computational challenge by leveraging customer clickstream data with
Graphical Lasso, and incorporating the learnt information as structured covariance
matrix in estimating the Probit model.
Large-scale choice model. While we estimate a choice model with large choice sets,
we contribute to an growing literature of large-scale choice models. Studies here have
several different emphasizes, including (A) estimating a basket demand as the number
of potential product baskets increases drastically with more products in the choice set
(Ruiz et al., 2017); (B) estimating models with an improved computational efficiency
and potentially trading-off some accuracy in estimating substitution patterns among
all choices (Fox, 2007; Chiong and Shum, 2016; Amano et al., 2019); and (C) recovering
a realistic and flexible substitution patterns in presence of the large choice sets, while
maintaining computational feasibility. The focus of our paper is (C), which we discuss
in more details.
The closest to our method are papers estimating a structured covariance matrix. As
mentioned above, estimating a full covariance matrix in Probit models allows for any
substitution patterns, but generates huge computational burden. This computational
burden can be alleviated with an imposed structure on the covariance matrix (instead
of estimating a full covariance matrix for the errors). Yai et al. (1997) estimates a
Probit model of route choice where thee covariance between any two routes depends on
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the length of shared routes segments. Dotson et al. (2018) estimates a Probit model of
product choice where covariance between any two products depends on the perceptual
distance between choice alternatives; and the distance is parameterized by the observed
product attributes (i.e., the covariates). Our paper shares the same spirit—enjoying the
flexibility from Probit model, and meanwhile cutting down the parameters in inverse
covariance matrix (or precision matrix). But instead of making assumption a priori
(i.e., parameterizing the covariance with the observed product attributes), we let the
data tell us what structure to impose on the inverse covariance matrix by looking at
what products consumers click at the same time.
There are other papers approaching the problem (i.e., allowing for a flexible substi-
tution patterns in presence of the large choice sets) using aggregate demand models.
Smith and Allenby (2019) and Smith et al. (2019) propose random partition in estimat-
ing a demand model and use a Bayesian approach to flexibly estimate these partitions
using supermarket scanner data. Yet, the aggregate demand model does not capture
more micro-level consumer choice, making it hard to run counterfactual analyses based
on consumer behavior and to provide optimal solutions to retailers’ pricing decisions.
Moreover, the work considers single-layer, non-overlapping partitions, which could be
important to relax.
Machine learning methods in choice models and graphical lasso. Our paper
also contributes to an emerging literature on combining machine learning methods with
choice modeling methods. A couple of above-mentioned papers in large-scale choice
models are also in this area. Ruiz et al. (2017) apply machine learning techniques (in
particular, stochastic gradient descent and variational inference) to make the choice
model scalable for a large choice setting. Chiong and Shum (2016) use random pro-
jection to compress a high-dimensional choice set into a lower-dimensional Euclidean
space when estimating the choice model. Wan et al. (2017) use a latent factorization
approach that incorporates price variation. Our paper introduces the idea of using
Graphical Lasso, a tool popular in machine learning field, in estimating the structure
of the covariance matrix of errors in Probit models. Below, we briefly summarize this
approach and its use in other areas.
To uncover the important connections among a large number of products, we utilize
the consumer clickstream data and let the data inform us about the product network
using a Gaussian graph model. The edges in these Gaussian graphical models can
be interpreted as the direct influence between two nodes. Graphical Lasso method
eliminates spurious or misleading relationships by removing non-existing direct links
among a large number of nodes. Proposed by Friedman et al. (2008), Graphical Lasso is
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developed to estimate the precision matrix and obtain the graphical structure through a
penalized maximum likelihood approach. It is soon applied to different fields, including
neuro-science (Allen et al., 2014), information network (Gomez-Rodriguez et al., 2012),
biostatistics (Cai et al., 2013), and transportation (Yan and Kung, 2018). Similar to
Rothman et al. (2010), Yin and Li (2011), and Cai et al. (2013), we are aiming at
estimating a sparse precision matrix after taking into account for the effects of the
covariates on the mean utilities. It has not yet been applied to operations management
problems, nor to choice models.
Empirical Revenue Management. Finally, our research contributes to empirical
revenue management literature by providing realistic estimates for the substitution
patterns among products, which is an important foundation for revenue management
decisions in retailing context. Potential applications include dynamic pricing decisions
(Ferreira et al., 2016; Papanastasiou and Savva, 2017; Fisher et al., 2018) and inventory
decisions (Caro and Gallien, 2010; Gallego et al., 2020).
Closest to our work, there is a stream of literature in empirical revenue management,
that uncovers products substitution patterns. To describe the competitive market
structure and product substitution patterns, researchers have been utilizing the co-
occurrence of products mentioned in online discussion forums (Netzer et al., 2012),
customer reviews and the products they mention (Lee and Bradlow, 2011), and, similar
to our approach, online search data (Ringel and Skiera, 2016; Kim et al., 2010). With
the main focus being visualizing the connections among products, these work (most
with descriptive methods) does not provide an explicit elasticity matrix nor a straight-
forward solution for pricing decisions.
4.2 A Model with Flexible Substitution Patterns
In this section, we first present the choice model and discuss the challenges associated
with estimating the model. We then provide two solutions to address the challenges of
high dimensionality and limited variations in purchase data. Specifically, we estimate
a sparse precision matrix defined as the inverse of covariance matrix, while leveraging
denser substitution information provided through clickstream data.
4.2.1 The Model
Consider a product category with J products. Let uij denote the utility that consumer i
obtains when purchasing product j (j = 1, 2, ..., J). Consumer i can also not purchasing
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any of the offered products, i.e., choose the outside option with a utility ui0. Let yij be
a binary variable, where yij = 1 denotes consumer i purchases project j, and yij = 0
otherwise. A customer will choose the option j that maximizes her utility, that is,
yij = I (uij = maxk,k=0,1,2,...,J{uik}).
In particular, here is our product utility specification,
uij = vij + ij = α +Xijβ + ij, j = 1, 2, ..., J,
ui0 = i0.
(4.1)
The vector Xij captures product features, which includes time-variant, person-specific
characteristics (for example, product reviews, recommendations, prices and promo-
tions), as well as characteristics that are constant over time and across person (for
example, product specifications). The coefficient β captures sensitivities to observed
product characteristics. Since only the differences across these utilities are identifiable,
we normalize vi0 in the outside option to be zero. Error term ij represents customer
i’s utility shock of purchasing product j. Since only differences in utilities are identi-
fiable, we normalize the utility shocks of all products with respect to the utility shock
of the outside option. Specifically, we define a vector ˜i := {˜i1, ˜i2, ..., ˜iJ}, where
˜ij = ij − i0, j = 1, 2, ..., J . Vector ˜i is a normally distributed J × 1 vector, i.i.d.
across individual customers, with zero mean and variance–covariance matrix
Σ =

1 σ1,2 · · · σ1,J
σ2,2 · · · σ1,J
. . .
...
σJ,J
 . (4.2)
We only specify the upper part of the matrix because it is symmetric. The elements
in the lower part equal the corresponding elements in the upper part. Note σ11 is
standardized to 1 because the scale of the utility is unidentifiable and irrelevant.
The model is very similar to the standard Probit model, except for that the latter
assumes the variance–covariance matrix to be the identity matrix (i.e., error terms are
i.i.d. across options). The advantage of allowing a fully flexible variance–covariance
matrix is that it imposes minimal assumptions on substitution patterns (Train, 2009).
Recover a flexible substitution pattern by estimating the variance-covariance matrix
of error terms is greatly beneficial in online retail settings, since there might be a
lot of important product features not included in the observed product feature X for
the following two reasons. First, the space of all the important product features of
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a product can be extremely large. Second, many the product features are difficult to
quantify (e.g., shape of the product, and color shades and patterns) or to observe (e.g.,
product information/advertisement from other online retailers or search engine could
affect consumers purchasing decision, but might not be available to the focal online
retailer). Later, we are going to see this benefit from estimating the variance-covariance
matrix based on our simulation and empirical analyses.
However, the matrix Σ contains [(J − 1)J/2− 1] free parameters to be estimated,
which increases quadratically with the number of products. For example, if the product
category includes 100 products, then there will be (100 − 1) ∗ 100/2 − 1 = 4, 949
parameters to be estimated. In other words, the estimation problem becomes too large
to solve as the number of products rises. On the other hand, in contrast with the scale
of the problem, consumer purchase data are usually sparse, because a consumer only
selects one of the many options. As a result, most of the outcome variables take zero
as values. The limited variation among the outcome variables, or the sparsity of the
data, further adds to the difficulty of estimating a flexible covariance matrix.
4.2.2 Overview of Our Solutions
We offer two solutions to tackle these challenges. To address the dimensionality chal-
lenge, we estimate a sparse precision matrix, which is defined as the inverse of the
covariance matrix. To overcome the sparsity of purchase data, we leverage clickstream
data which provide denser information on what consumers consider as substitutable
products. We first summarize the insights and then discuss the details of the approach
in Section 4.2.3.
To tackle the dimensionality challenge, we leverage one critical property of Gaussian
variables and its implication in graph theory: the precision matrix of Gaussian variables
indicates conditional dependence. In particular, an element of the precision matrix is
non-zero if and only if the two corresponding variables are correlated conditional on
all other variables. Theoretical details of this property are formally introduced in
Section 4.2.3.1. In our setting, this property intuitively suggests a non-zero element
in the precision matrix of the unobserved errors indicates: the two products’ utility
shocks are correlated conditional on utility shocks of all the other products, in other
words, the two products experience common utility shocks that are unique to them
but not to other products—for instance, two sweaters both have unique lace trims
while others do not; two cosmetic products are both promoted by a Youtube influencer
but not other products. While there could be tens of thousands or even millions of
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product pairs, we note that most product pairs likely do not share (sufficiently) unique
utility shocks. Consequently, the precision matrix is likely sparse. Moreover, customers
typically consider a handful of options in their decision process even though hundreds
options are available, which also likely leads to a sparse precision matrix. As we will
show in Section 4.4.1, we find empirical evidence supporting our conjecture of sparse
precision matrices in various retailing contexts.
Next, to overcome the sparsity of purchase data, we leverage clickstream data which
provide denser information on what consumers consider as substitutable products. We
leverage consumer clickstream information to estimate the structure of the precision
matrix, that is, which elements are non zero. Clickstream data are helpful for two
reasons. First, clickstream data are typically denser than purchasing data. Many
consumers with clicking activities do not end up purchasing. According to recent
surveys,1 the average conversion rate in online shopping is often less than 4% across
many product categories and shopping channels. Even among consumers who decide
to purchase, they click more options than they purchase. Second, if we use purchasing
data to estimate the non-zero entries in the precision matrix, the identification needs to
reply on aggregate-level variations across time and markets rather than consumer level
variations, because each consumer only chooses one option. In practice, we may not
have sufficient variations across time or markets to estimate the precision matrix. On
the other hand, if we use clickstream data, we can exploit individual-level variations to
estimate which products are close substitutes, because we can directly observe products
that consumers consider at the same time. We prove that this intuition is true and
explain how we achieve the estimation in Section 4.2.3.2.
4.2.3 Estimation
We first introduce the theoretical properties of the precision matrix. We then discuss
the two stages of our estimation strategy. In the first stage, we use clickstream data
to estimate which entries of the precision matrix are non zero. In the second stage, we
solve the original estimation problem knowing which elements of the precision matrix
are non zero.
1Adobe Digital Index 2020 report: https://www.slideshare.net/adobe/adi-consumer-electronics-
report-2020.
Research from Episerver retail clients: https://www.episerver.com/reports/2019-b2c-ecommerce-
benchmark-report/.
E-commerce 2019 KPI report: https://www.wolfgangdigital.com/kpi-2019/.
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4.2.3.1 Theoretical properties of the Precision Matrix
The precision matrix Φ (Φ = Σ−1, where Σ−1 is from Equation (4.2)) have the following
properties.
Property 1: If  follows multivariate Gaussian distribution, the conditional in-
dependence between j and k given other variables (−j,−k) is equivalent to Φjk = 0.
Mathematically, Φjk = 0 ⇐⇒ j⊥k|−j,−k. This property is based on Hammersley-
Clifford Theorem (Hammersley and Clifford, 1971).
Property 2: Let G = (V,E) be a graph representing conditional independence
relations among , where V is the vertex set and E is the edge set. We denote (j, k) ∈ E,
if there is an edge between j and k. The edge between j and k is excluded from E if
and only if j and k are independent given −j,−k. Mathematically, j⊥k|−j,−k ⇐⇒
(j, k) /∈ E (Lauritzen, 1996).
We define the support of a matrix M as the (0,1)-matrix with ijth entry equal to
1 if the ijth entry of M is non-zero, and equal to 0, otherwise. Properties 1 and 2
suggest that the support of the precision matrix for Gaussian variables  represents
the conditional dependence among products’ unobservables. It also has implications
in graph theory—the support of the precision matrix can be represented by a graph
whose edges denote conditional dependence between corresponding products.
4.2.3.2 Stage I: Estimate the Location of Non-Zero Entries In The Preci-
sion Matrix
We leverage clickstream data to estimate the non-zero entries in the precision matrix.
At the time when consumers are deciding which products to click, the utility of product
j perceived by consumer i is denoted by ub. Specifically,
Assumption 1-Perceived Utility: The perceived utility, ubij, of product j for
consumer i is ubij = h(uij−ui0), where h(·) is a strictly monotonic (increasing) function.
(We further relax this assumption and allow for the possibility that consumers might
not be able to assess utilities precisely at the time when they decide which products
to click in Section 4.3.4 and Appendix C.5.)
We also assume a customer has a higher probability to click products with a higher
perceived utilities ub. We denote customer i’s clicking probability for product j by pbij;
in particular,
Assumption 2-Monotone Increasing Clicking Probability: Customer i
clicks product j with a clicking probability of pbij, and p
b
ij is strictly monotonic increasing
with ubij, in particular, p
b
ij = g(u
b
ij) and g(.) is a strictly monotonic increasing function.
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Assumption 1 assumes that a product’s perceived utility is an increasing function
of its actual utility and a decreasing function of the utility of the outside option.
Assumption 2 assumes that the products with higher perceived utilities are more likely
to be clicked than the less preferred ones. Under the two assumptions, a product with
higher actual utility is more likely to be clicked, everything else being equal. Moreover,
a customer with less preferred outside option will click more products, everything else
being equal. Both assumptions are intuitive and likely satisfied. For simplicity of
notations, we denote u˜ij = uij − ui0 and pbij = H(u˜ij) = g(h(u˜ij)) in the rest of the
paper. Based on Assumptions 1 and 2, H(.) is strictly monotonic increasing.
Intuitively, clickstream data provide information about the structure of the preci-
sion matrix Φ in latent utilities. Suppose we observe consumers who are likely to click
products j also tend to be more likely to click product k conditional on the probability
of clicking for all other products, and such conditional co-clicking behavior is not well
explained by the observed product features Xij and Xik, then it is likely that the unob-
served utility shocks, ˜ij and ˜ik conditional on ˜i,−j−k, are highly positively correlated.
Correspondingly, the ikth element in Φ is significantly positive. This aforementioned
intuition is indeed proven to be true. Namely, clickstream data inform us the positions
of non-zero entries in the precision matrix. Lemma 4.2.1 states this intuition formally.
Lemma 4.2.1 Under “Assumption 1-Perceived Utility” and “Assumption 2-Monotone
Increasing Clicking Probability”, controlling for product features Xs, pbij and p
b
ik are
independent conditional on pbi,−j−k, if and only if ˜ij and ˜ik in Equation (4.1) are
independent conditional on ˜i,−j−k, i.e.,
pbij⊥pbik|pbi,−j−k,X ⇐⇒ ˜j⊥˜k|˜i,−j−k,X .
Proofs for the Lemma are provided in Appendix C.1.
Let us denote the precision matrix of pb conditional on X as Φb with the jkth
entry being pbij⊥pbik|pbi,−j−k,X . Lemma 4.2.1 shows that Φb and Φ share the same sup-
port, where Φb denotes the conditional precision matrix of clicking probability among
products in the clicking model and Φ denotes the precision matrix among the unob-
served factors in the product latent utility in Equation (4.1). In particular, if and only
if σ(pbij, p
b
ik)|pbi,−j−k,X in Φb is non-zero (zero), σ(˜ij, ˜ik)|˜i,−j−k,X in Φ˜ is also non-zero
(zero), suggesting the utility shocks of products j and k are significantly correlated
(uncorrelated) conditional on the shocks of all other products. This is exactly how
we are able to learn the positions of the non-zero entries in the precision matrix Φ by
estimating the structure of Φb from the clickstream data.
79
As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, Φ is likely to be sparse; therefore, Φb, which shares
the same support as Φ, is likely to be sparse too. We apply the Graphical Lasso
algorithm developed by Friedman et al. (2008) to estimate the positions of the non-
zero entries in a sparse precision matrix Φb. Specifically, Φˆb is the solution to the
following optimization problem over nonnegative definite matrices Φb:
Φˆb = argminΦb
(
trSppΦ
b − logdetΦb + λ‖Φb − diag(Φb)‖1
)
, (4.3)
where Spp is the empirical covariance matrix of vector p
b conditional on product fea-
tures X.2 The term trSzzΦ
b− logdetΦb is the negative log-likelihood, where tr denotes
the trace and det denotes the determinant. The term ‖Φb − diag(Φb)‖1 is the sum of
the absolute values of off-diagonal coefficients of Φb. See Appendix C.2 for proof.
The Graphical Lasso estimator uses an L1 penalty to enforce sparsity on the pre-
cision matrix Φb through the tuning parameter λ: the larger the tuning parameter λ
is, the more sparse the precision matrix. There are several methods to set the tuning
parameter λ: cross-validation, BIC, or adaptive methods. We discuss these methods
in detail in Appendix C.4. The optimization problem in Equation (4.3) can be solved
using the blockwise coordinate descent approach in Banerjee et al. (2008). See Roth-
man et al. (2008) for the guaranteed convergence of this estimator. In particular, the
convergence rate of this estimator depends on the sparsity of the true precision matrix.
Upon obtaining the estimated Φˆb, we also compute the corresponding covariance
matrix associated with the sparse precision matrix (Σˆb = (Φˆb)−1). Now with this Φˆb
(i.e., for each element in the matrix, we know whether it is zero or not), we have learnt
the structure of Φ in the latent utility, which shares the same structure as Φb (according
to Lemma 1).
4.2.3.3 Stage II: Estimate The Probit Model with A Sparse Precision Ma-
trix
Knowing which entries in the precision matrix take non-zero values, we now return to
the original problem: estimating the choice model using purchase data. We fix the zero
entries in Φ to be zero, and focus on estimating its non-zero elements and coefficients
for product characteristics, i.e., α and β. For simplicity of notation, we denote the
vector of all the non-zero elements in Φ as γ. Specifically, we estimate α , β, and γ by
2In particular, Spp =
1
N
∑N
i=1[(p
b
i − βˆbpbi )(pbi − βˆbpbi )T], in which βˆb = SxpS−1xx and Sxp =
1
N
∑N
i=1(p
b
i − p¯b)(xi − x¯)T and Sxx = 1N
∑N
i=1(xi − x¯)(xi − x¯)T.
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maximizing the following likelihood function
L(α,β,γ) =
N∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
Pr(yij = 1|α,β,γ)dij , (4.4)
where dij indicates whether consumer i purchases product j or not based on the real
data,
∏J
j=1 Pr(yij = 1|α,β,γ)dij is the probability of observing the actual choice dij
made by consumer i, and Pr(yij = 1|α,β,γ) is the conditional choice probability
(CCP) of observing consumer i purchase product j given a set of parameters (α,β,γ).
Specifically, CCP is calculated as
Pr(yij = 1|α,β,γ) = Pr(uij > uik,∀k 6= j)
= Pr(vij + ij > vik + ik,∀k 6= j)
= Pr(vij + ij − i0 > vik + ik − i0,∀k 6= j)
= Pr(vij + ˜ij > vik + ˜ik,∀k > 0, k 6= j)
=
˜ij+vij−vi1∫
˜i1=−∞
· · ·
∞∫
˜ij=−vij
· · ·
˜ij+vij−viJ∫
˜iJ=−∞
F (˜i) d˜i1 d˜i2...d˜iJ ,
(4.5)
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function for ˜i (= {˜i1, ˜i2, ..., ˜iJ}).
We estimate the parameters in Equation (4.5) using simulated maximum likeli-
hood (SML) estimator, because the conditional choice probability based on normally
distributed error terms does not have a closed-form expression. In particular, the sim-
ulation of F (·) is performed using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator
(Hajivassiliou, 1992).
Note we do not use clickstream data in this stage of estimation for three reasons.
First, we would like to retain the generality of our method. To use clickstream data
in this stage, we would need to make additional structural assumptions about (1)
how consumers decide which options to click, (2) how a consumer’s clicking decisions
might inform us about his/her purchasing decisions, and (3) what product information
is not available at the clicking stage and what is available at the purchasing stage.
It is unclear whether these assumptions will be supported in each specific setting,
as consumer decision process will vary by contexts and platform designs. Second,
in the model applications, we run policy simulations by applying the model under
alternative product features, such as, alternative pricing strategies. If we need the
clickstream information to estimate the second stage, we would need to simulate all
possible subsets of products clicked by a consumer, which is a combinatorial problem.
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Lastly, using only purchase data and not making additional assumptions would allow us
to make fair comparisons between our model and other choice models. It better allows
us to assess the value of estimating a flexible precision matrix rather than ignoring
unobserved substitutability or making assumptions about it.
4.2.3.4 Stage II Extension: Polynomial Approximation
Even with a relatively sparse precision matrix, sometimes we may still end up estimat-
ing a large number of parameters if the space is large or if the precision matrix is not
sufficiently sparse. In this case, the estimation in Stage II may still take considerable
time because it involves simulation. Therefore, to further alleviate the computational
burden, we propose an approximation method.
Recall that in the first stage, we obtain an estimate of the precision matrix based on
clickstream information (Φˆb) using the Graphical Lasso estimator. So far, we have only
used it to obtain the positions of the non-zero entries in the precision matrix, but have
not used the levels of the non-zero entries. A larger entry in Φˆb would likely suggest
a larger entry in the precision matrix for the latent utility Φˆ.3 Therefore, we propose
to approximate the precision matrix Φˆ using a function of Φˆb. Specifically, instead of
estimating all the non-zero elements in the precision matrix, we approximate it using
a polynomial function. For a M -level polynomial approximation, we have:
φ˜jk =
M∑
m=1
am ∗ (φbjk)m−1. (4.6)
That is, we estimate M parameters in a = {a1, a2, ..., aM}.
Now, both the structure and the intensity of the precision matrix Φ are represented
by a small number of parameters in a. We thus revise the likelihood function in
Equation (4.4), in particular,
L(α,β,a) =
N∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
Pr(yij = 1|α,β,a)dij , (4.7)
and
Pr(yij = 1|α,β,a) =
˜ij+vij−vi1∫
˜i1=−∞
· · ·
∞∫
˜ij=−vij
· · ·
˜ij+vij−viJ∫
˜iJ=−∞
F˜a(˜i) d˜i1 d˜i2...d˜iJ . (4.8)
3This intuition is supported in our simulations (Section 4.3).
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where Fa˜(·) is the cumulative normal distribution of a vector of dimension J with mean
zero and variance-covariance Σ˜(a) = Φ˜−1(a), and the jkth entry in Φ˜−1(a) is specified
in Equation (4.6).
From now on, we refer to the original method without approximation as the full
model and the approximation method as the approximation model. We evaluate the
approximation model’s performance using synthetic data and empirical data in Section
4 and Section 5 respectively.
4.3 Performance on Synthetic Data
We now demonstrate the performance of the proposed method and fine-tune the es-
timation procedure using simulated data. We first describe how we construct the
synthetic data. We then discuss the following key points in the estimation process:
(1) selection of the tuning parameters, (2) stage I performance in recovering the posi-
tions of non-zero entries in the precision matrix, (3) stage II performance in estimating
model coefficients, and (4) product-level demand estimation accuracy of our method
in comparison with existing methods. These results will guide our estimation strategy
on the real data.
4.3.1 Synthetic Data Generation
Before discussing tuning and model performance, we first introduce how our synthetic
data are generated. We simulate consumer clicking and purchasing data based on
assumptions introduced in the previous section. That is, we intuitively assume that
consumers are more likely to click products that are of higher utilities in comparison
to the utility of the outside option (Assumptions 1 and 2), and purchase products with
the highest utility.
For the baseline case, we consider a choice setting with 20 periods, 500 customers per
period, 30 products, and 3 observed product features: x1,j,t, x2,j,t, and x3,j,t, where x3,j,t
denotes price. The scale of the underlying parameters and the distribution of product
features are set based on a real-world empirical setting, which we introduce in Section
5. In particular, we set: α = 0, β1 = 0.5631, β2 = 1.2568, β3 = −0.0144. The precision
matrix Φ is assumed to has 8% non-zero elements with the non-zero off-diagnol entry
positions randomly determined. The product features are simulated based on their
distributions in the real data. The resulting signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is 5.339. When
generating the clicking incidences, we assume that customer i clicks product j with a
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probability of pbij, which is increasing with u˜ij. In particular, we assume that H(.)
in Section 4.2.3.2 is a Sigmoid function, i.e., pbij =
exp(u˜ij+c
b)
1+exp(u˜ij+cb)
, where cb adjusts the
clicking level and is set to be zero in the baseline case. Later in alternative simulation
settings, we conduct sensitivity analyses regarding this functional form assumption,
the clicking level assumption, and other uncertainties during the clicking step.
Apart from the baseline choice setting, we also consider several variations of it in
alternative simulation settings. These variations help us understand how our model
performs under different simulation primitives. In particular, we experiment with dif-
ferent (1) signal-to-noise ratios (increase or decrease by 50%), (2) sample sizes (5,000,
10,000, and 20,000), (3) sparseness of the precision matrix (6%, 8%, and 10% of non-
zero entries), (4) numbers of products (50, 80, and 100), (5) clicking levels for the
clicking probability (cb = −1.409, 0, and 1.409)4, (6) two alternative functional form
assumptions for the clicking probability H(.) (i.e., a cdf function and a linear function,
refer to Appendix C.5 for more details), and (7) including uncertainties/noises asso-
ciated with the perceived utilities while consumers are making clicking decisions (see
Appendix C.5 for details).
4.3.2 Observing Only Clicking Dummies
In reality, we often cannot directly observe the underlying clicking probabilities pbij,
but only the clicking dummies realized from pbij. In particular, a clicking dummy zij
indicating whether a consumer i clicks product j, which is a draw from the Bernoulli
distribution with a probability pbij. In simulations, we demonstrate that, using the
clicking dummies can achieve results almost as good as using the clicking probabilities
when estimating Equation (4.3) in Stage-1. In particular, we solve for Φˆb,z as the
solution to the following optimization problem in Equation (4.9) over nonnegative
definite matrices Φb:
Φˆb,z = argminΦb
(
trSzzΦ
b − logdetΦb + λ‖Φb − diag(Φb)‖1
)
, (4.9)
where Szz is the empirical covariance matrix of vector z conditional on product features
X.5 In Section 4.3.4, we demonstrate that estimating Equation (4.3) and Equation (4.9)
provide similar have similar Stage-1 performance in terms of the error rates, and both
4We choose −1.409 and 1.409 as the clicking levels to test, since they meaningfully vary the clicking
probability: 0.5 ∗ std(uij) equals 1.409, where std(uij) is the standard deviation of the latent utilities.
5In particular, Szz =
1
N
∑N
i=1[(zi − βˆbzi)(zi − βˆbzi)T], in which βˆb = SxzS−1xx and Sxz =
1
N
∑N
i=1(zi − z¯)(xi − x¯)T and Sxx = 1N
∑N
i=1(xi − x¯)(xi − x¯)T.
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Φˆb and Φˆb,z are close to the true precision matrix used in the underlying data generation
process.
4.3.3 Tuning Parameter Selection
As we can see from the Graphical Lasso formulation in Equation (4.3), the tuning
parameter (λ) controls the accuracy and sparsity of the model. Various approaches
have been proposed to select the tuning parameter λ including cross-validation (CV),
BIC, and adaptive methods. We provide details of these methods in Appendix C.4.
We test the model performance under different tuning parameter selection methods.
Specifically, we measure performance using false positive error rate and false negative
error rate. The false positive error rate measures the percentage of zero entries in
the precision matrix labeled as non-zero by our method. The false negative error rate
measures the percentage of non-zero entries in precision matrix labeled as zero by
our method. We specifically account for both error types because they have different
consequences. Recall that in Stage II, we only estimate entries that are estimated to be
non-zero from Stage I. Therefore, false positive errors result in wastes of computation
time in Stage II, whereas false negative errors lead to biases in the estimation and
inaccurate model predictions. We consider false negative errors to be more problematic.
The results are reported in Table 4.1, with columns representing different tuning
parameter selection methods, and rows representing variations of simulated settings.
Comparing columns in Table 4.1, in general the adaptive method provides the best
performance. CV tends to select a large number of non-zero entries, which leads
to a relatively low false negative rate but a high false positive rate. BIC, on the
other hand, achieves significantly lower false positive rate, yet the corresponding false
negative rate is high. The adaptive method leads to more balanced performance—
the false positive rate and the false negative rate are both relatively low. Among the
different variations of the adaptive methods, the adaptive cross-validation approach
with squared-inverse, or A-CV, provides the best performance. Note that we test both
inverse data-dependent weights and inverse-square weights, and find the performance
is better when using squared inverse as weights. From now on, we use A-CV for the
tuning parameter selection.
4.3.4 Stage I Estimation Performance
We now discuss the performance in Stage I. Recall that in this stage, we estimate the
structure of the precision matrix, that is, the positions of non-zero entries. To demon-
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strate the performance of this step, we compare the structure of estimated precision
matrix Φˆb to the structure of the true underlying precision matrix Φ.
As shown in Table 4.1, our model does a good job recovering the structure of the
underlying precision matrix. Focusing on the results using Adaptive-CV in Columns (5)
and (6), our model achieves a false negative rate as low as 5.60% in the base case, which
suggests we successfully identify most of the positions of the non-zero entries in the
precision matrix. Our model also achieve a low false positive rate (6.50%) in the base
case. Figure 4.1 illustrates the performance of our method graphically. The upper panel
demonstrates how well we recover the true precision matrix, whereas the lower panel
demonstrates how well we recover the true covariance matrix in the base case. From
left to right in each panel, we present (1) the precision (covariance) matrix of consumer
clicking activities, (2) the precision (covariance) matrix of consumer clicking activities
conditional on product features, (3) the sparse precision matrix (or the corresponding
covariance matrix) estimated using the Graphical Lasso algorithm, and (4) the true
underlying precision (covariance) matrix. The zero elements in the matrix are not
colored, or colored white. Positive elements are colored red. Negative elements are
colored blue. The darkness of the color of each element represents how much the
corresponding entry deviates from zero—darker colors indicate larger absolute values,
while lighter colors indicate values closer to zero. As shown in the figure, precision
matrices Φˆb and Φ share a similar structure. Covariance matrices Σˆb and Σ share a
similar structure too. Moreover, we notice that the estimated covariance matrix also
shares a similar intensity structure with the true covariance matrix, as indicated by the
darkness of the color. This observation suggests that besides using the position of non-
zero entries in the second stage, we can potentially use the estimated covariance matrix
itself from Stage-I to obtain a proxy for the true precision matrix in the following stage.
We will test how well such approximation work in the second stage.
Next, we discuss how the model performance varies in different simulation set-
tings. We again focus on the results using Adaptive-CV in Columns (5) and (6), since
Adaptive-CV tend to be the best tuning parameter selection method compared to
others.
• Clicking Probabilities: Our model performs better in terms of the false negative
rate when we observe the clicking probabilities. This is expected, since the click-
ing probability gives us more information about the unobserved shocks in the
latent utilities. Yet, we notice that, using the clicking dummies in the base case,
we achieve similar performance—the false positive rate is even lower, and the
false negative rate is not much higher. This suggests that we can use clicking
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Figure 4.1: Figure Illustration of Stage I Performance
†
Notes: The upper panel demonstrates the model performance in estimation the precision matrix, whereas the lower
panel demonstrate the performance in estimating the covariance matrix. In both panels, the three figures starting
from the left illustrate how we recover the true precision and covariance matrices step by step. In particular,
we illustrate the empirical precision (covariance) matrix of consumer click activities (first left), the empirical
precision (covariance) matrix conditional on the product features (second left), and the precision (covariance)
matrix estimated using the proposed method (third left). The last figure in each panel demonstrate the true
precision (covariance) matrix, simulated using the base model introduced in Section 4.3.1. The tuning parameter
is selected using adaptive CV with inverse square weights. Red colors represent positive elements. Blue colors
represent negative elements. The darker the color, the larger the absolute value of the corresponding element.
dummies in the Stage-1 of our model.
• Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR): Our model performs well with higher and lower
SNRs. We notice that the false negative rate is even lower with a lower SNR.
This makes sense because in cases where the noise (unobserved shocks) is relative
high compared to the signal (observed features), it is even easier to detect and
estimate the precision matrix of the unobserved shocks.
• Sample Size: Our model maintains relatively low false positive and negative
rates when we double the sample size or decrease it by half. As expected, a
larger sample size leads to a slightly lower false negative rate.
• Sparseness of the Underlying Precision Matrix : Our model maintains low false
negative rates in cases where there are less (6%) and more (10%) non-zero entries
in the precision matrix. Yet, we note that the false positive rate is higher when
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the precision matrix is denser, for instance, the false positive rate is 11.50% when
the precision matrix has 10% non-zero entries. This is will slightly increase the
computational burden in the second stage. Even in this case, the false negative
rate is still very small (7.00%).
• Number of Products : Our model is able to scale up to handle a large choice set. In
cases where there are 50 or 80 products, the model keeps generating reasonably
low false positive rates. Though the false positive rates when there are 50 or
80 products are higher, it is not as crucial, since it just means more wastes of
computation time in step-2.
• Clicking Levels (cb): our model maintains relatively low false positive and neg-
ative rates with different clicking levels. We tend to have higher false negative
rates in cases with lower clicking levels. This is also intuitively: lower clicking
levels mean fewer products will be clicked, which reduces the number of clicking
observations and leads to less accurate estimates.
• Alternative Functional Forms H(.) for Clicking Probabilities : Our model can still
identify the true precision matrix with relatively low false positive and negative
rates when the clicking incidences are generated from clicking probabilities based
on alternative functional forms. In fact, both low false positive and negative rates
are comparable with the base case, suggesting that the performance results are
not driven by the functional form assumption we made in the data generation
process.
• Uncertain Perceived Utilities : Our model can still identify the true precision ma-
trix with relatively low false positive and negative rates with uncertain perceived
utilities. Note that xij measures potential noises associated with the perceived
utilities while consumers are making clicking decisions, which is formally defined
in Appendix C.5.
4.3.5 Stage II Estimation Performance
Knowing the positions of the non-zero entries in the precision matrix, we estimate their
values in stage II. We compare the in- and out-of-sample performance of our model
with alternative, commonly used discrete choice models: (1) the standard Probit model
with i.i.d utility shocks; and (2) the random coefficient Probit model, also referred to
as Mixed Probit model. Note that, in both alternative models, we keep the Probit
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specification ensure comparability with our model. Nevertheless, the comparison will
not be affected if we use logit models. In addition to estimating our model and the
two alternative models, we also estimate an approximation model as introduced in
Section 4.2.3.4, which further alleviates the computational burden when the option
space becomes exceptionally large.
We estimate all four models and compare the estimation results along the following
dimensions: (a) how well each model recovers the true coefficients; (b) model fits in
terms of in- and out-of-sample likelihoods; (c) in- and out-of-sample demand estimation
accuracy. The sample used for in-sample estimation is same as the base case synthetic
data. We generate another random sample of the same size and using the same model
parameters for out-of-sample tests. The results from all models are discussed below.
We report the estimation results in Table 4.2, where the columns represent the
true parameters and estimated parameters from four different models, namely, our
full model, our approximation model, the standard Probit model with i.i.d. errors,
and the random coefficient Probit model. As shown in the table, both of our models
(the full and the approximation models) generate significantly more accurate estimates
compared with the alternative models (the random coefficient model and the IID Probit
model). The %error in parameter estimates is significantly smaller under our models
(6.40% in the full model and 6.83% in the approximation model) compared to the
standard Probit model (19.29%) and the random coefficient model (15.06%). The
errors here %error are defined as the percentage deviation from the true parameters,
i.e., %error = |β − βtrue|/|βtrue|.
Our method also yields good performance fitting the data. The negative in-sample
and out-of-sample likelihoods are reported in the first two rows in Table 4.3. Both
the full model and the approximation model achieve lower negative in- and out-of-
sample likelihoods, i.e., higher in- and out-of-sample likelihoods, in comparison to
the alternative models. This suggests that our proposed method better explains and
predicts individual choices.
Most importantly, we are interested in how well our model predicts the demand for
each product. This could be crucial building blocks for important decisions such as
assortment and pricing decisions. We measure demand estimation error using MAPE
(mean absolute percentage error) and MSE (mean squared error). In particular,
MAPE =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
J
J∑
j=1
|Dej,t −Daj,t|
Daj,t
, (4.10)
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MSE =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
J
J∑
j=1
(Dej,t −Daj,t)2. (4.11)
In Equations (4.10) and (4.11), Daj,t summarizes the total actual demand of product j
in period t, whereas Dej,t is its counterpart in the estimation. In particular,
Daj,t =
N∑
i=1
dij,t, (4.12)
where dij,t indicates whether customer i arriving at time t purchases product j or not
in the synthetic data; and
Dej,t =
N∑
i=1
Pr(yij,t = 1), (4.13)
where Pr(yij,t = 1) is the conditional choice probability predicted by the model.
The results are reported in the last four rows in Table 4.3. Note that the first
column indicates the demand estimation accuracy using the true parameters, which
help us understand the intrinsic level of variability beyond what any model can ex-
plain. Even when we know the underlying data generation process, we cannot always
perfectly predict the realized demand—we cannot observe the error terms (or utility
shocks) in individual consumers’ utilities realized from the true data generation pro-
cess, and thus, cannot perfectly predict the day-to-day demand realizations on the
product level. In sum, our model demonstrates a performance that is very close to
the true model, and is significantly better than the alternative models both in sam-
ple and out of sample. Taking out-of-sample MAPE for example, our model has an
MAPE of 18.48%, and it is only slightly larger than the MAPE from the true model
(16.81%). Our model’s MAPE is significantly lower than that of the random coefficient
model (45.31%) and the IID Probit model (46.44%), representing 59.21% and 60.21%
reductions, respectively. Moreover, our approximation model also achieves much lower
demand estimation error in comparison to the two alternative models (19.36% com-
pared to 45.31% and 46.44%). The MAPE of the approximation model is also close
to that of the true model, which is 16.81%. This result suggests that the approxima-
tion model preserves a desirable performance while saving significant computational
time—in particular, from 2374 minutes to 336 minutes. The improvements in MAPE
might be surprising large. Intuitively, we can provide such significant improvements
in MAPE for the following reason. We do a better job in accurately estimating the
changes in demands for a large number of products, many of which are slow-moving
with low demand levels. For these slow-moving products, even a slightly improved ab-
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solute demand estimation accuracy can translate into a large reduction in the relative
demand estimation error.
4.4 An Empirical Example
We test our method using data from a leading international online retailer. We dis-
cuss the empirical setting, the estimation results and the in-sample and out-of-sample
performance below.
4.4.1 Empirical Setting and Data
We obtain detailed information of product prices, product features, as well as customer
clickstream and purchase decisions from a large international retailer. Specifically, the
data are generated on the mobile app of the sponsor’s e-commerce platform. There are
three distinguishing features of our data. First, our retail partner recorded and made
available to us product features and prices at the exact time when a consumer clicks
or purchases a product. As product features and prices change dynamically over time,
consumers substitute among the offered products. Such variations are instrumental for
us to estimate the substitution patterns across products. Secondly, our retail partner
provides product features capturing the matching score between a consumer and a
product, and this score feeds into the retail’s recommendation system. Controlling for
this matching score allows us to control for the effects’ of the recommendation system
in real time. Lastly, the retail partner made available to us consumer IDs linking all
consumer activities (clicks and purchases), which is essential for the first stage of our
estimation. The co-click patterns provide information about which products are close
substitutes after controlling for co-movement caused by observable product features.
Specifically, the dataset contains the clicking and purchasing history of all user
searching kitchen appliances through the retailer’s mobile app platform during the
observation period from April 1, 2018 to April 14, 2018. There are 46 products with at
least one impression during the study period and 32,217 consumers.6 For each consumer
impression, the dataset includes the product’s features and its price at the time of the
impression.7 Note that the application of the discrete choice model typically requires a
6Note that there are in total 82 products in this category. However, if a product is never clicked
by any consumer, then there is almost no information that one can use to estimate its substitution
patterns with other products. Therefore, we do not include those products in our analyses.
7Like most retailers, our retail partner only archives a product’s information when the product is
viewed or purchased by a customer. Since product features and prices can vary dynamically (daily,
in out setting), features and prices for products with low impressions are not always observable.
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single choice setting, where consumer chooses only one option. The category of kitchen
appliances is suitable for this analysis because most consumers purchase zero or one
product. In particular, we observe only 10 out of 32,217 consumers purchase more
than one products from this product category in a day. We therefore exclude them
from the analyses. A second reason why the kitchen appliance category is a good fit
for our analysis is that consumers purchase kitchen appliances infrequently. Unlike in
other categories such as consumer packaged goods, consumers will not stockpile kitchen
appliances. In particular, we only observe 1242 out of all 32,217 consumers, or 3.86%,
have impressions on multiple days. For the purpose of our analysis, we treat the same
consumer on different days as different consumers.
Similar to other retail settings, we observe a large portion of consumers with no-
purchase. Specifically, around 96.11% of the consumers did not purchase any product.
It is likely that some of the consumers who did not purchase anything are just casual
“browser”. With most of the consumers being “browsers”, it is difficult for us to
illustrate our model performance – there is little room left for any demand forecasting
improvement, as we can just forecast that the consumers are not going to purchase
anything and achieve a fairly high accuracy. To alleviate this issue, we refer to Feldman
et al. (2018) and balance our sample,8 so that we can focus on studying how well our
model recovers the substitution patterns among all the offered products. Note that the
balancing will not affect our MAPE measures, since both the denominators (Daj,t) and
the numerators (|Dej,t −Daj,t|) in Equation (4.10) are being balanced proportionally.
On average, a customer clicks 0.593 products after seeing the initial product display.
Among all consumers in our sample, 1,254 purchased an item. To understand the co-
clicking behavior, we plot the click correlation matrix in Figure 4.2a, which represents
the degree to which two products are clicked together by the same consumer. As shown
in Figure 4.2a, the co-clicking matrix is fairly sparse. This supports our assumption
that the underlying precision matrix is likely sparse. As a sanity check, we plot the
products displayed for the same consumers at the same time in Figure 4.2b, and see
that the co-impression plot is not sparse.
In our analysis, we focus on three most important product features selected us-
ing the gradient boosting method—(1) consumer preference score (scoreij,t): the
Therefore, for days on which we do not observe a product’s features and price, we interpolate the
missing values by taking the average of values before and after the missing period.
8In particular, we randomly discard 96% of the no-purchase events, and focus on the rest of the
events as working sample. Namely, the sample consists of 4% of the consumers who did not purchase
anything, and all the consumers who ended up purchasing the products. In this balanced sample of
2491 consumers, on average consumers buy 0.494 products.
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(a) Co-click (b) Co-impression
Figure 4.2: Co-click and Co-impression Behavior
individual-specific consumer preference score calculated based on i2i algorithm, which
intuitively represents how likely a consumer is going to purchase this product based on
his/her previous activities on the platform calculated by a machine learning algorithm,
(2) display record (displayj,t): the number of times the product is displayed histori-
cally, (3) product price (pricej,t). The summary statistics for these product features
are reported in Table in Appendix .
4.4.2 Estimation Results
We analyze this dataset using our two-stage method. We first estimate the positions
of non-zero entries of a sparse precision matrix using clickstream data, which is shown
in Figure 4.3. Next, we estimate the parameters in the choice model knowing the
positions of the non-zero entries in the precision matrix. We estimate the parameters
using the full model as well as the approximation model. Results of these two models
are presented in the first two columns of Table 4.4. We also estimate the parameters
using traditional models: the random coefficient model and the IID Probit model. The
results are shown in the last two columns in Table 4.4. Our models have lower negative
log likelihood—in other words, the highest likelihood—compared to traditional models,
which suggests they fit better with the empirical observations.
We now assess the model performance in terms of demand prediction accuracy. We
again compute both in-sample and out-of-sample MAPE and MSE as in the previous
section. The results are reported in Table 4.5. Our models have lower in-sample and
out-of-sample errors compared to traditional models. For example, the in-sample (out-
of-sample) MAPE of our full model is 15.79% (16.38%), which is 37.59% (41.44%) lower
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Precision Matrix In Stage I
Notes: The figure demonstrates the precision matrix of the utility stocks in the empirical setting
estimated from Stage I of our model. Red colors represent non-zero elements. The darker the color,
the larger the absolute value of the corresponding element. In Stage II, we estimate the exact values
of the non-zero elements in the precision matrix.
than the that under the random coefficient Probit model, and 57.02% (59.12%) lower
than that under the standard Probit model with iid errors. Our approximation model
also has similar performance to our full model, and is significantly more accurate than
the alternative models. Finally, we see a similar performance gap using MSE as the
performance measure.
4.5 An Application in Managing Products’ Prices
So far we demonstrate our model out-performs traditional models in both simulated
settings and a real-world empirical setting. Our model can be used to assist firms in
making various business decisions such as assortment planning, inventory management,
pricing and so forth. In this section, we illustrate how it can be used to make better
pricing decisions. In particular, we show that our model obtains a better estimate
of product substitution patterns compared to traditional models. As a result, we are
able to make better price recommendations that lead to larger profit or revenue gains.
For the purpose of evaluating potential profit/revenue gains, we utilize the synthetic
data generated in Section 4.3. Since we know the underlying true demand model that
generates the data, we can use it to simulate demands and profits/revenues under price
recommendations made using our model and the traditional models, and then compare
them.
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4.5.1 Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities
As in Equation (4.13), the expected demand for product j predicted by model m is
calculated as
Dmj =
N∑
i=1
Prm(yij = 1|X; θm)
=
N∑
i=1
˜ij+vij(θ
m)−vi1(θm)∫
˜i1=−∞
· · ·
∞∫
˜ij=−vij(θm)
· · ·
˜ij+vij(θ
m)−viJ (θm)∫
˜iJ (θm)=−∞
Fθm(˜i) d˜i1 d˜i2...d˜iJ ,
(4.14)
where X is the given set of product features, and θm summarizes the set of pa-
rameters under choice model m. In particular, we evaluate four models: (1) the
full version of our model (i.e., m = Full Model), (2) our model with approxima-
tion (i.e., m = App Model), (3) standard Probit model with iid error terms (i.e.,
m = IID Probit), and (4) random coefficient Probit model (i.e., m = Random Coef).
In our full model, the parameter space θFull Model = {α, β, γ}. Recall α and β represent
the coefficients of observed product features, and γ represents the non-zero elements
in the precision matrix. In our approximation model, θApp Model = {α, β,a}, where a
is used to polynomial approximation of non-zero elements in the precision matrix. In
the IID Probit model, θIID Probit = {α, β}). Finally, in the random coefficient model,
θRandom Coef = {µ(α), σ(α), µ(β), σ(β)}, where µ and σ represent the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the corresponding parameter.
Based on these demand functions, we can estimate the substitution patterns across
different products. Specifically, we compute own-price and cross-price elasticities, in-
dicating how a marginal change in one product’s price will affect its own demand and
other products’ demand. Let ekj denote the elasticity of product j’s demand to product
k’s price. With any given demand model m, we have
emkj =
%∆Dmj
%∆pk
=
∆Dmj
∆pk
· pk
Dmj
. (4.15)
Let matrix Em denote the own- and cross-price elasticity matrix under model m.
Recall that CCP under normal distribution does not have a close-form solution, and as
a result, we calculate the elasticity matrices numerically. We first evaluate the expected
demand under a specific price vector. We then change the price for one product by a
small amount (i.e., ∆p = 0.001), and re-evaluate the expected demand under the new
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price vector. To demonstrate how well our models recover the true substitution pattern
compared to traditional models, we measure the deviation of the estimated elasticity
matrices (EFull Model, EApp Model, EIID Probit, and ERandom Coef) from the true elasticity
matrix (ETrue). The true elasticity matrix is calculated based on the true model of the
underlying data generate process—in particular, the kjth entry eTruekj in the elasticity
matrix ETrue is calculated as: eTruekj =
%∆DTruej
%∆pk
=
∆DTruej
∆pk
· pk
DTruej
, where DTruej is the
aggregate demand for product j predicted by the true model. After obtaining the
true elasticity matrix ETrue, we measure how far estimated elasticity matrices deviates
from ETrue. Specifically, we measure the deviations using both the absolute and the
euclidean distances:
DistmAbs =
∑
k
∑
j
|emkj − eTruekj |, (4.16a)
DistmEuc =
√∑
k
∑
j
(emkj − eTruekj )2. (4.16b)
The results are presented in Table 4.6. As shown in the table, the elasticity matrices
estimated using our models are closer to the true elasticity matrix. In particular, the
distances under our models are only half of those under the IID Probit and the random
coefficient models. The improvement brought by our model in recovering the “true”
substitution pattern is an important building block for making better pricing decisions,
as illustrated in the next subsection.
4.5.2 Price Recommendations and Profit Gains
As described in the earlier subsection, our model better recovers the underlying sub-
stitution pattern among products. It has many business implications such as better
demand forecasting, assortment planning, pricing and promotional decisions.9 In this
section, we illustrate one such application in making pricing decisions. Consider a
retailer selling J substitutable products. The retailer either maximizes profit or max-
imizes revenue while subject to margin constraints. Given any demand model m,
the retailer chooses optimal prices for J products over a time period t = 1, 2, ..., T ,
9Note that, our model can capture the effect of a recommendation system by capturing in X how
this system recommends a product to a consumer (for example, including score in the empirical model
in Section 4.4.1). Estimating such model helps us understand consumer demands under alternative
designs of the recommendation system, namely, alternative Xs. However, in other cases where multiple
recommendation channels exist and it is hard to capture all systems’ effects in X, our model predicts
consumer demands and offers pricing strategies under the current recommendation systems. In these
cases, we would need to re-estimate our model if the recommendation systems change.
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p = {pj,t}j=1,2,...,J ;t=1,2,...,T , to either (1) maximize the total profit pimprofit based on
Equation (4.17), or (2) maximize the total revenue pimrevenue based on Equation (4.18):
p∗mprofit :=p pi
m
profit(p) =p
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
Dmj,t(pt) (pj,t − cj) , (4.17)
or
p∗,mrevenue :=p pi
m
revenue(p) =p
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
Dmj,t(pt) · pj,t,
s.t., pj,t > (1 +MPM) · cj,
(4.18)
where Dmj,t represents the demand for product j in period t predicted by model m
(recall from Equation (4.14)), cj is the unit marginal cost of product j, and MPM is the
minimum profit margin for the retailer, and p∗mprofit and p
∗m
revenue denotes the optimal price
vectors for J products under demand model m when the retailer is maximizing profit
and revenue, respectively. We solve the maximization problem under each demand
model m, including our full model, our approximated model, the Probit model with iid
error term, and the random coefficient model. With the price vectors recommended by
each demand model m, we then simulate the “true” expected profit/revenue under each
m. Note that since we know the “true” demand model, which is used in the synthetic
data generation process, we can simulate the expected sales and the expected profit or
revenue given any price vector.
We report the profit/revenue performance in Table 4.7. In the upper and lower two
sections of Table 4.7, namely, “Profit when Maximizing Profits” and “Revenue when
Maximizing Revenues”, we report the average profit and revenue obtained under each
model when the retailer’s goal is to maximize profit and revenue, respectively. Our
models, the full version and the approximated version, achieve better overall perfor-
mance than the IID Probit model and the random coefficient model. Specifically, when
the retailer’s goal is to maximize profit, our full model achieves 32.267 profit, which is
13.47% higher than the IID Probit model (28.438) and 29.05% higher than the random
coefficient model (25.003). We also divide the products into slow-moving products and
fast-moving products, which are the one third of the products with the least and most
amount of sales. We notice that our model does particularly well in improving profits
among slow-moving products. Our full model achieves more than twice of the profit
among slow-moving products than the IID Probit model, while trading-off a slightly
lowered profit with fast-moving products. When the retailer’s goal is to maximize
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revenue, our full model achieves 29.05 revenue, which is 17.40% higher than the IID
Probit model (106.110) and 8.72% higher than the random coefficient model (114.583).
Similar to the results of profit maximization, we find that our model does particularly
well in improving revenues among slow-moving products.
4.6 Conclusion and Contribution
To improve demand estimation and pricing decisions, an important first step is to
achieve a realistic understanding of the substitution patterns among products. Yet,
it is challenging to do so among a large number of products and in the complex on-
line environment. We propose a methodology that combines a machine learning tool
(namely, Graphical Lasso) with choice models to tackle this challenge. There are two
major innovations in our method. First, we leverage consumer clickstream data to iden-
tify the product network based on the error terms. Second, we introduce Graphical
Lasso method to the choice modeling framework in identifying the product substitution
patterns.
Our method performs well using synthetic data under various scenarios (classified
based on precision matrix density, signal-to-noise ratio, high-low clicking levels, etc) in
recovering the true underlying product network. The method is also robust to several
types of noises in consumers clicking step—our method could still successfully recover
the true underlying product network, even when we consider the fact that (1) con-
sumers might not be able to evaluate the product utilities while clicking, or (2) might
have a limited attention span to click all the good products. Compared to classical
multinomial Probit model with iid error terms, our method consistently offers bet-
ter in- and out-of-sample fit with the data (the out-of-sample negative Log likelihood
reduced from 29097 to 27460 using synthetic data), and provides more accurate de-
mand forecasts—out-of-sample MAPE is reduced from 46.44% to 18.48%, representing
a 60.21% reduction. Our method even outperforms the more advanced random coef-
ficient model—the out-of-sample MAPE reduced from 45.31% to 18.48% on average,
suggesting an improved demand estimation accuracy by 59.21%. By doing so, we are
able to recommend better pricing decisions—in comparison with the IID Probit model
(the random coefficient Probit model), we provide an 13.47% (29.05%) increase in total
profit when maximizing profits, and an average 17.40% (8.72%) increase in total rev-
enue when maximizing revenues. Applying our method to the real online retail setting,
we show that our method continues offering better in- and out-of-sample performances,
and providing more accurate demand forecasts—out-of-sample demand forecasts are
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on average improved by 59.12% and 41.44% in comparison with the IID Probit model
and the random coefficient model respectively.
Practically, our proposed method can be readily applied by online retailers to var-
ious business settings with large choice sets. This includes demand estimation for
inventory and transshipment decisions, as well as a variety of other operational deci-
sions, such as promotion and assortment planning decisions. We find that capturing
the product network via Graphical Lasso approach will lead to a more accurate de-
mand estimation (avoiding around 50% demand estimation error), and more accurate
own-price and cross-price elasticity estimates. This highlights the importance of incor-
porating information learned from consumers’ clicking activities as well as combining
state-of-art machine learning methods with the choice modeling framework.
Our analysis is, of course, not without limitations. First, this study focuses on
the demand forecasting on the product-level, which assists retailers making important
operational decisions, such as demand forecasting and product pricing. It would be
interesting to see how clickstream information could help inform demand estimation for
each consumers, which could help retailers make promotion decisions for each individual
consumers or groups of consumers. Second, we learn the product network based on
error terms by observing the consumer co-click activities among the offered products.
An important extension is learning the product network for new products based on pre-
existing products. This could help retailers determine ordering quantities and making
pricing decisions for newly introduced products.
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Table 4.1: Precision Matrix Estimation Accuracy on Simulated Data
CV . BIC . A-CV . A-BIC
FN FP FN FP FN FP FN FP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Main 5.60% 8.90% 5.56% 2.90% 5.60% 6.50% 5.60% 10.40%
Observe Click Probability 0.00% 13.04% 0.00% 5.31% 0.00% 7.73% 0.00% 14.49%
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)
SNR + 50% 5.60% 7.20% 13.89% 1.69% 5.60% 5.30% 5.60% 10.90%
SNR - 50% 0.00% 10.90% 2.78% 4.35% 0.00% 9.20% 0.00% 13.00%
Sample Size
Sample = 5000 5.60% 7.20% 8.33% 2.17% 5.60% 4.10% 5.60% 9.90%
Sample = 20000 2.80% 12.80% 2.78% 3.14% 2.80% 8.70% 2.80% 11.80%
Sparseness of Precision Matrix
Chol 6% 3.20% 8.40% 3.23% 2.39% 3.20% 6.90% 3.20% 11.00%
Chol 10% 4.70% 16.00% 9.30% 5.16% 7.00% 11.50% 4.70% 21.10%
Number of Products
Prod = 50 3.70% 22.24% 23.46% 2.48% 6.17% 16.60% 3.70% 27.12%
Prod = 80 5.80% 36.92% 43.48% 3.64% 7.25% 28.50% 3.87% 45.01%
Clicking Levels
cb = −1.409 8.30% 3.60% 8.33% 3.38% 8.30% 3.40% 2.80% 8.50%
cb = 1.409 2.80% 14.70% 2.78% 4.11% 2.80% 10.90% 2.80% 17.40%
Alternative Functional Forms H(.)
cdf 5.60% 7.50% 25.00% 1.69% 5.60% 4.30% 5.60% 7.70%
linear 2.80% 11.80% 8.33% 2.42% 2.80% 7.50% 2.80% 14.00%
Uncertain Perceived Utilities
ξij = 1.409 2.80% 8.00% 13.89% 1.93% 2.80% 6.00% 2.80% 8.70%
ξij = 2.818 5.60% 9.20% 33.33% 0.48% 8.30% 5.80% 2.80% 12.60%
Notes: The table reports false positive error rate (FP) and false negative rate (FN). FP measures the percentage of
zero entries in the precision matrix labeled as non-zero by our method, and false negative error rate. FN measures the
percentage of non-zero entries in precision matrix labeled as zero by our method. The columns represent different
tuning parameter selection methods. In particular, Columns (1) and (2) represent results from cross validation (CV).
Columns (3) and (4) represent results from BIC. Columns (5) and (6) represent results from Adaptive-CV with
inverse-squared data-dependent weights. Columns (7) and (8) represent results from Adaptive-BIC with
inverse-square data-dependent weights. We also test adaptive models with non-squared weights, and find their
performance are worse. The rows represent different simulation settings. Among them, the base case is defined as: 30
products, 20 periods, 500 customers per period, α = 0, β1 = 0.5631, β2 = 1.2568, β3 = −0.0144, the sparseness of Φ
equals 8%, SNR = 5.339, consumer i clicks product j with probability pbij =
exp(uij−ui0)
1+exp(uij−ui0) . Note that xij measures
potential noises associated with the perceived utilities while consumers are making clicking decisions, which is formally
defined in Appendix C.5.
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Table 4.2: Accuracy of Model Estimates
Model Estimates
True Model Full Model App Model IID Probit Random Coef
β1 0.563 0.584 (0.031) 0.585 (0.032) 0.544 (0.026) 0.560 (0.026)
β2 1.257 1.203 (0.040) 1.170 (0.036) 0.855 (0.026) 0.936 (0.028)
βp -0.014 -0.013 (0.000) -0.013 (0.000) -0.011 (0.000) -0.012 (0.000)
σβ1 -0.496 (0.064)
σβ2 0.642 (0.065)
σβp 0.003 (0.000)
%error 6.40% 6.83% 19.29% 15.06%
Log likelihoood 26992.2 27230.3 29148.7 28959.4
Note: (1) App Model is short for the approximation model defined in Section 4.2.3.4. (2) %error is defined as
|β − βtrue|/|βtrue|. (3) Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors of the estimates.
Table 4.3: Model Fit and Demand Estimation Accuracy
True Model Full Model App Model IID Probit Random Coef
In-Sample Negative LL 27555 27362 27395 29196 29196
Out-of-Sample Negative LL 27608 27460 27433 29097 29079
In sample MAPE 14.81% 16.89% 17.86% 45.42% 44.16%
Out-sample MAPE 16.81% 18.48% 19.36% 46.44% 45.31%
In sample MSE 5.22E-05 6.60E-05 7.44E-05 3.83E-04 3.72E-04
Out-sample MSE 6.15E-05 6.95E-05 7.62E-05 4.07E-04 3.94E-04
Note: (1) App Model is short for the approximation model defined in Section 4.2.3.4. (2) LL is short for Log
Likelihood. (3) MAPE stands for mean absolute percentage error defined in Equation (4.11). MSE stands for mean
squared error defined in Equation (4.10).
Table 4.4: Parameter Estimates from The Empirical Example
Full Model App Model Random Coef IID Probit
βprice -0.138 (0.005) -0.112 (0.003) -0.141 (0.006) -0.080 (0.001)
βdisplay 6.068 (0.473) 4.620 (0.394) 10.249 (0.425) 6.185 (0.188)
βscore 12.622 (0.634) 9.126 ( 0.376) 12.644 (0.634) 6.752 (0.205)
σβprice -0.074 ( 0.003)
σβdisplay -0.000 (2.318)
σβscore 10.003 (1.693)
In-Sample Negative LL 1.95E+03 1.97E+03 2.12E+03 2.74E+03
Note: (1) App Model is short for the approximation model defined in Section 4.2.3.4. (2) LL is short for Log
Likelihood.
Table 4.5: Model Performance on The Empirical Example
Our Model App Model Random Coef IID Probit
In-Sample MAPE 15.79% 18.66% 25.30% 36.74%
Out-of-Sample MAPE 16.38% 18.65% 27.97% 40.07%
In-Sample MSE 2.59E-04 2.58E-04 4.11E-04 1.10E-03
Out-of-Sample MSE 2.05E-04 2.27e-04 4.40E-04 1.30E-03
Note: (1) App Model is short for the approximation model defined in Section 4.2.3.4. (2) MAPE stands for mean
absolute percentage error defined in Equation (4.11). MSE stands for mean squared error defined in Equation (4.10).
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Table 4.6: The Distance from the True Elasticity Matrix to the Elasticity
Matrix of Alternative Models
Full Model App Model IID Probit Random Coef
All Products
DistAbs 24.967 27.783 47.646 47.193
DistEuc 1.849 2.048 3.965 3.906
Own Price
DistAbs 19.661 21.973 40.720 40.072
DistEuc 1.944 2.186 4.667 4.581
Cross Price
DistAbs 20.442 22.607 34.212 34.278
DistEuc 1.231 1.307 1.641 1.653
Note: (1) App Model is short for the approximation model defined in Section 4.2.3.4. (2) ”All Products” considers all
elasticities among J products; “Own Price” considers only own price elasticity, namely, emkj when k = j; “Cross Price”
considers only cross price elasticity, namely, emkj when k 6= j. (3) DistAbs stands for the absolute distance between two
elasticity matrices defined in Equation (4.16a). DistEuc stands for the euclidean distance between two elasticity
matrices defined in Equation (4.16b).
Table 4.7: Average Profit and Revenue Over Time Obtained by Each De-
mand Model
Full Model App Model IID Probit Random Coef
Profit when Maximizing Profits
All Products 32.267 32.540 28.438 25.003
Slow Moving 2.132 1.983 0.914 0.575
Medium Moving 7.603 7.819 5.284 4.176
Fast Moving 22.532 22.737 22.239 20.252
Revenue when Maximizing Revenues
All Products 124.572 125.080 106.110 114.583
Slow Moving 14.121 13.272 8.138 9.886
Medium Moving 38.530 39.041 23.406 27.044
Fast Moving 71.921 72.767 74.565 77.652
Note: (1) “Profit when Maximizing Profits” stands for the average profit across periods under the optimal pricing in
maximizing profits recommended by each model, defined in Equation (4.17). “Revenue when Maximizing Revenues”
stands for the average revenue across periods under the optimal pricing in maximizing revenues recommended by each
model, defined in Equation (4.18). (2) App Model is short for the approximation model defined in Section 4.2.3.4. (3)
“All Products” stands for the profit/revenues for all J products averaging across periods; “Slow Moving” (“Fast
Moving”) stands for the profit/revenues for the slow-moving (fast-moving) products averaging across periods.
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APPENDIX A
Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs for Theorem 2.3.1 — Designers’ Equilibrium Decisions
To solve designers’ problem (Equation (2.3)), we first solve for designers’ equilibrium choices
of the number of conceptual objectives to incorporate (r∗(N)) and the number of design trials
to generate (m∗(N)), given a number of participating designers (N). Then we solve for the
equilibrium number of participating designers (N∗). As a preparation, we exploit the Gumbel
distribution’s property (recall that V.’s in Equation (2.2) follow a Gumbel distribution), and
compute designer i’s probability of winning, given i’s choices (ri and mi), and all other
competing designers’ choices (r and m):
Pr(i wins) = mi exp(v(ri)/µ)mi exp(v(ri)/µ)+(N−1)m exp(v(r)/µ) .
(A.1)
We analyze the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, where every designer chooses the
same r∗ and m∗. Such an equilibrium exists in our game, per Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000).
Equilibrium r∗: Designer i’s first-order condition (F.O.C.) with respect to concept for-
mation decision ri (in Equation (2.3)) is
∂Ui
∂ri
= 0. Substituting Pr(i wins) from Equa-
tion (A.1), and using symmetry (m = mi = m
∗ and r = ri = r∗), we can simplify the
marginal change in the winning chance with respect to ri as
∂Pr{i wins}
∂ri
= νwµ
N−1
N2
(Sr < r
∗);
∂Pr{i wins}
∂ri
= wµ
N−1
N2
(Sr > r
∗). With that, we solve the F.O.C. and obtain a unique symmetric
solution: rg =
ln(N−1
N2
νw
µ
A
c2
1
ln(1/p)
− cg
c2
1
ln(1/p)
)
ln(1/p) (Sr < r
∗); r =
ln(N−1
N2
w
µ
A
c2
1
ln(1/p)
)
ln(1/p) (Sr > r
∗). Since
cg > 0 and ν ∈ (0, 1), we have rg < r, for any N . Note that if designers guess and incorporate
more than the disclosed conceptual objectives, ri = r
g; if they incorporate all and only the
disclosed ones, ri = Sr; if they incorporate just a subset of the disclosed ones, ri = r. We
have
r∗(N) =
{
rg , if Sr<rg (Region 0)
Sr, if rg≤Sr≤r (Region I)
r if Sr>r (Region II)
(A.2)
Equilibrium m∗: Designer i’s F.O.C. with respect to trial effort decision mi (in Equation
(2.3)) is ∂Ui∂mi = 0. Substituting Pr(i wins) from Equation (A.1) into the F.O.C., and using
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symmetry (m = mi = m
∗ and r = ri = r∗), the F.O.C. reduces to A
(N−1)m∗
(m∗N)2 − c3 = 0, which
has a unique solution:
m∗(N) = A(N−1)
N2c3
. (A.3)
Equilibrium N∗: Having derived participants’ equilibrium choices (r∗(N) and m∗(N)) un-
der a given number of participants N , we compute the equilibrium number of participating
designers (N∗). We add a subscript to N∗ to help distinguish N∗ in three scenarios (specified
in Equation (A.2)): N∗0 stands for N∗ when Sr < rg (designers guess and incorporate more
than Sr); N
∗
1 stands for N
∗ when rg ≤ Sr ≤ r (designers incorporate all and only Sr); N∗2
stands for N∗ when Sr > r (designers incorporate only a subset of Sr).
• Region 0: Equilibrium conditions imply that designers are indifferent between partici-
pating or not, i.e., Pr(i wins) ·A−Ci(ri=r¯g,mi=m∗) = s. In a symmetric equilibrium,
Pr(i wins) = 1/N . After substituting rg (see Equation (A.2)), we can rearrange and
express the equilibrium number of participating designers through the implicit function
(we prove below that N∗0 is unique):
N∗ = N∗0 =
√
4Y (X+1)+X2−X
2Y , where X =
νw
µ ln(1/p) and Y =
s+cg ·(r¯g−Sr)++c1·Sr− cgln(1/p)
A .
(A.4)
• Region I: In equilibrium, designers are indifferent between participating or not, i.e.,
Pr(i wins) ·A−Ci(ri=Sr,mi=m∗) = s. In a symmetric equilibrium, Pr(i wins) = 1/N .
We can simplify and solve for the equilibrium number of participating designers as
N∗ = N∗1 =
√
A
s+c1·Sr+c2·(1/p)Sr . (A.5)
• Region II: In equilibrium, designers are indifferent between participating or not, i.e.,
Pr(i wins) · A − Ci(ri=r¯,mi=m∗) = s. In a symmetric equilibrium, Pr(i wins) =
1/N . After substituting r (see Equation (A.2)), we can rearrange and solve for the
equilibrium number of participating designers as:
N∗ = N∗2 =
√
4Y (X+1)+X2−X
2Y , where X =
w
µ ln(1/p) and Y =
s+c1·Sr
A . (A.6)
Next, we establish that the three regions are split by two thresholds: Sgsr such that S
gs
r =
rg(N∗0 (S
gs
r )) (where rg is from Equation (A.2), and N∗0 is from Equation (A.4)); Sicr such that
Sicr = r(N
∗
2 (S
ic
r )) (where r is from Equation (A.2), and N
∗
2 is from Equation (A.6)). In words,
Sgsr is the number of conceptual objectives the seeker discloses, under which designers are not
willing to guess any more conceptual objectives; Sicr is the number of conceptual objectives the
seeker discloses, under which designers are willing to incorporate exactly what are disclosed.
Online Appendix EC.6 formally characterizes Sgsr and Sicr , and proves that we can discuss N
∗
0 ,
N∗1 andN∗2 separately in Region 0, Region I and Region II; therefore, the three regions are self-
contiguous and do not overlap. Turning to N0, its uniqueness follows from three observations:
(i) Sr is a function of N
∗
0 , namely, Sr =
1
cg−c1
(
s− cgln(1/p) + cg r¯g(N∗0 )−A ·
X+1−N∗0X
(N∗0 )2
)
(by
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re-arranging Equation (A.4)). Hence, given N∗0 there is a unique Sr. (ii) From the analysis
below, we know that N∗0 is strictly increasing with Sr. (iii) N∗ is a continuous with Sr,
and N∗1 is unique given Sr (per Equation (A.5)). Hence, when Sr increases to approach S
gs
r
(recall that Sgsr is the cutoff of Region 0 and Region I), lim
Sr→Sgs−r
N∗(Sr) is unique. With (i)-
(iii) established, suppose N∗0 is not unique. Per (ii), there will be more than one increasing
trajectories of N∗0 (Sr). Per (iii) the increasing trajectories will merge at S
gs
r . We then have
multiple Srs corresponding to a N
∗
0 , contradicting (i).
Region 0: the number of participants increases with more disclosed conceptual
objectives. The proof is conducted using continuous N. Suppose with Sr disclosed objec-
tives, the number of participating designers is N and designers are guessing and incorporating
more than Sr (i.e., N
∗
0 (Sr) = N). This indicates the N
th designer’s expected utility equals
the opportunity cost (i.e., Ui(N ;Sr) = s), whereas the designers after the N
th designer have
lower expected utility than the opportunity cost (Ui(N + 1;Sr) < s). If the seeker discloses
slightly more conceptual objectives S′r = Sr + ∆(Sr), let us see the change in N∗0 (Sr). First
note that, under the same level of participation, the designer’s total participation cost is lower
as more objectives are disclosed, since cg > c1 and r
∗ does not change with Sr in Region 0
(under the same N). Consequently, designers’ expected utilities increase with Sr (given the
same N). Specifically, with a higher Sr, the N
th designer’s expected utility is even higher
than before (i.e., Ui(N ;S
′
r) > Ui(N ;Sr) = s), implying the N
th designer will still join the
contest under S′r. Moreover, the expected utility is strictly greater than the opportunity cost
(i.e., Ui(N ;S
′
r) > s), indicating that there will be designer(s) join after the the N
th designer.
Hence, as more conceptual objectives are disclosed, the number of designers participating in
the contest strictly increases; i.e., N∗0 strictly increases in Sr.
Regions I and II: the number of participants decreases with more disclosed
conceptual objectives. It is obvious that in Region I, N∗1 decreases with more
disclosed conceptual objectives (Sr). In Region II, we have,
∂N∗2
∂Sr
=
∂N∗2
∂Y · ∂Y∂Sr =
−−X
√
X2+4XY+4Y+X2+2XY+2Y
2Y 2
√
X2+4XY+4Y
· c1A ≤ 0. That is, N∗2 also decreases with more disclosed
conceptual objectives (Sr) in Region II. Moreover, N
∗ is continuous with Sr. Hence, the
number of participating designers always decreases with Sr.
Lastly, we can substitute N∗ (Equations (A.5)-(A.6)) into Equations (A.2)-(A.3), and get
m∗ and r∗ under the equilibrium number of participating designers.
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A.2 Proof for Lemma 2.3.1
maxSr≤Sr,Sg≤SgΠs(Sr, Sg) = max
Sr≤Sr,Sg≤Sg
[
Emax
i∈N∗
V ∗i (r
∗,m∗)
]
(from Problem (2.4))
= max
Sr≤Sr,Sg≤Sg
[v(r∗(Sr)) + µ ln (m∗(Sg, N∗(Sr)) ·N∗(Sr))] ,
(Theorem 2.3.1 and Gumbel distribution property)
= max
Sr≤Sr
[
w · r∗(Sr) + µ lnAN
∗(Sr)−1)
N∗(Sr)
]
+ max
Sg≤Sg
[−µ ln(h(Sg))] .
A.3 Proof and Additional Detail for Proposition 2.3.1
Theoretical Properties of S∗r . We separately discuss the optimal number of conceptual
objectives to disclose (S∗r ) under three scenarios: In Scenario 0, we assume that N∗ follows
Equation (A.4), m∗ follows Equation (A.2), and r∗ = rg. In Scenario 1, we assume that
N∗ follows Equation (A.5), m∗ follows Equation (A.2), and r∗ = Sr regardless of the size of
Sr. In Scenario 2, we assume that N
∗ follows Equation (A.6), m∗ follows Equation (A.2),
and r∗ = r regardless of the size of Sr. In words, in Scenario 0 (1/2) we assume that the
equilibrium formulas of Region 0 (I/II) will prevail regardless of the size of Sr. We define
S1∗r and S2∗r as the optimal numbers of conceptual objectives the seeker should disclose in
Scenario 1 and 2 under Sr = ∞, and show their properties in Lemmas A.3.1 and A.3.2,
respectively.
Lemma A.3.1 In Scenario 1, the seeker’s profit Πs is first increasing and eventually decreas-
ing with Sr. When c1 = 0 (i.e., no designers’ problem framing cost), Πs(Sr) is a concave func-
tion maximized at S1∗r,c1=0 =
ln
(
2[
√
A(A+s( µ
w
)2 ln2 1
p
+2s µ
w
ln 1
p
)+(A−2s)−s µ
w
ln 1
p
]
)
−ln
(
c2(
µ
w
ln 1
p
+2)2
)
ln (1/p) .
When c1 ≥ 0, Πs(Sr) is maximized at S1∗r , and S1∗r ≤ S1∗r,c1=0.
Lemma A.3.2 In Scenario 2, the seeker’s profit Πs decreases with Sr.
Lemmas A.3.1 and A.3.2 are proved in Online Appendices EC.8 and EC.9, respectively. Using
EC.6, note that Scenario 1 corresponds to Region I in Lemma 5 when Sr ≤ Sicr ; Scenario
2 corresponds to Region II in Lemma 5 when Sr > S
ic
r . With this observation and the
continuity of Πs(Sr), Lemmas A.3.1 and A.3.2 imply that S
∗
r ≤ min{Sr, S1∗r , Sicr }; i.e., the
seeker should not always disclose all the conceptual objectives he cares about.
Comparative Statics of S∗r . Next, we examine how S∗r changes with the nature of the
design problem. Specifically, we simulate S∗r at different values of the model primitives, in-
cluding: cost of digesting each conceptual objective (in the design problem framing stage)
(c1); unit cost of each design concept formulating attempt (c2); opportunity cost (s); concept
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formulating difficulty (1/p); award level (A); and relative problem uncertainty (λ := µw ). Fig-
ure A.1 illustrates the simulation results. The relationships between S∗r and model primitives
are consistent with intuition.
(a) c1 (b) c2 (c) s
(d) 1/p (e) A (f) λ
Figure A.1: Optimal Number of Conceptual Objectives S∗r (A = 200, s =
2, p = 0.5, c2 = 3, µ = 6, w = 2, c1 = 2).
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A.4 Examples of the Types of Information in Problem Specifications in
the Data
Table A.1: Three Examples of the Types of Information in Problem Speci-
fications in the Data
Company Industry Q3 (Conceptual objectives) Q4 (Execution Guid-
ance)
Q5 (Execution Guid-
ance)
Quackers Retailing It’s a fun brand for kids. Very
happy, upbeat and never quit
on your dreams. Community
and fun.
Image only. A car-
toon duck with a sailor
hat - not too much like
Donald Duck. The hat
should be green, the
duck bill should be yel-
low.
Duck face a bit like this
but with hat and less
body visible. (A hyper-
link to company web-
site).
Intertwined Consulting and
Professional
Services
We want to generate a sense of
progress to our customers, as
well as communicate that we
are a professional organization.
We’re here to help our clients
cut through industry baggage
to help them really focus on
what will help them do busi-
ness well.
Image with the com-
pany name, or image
only. We won’t con-
sider text only logos.
None
Rise Social Media
Advertising
and Marketing
We are looking for a design
that is professional but not too
corporate. We want to convey
reliability, fun and profession-
alism.
None. Not really.
A.5 Image Comparison Algorithm – SIFT
To classify designers’ submissions into “distinct designs” and “variations” in our large-scale
data, we employ Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT). SIFT is an algorithm proposed by
Lowe (1999) that detects and describes local features in images, and comprises four steps: (1)
Extract SIFT Feature Vectors: From a pair of images (A and B), descriptors of the key points
are extracted by identifying SIFT feature vectors in scale space; these vectors are constructed
to robustly capture the structural properties of the images. (2) Match SIFT Feature Vectors:
For each feature vector DAi in image A, its shortest Euclidean distance (d(D
A
i , D
B
j )) to each
of the SIFT feature vectors in image B (DBj ) is calculated. Feature vectors D
A
i and D
B
k are
defined as a matched pair if and only if
d(DAi ,D
B
k )
d(DAi ,D
B
j )
< 2/3 for all j. (This is the default threshold
in Lowe’s paper (1999), essentially the nearest-neighbor approach.) (3) Compute Similarity
Ratio: Let γA,B =
NmA,B
min{NA,NB} , where N
m
A,B is the number of matched pairs between image
A and image B, and NA (NB) is the total number of feature vectors extracted from image
A (B). (4) Classify Images Pairs as Similar or Different: Similarity Ratio γA,B is used to
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classify images A and B as either similar or different. The higher the ratio, the more similar
the two images are (a ratio of 1 means the two images are exactly the same). In our empirical
analysis, we classify two submissions as similar if γA,B ≥ 0.4. If a designer’s new submission
(a logo image) is very similar to any of her prior submissions (based on the SIFT score), we
classify the new submission as a “variation”; otherwise, we consider the new submission a
“distinct design”.
A.6 Power Analysis
We use power analyses to evaluate the ability of our empirical study to detect variables
characterizing the problem specification that have an impact on the number of partici-
pants ((No.Designers)q) and designers’ trial efforts ((No.Submissions)i,q). Based on the
R-squares before and after the inclusion of problem specification-related variables and an al-
pha level of 0.05 with Bonferroni adjustment, the sample size analysis indicates that we need
sample sizes of 174, 182 and 2987 to achieve a power of 0.8 to detect variables characterizing
the problem specification in Table 2.2’s Columns (1)(3)(5) respectively. With our current
sample sizes, we have enough data to detect any significant variables. Equivalently, we can
calculate a post-hoc level of statistical power. With our current sample sizes, we can achieve a
power above 0.95 in all regressions, indicating that our tests have adequate statistical power.
A.7 Additional Empirical Results about the Impact of Problem Specifica-
tion
Table A.2: Impact of Different Categories of Execution Guidelines on
No.Submissions Per Designer
Dependent Variable:
(NO Submission)i,q
In Post-Update
Multiple-Choice
Questions?
Elements of Execution Guidance
Colors Dummy 0.177∗ (0.083) Yes
Logo Style Dummy 0.101 (0.105) Yes
Shapes Dummy 0.214∗ (0.097) No
Font Dummy 0.029 (0.116) Yes
Usage Dummy 0.239∗∗ (0.078) Yes
Art Styles Dummy 0.163∗ (0.077) No
Resources Dummy 0.132· (0.076) No
Control Variables
(No.Concepts)q 0.013 (0.010)
Concept Similarity 0.149 (0.479)
(No.Designers)q −0.009∗ (0.004)
(No.Updates)q 0.204∗∗∗ (0.034)
DoW, Month, Year Dummies Yes
Industry, Creator Dummies Yes
Observations 11,757
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.480 (0.304)
Residual Std. Error (F Statistic) 3.317 (df = 8790)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Common vs. Rare Keywords We measure the keyword usage frequency with Zipf fre-
quency (ConceptFreq, which ranges from 0-8, with more frequently used words having large
ConceptFreqs). (The Zipf frequency of a word is the base-10 logarithm of the number of
times it appears per billion words.) For each problem specification, we compute the average
and the minimum usage frequency among the manually-coded conceptual objective keywords
((Avg.ConceptFreq)q and ((Min.ConceptFreq)q). We consider and estimate models in Ta-
ble A.3, and find that (Avg.ConceptFreq)q and (Min.ConceptFreq)q are both negatively
and significantly associated with (No.Designers)q, suggesting that rare conceptual objective
keywords are relatively less discouraging for designers participation.
Categories vs. Intensities of Execution Guidance We separately consider the effect
of offering more categories of execution guidance ((No.GuideCats)q), and that of offering
more detailed guidance in each category, i.e., more keywords per category ((No.GuideWordsNo.GuideCats )q).
We regress (No.Submissions)i,q on both (No.GuideCats)q and (
No.GuideWords
No.GuideCats )q, report the
results in Table A.4, and find that (No.GuideCats)q is significantly positively associated with
(No.Submissions)i,q, whereas (
No.GuideWords
No.GuideCats )q is not.
Table A.3: Nuance Findings for
Conceptual Objectives – Does
Frequency of a Keyword in En-
glish Affect Participation?
Dependent variable: (No.Designers)q
Conceptual Objectives
(No.Concepts)q −0.396∗∗ (0.137) −0.604∗∗∗ (0.124)
Concept Similarity 0.176∗∗ (0.064) 0.178∗∗ (0.064)
(Avg.ConceptFreq)q −2.776∗∗ (0.887)
(Min.ConceptFreq)q −1.316∗∗ (0.405)
Execution Guidance
(No.GuideWords)q −0.042 (0.104) −0.040 (0.104)
Control Variables
(lenQ3/No.Concepts)q 0.043 (0.130) −0.037 (0.130)
(No.Updates)q 0.011 (0.427) −0.012 (0.427)
DoW, Month, Year, Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 441 441
R2 0.271 0.272
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.199
Residual Std. Error (df = 400) 9.392 9.383
F Statistic 3.709∗∗∗ 3.735∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A.4: Nuance Findings for
Nested Structure of Execution
Guidance
Dependent variable:
(No.Submissions)i,q
Conceptual Objectives
(No.Concepts)q 0.010 (0.010)
Concept Similarity 0.002 (0.005)
Execution Guidance
(No.GuideCats)q 0.172∗∗∗ (0.025)
(No.GuideWords
No.GuideCats
)q 0.048 (0.052)
Control Variables
(No.Designers)q −0.010∗ (0.004)
(No.Updates)q 0.199∗∗∗ (0.034)
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Creator Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 11,509
R2 0.483
Adjusted R2 0.306
Residual Std. Error 3.333 (df = 8576)
F Statistic 2.729∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
A.8 Additional Tables
Data evidence for problem framing cost increasing with conceptual objectives.
Table A.5 reports the results of the regression of coders’ reading time for a problem specifica-
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tion on the characteristics of the problem specification. The results suggest that the coders
spend more time reading problem specifications with more conceptual objectives, but not
on those with more execution guidelines. This supports our modeling assumption that the
problem-framing cost only changes with the number of conceptual objectives.
Table A.5: Regression of Reading Time
Dependent Variable: (Reading T ime)q
(No.Concepts)q 0.071∗∗∗ (0.004)
(lenQ3/No.Concepts)q 0.054
∗∗∗ (0.004)
(No.GuideWords)q 0.001 (0.003)
Observations 441 R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.622 (0.587)
Residual Std. Error 0.304 (df = 403) F Statistic 17.889∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Robustness checks – alternative measures for designer trial efforts. As we can see
from Table A.6, the two new measures for designer i’s trial effort, (No.DesignStyle)i,q and
(V ariations/Style)i,q, are both significantly positively correlated with (No.GuideWords)q,
but neither is significantly associated with (No.Concepts)q, which again supports Hypotheses
2a and 2b – more seeker execution guidance leads to more submissions from each designer
(both in terms of “distinct designs” and their “variations”), but more conceptual objectives
do not.
Robustness checks – sub-sample tests only with contests that did not have up-
dates. The results reported in Table A.7 are qualitatively the same as those estimated with
the full sample (reported in Table 2.2), indicating that the main findings are not affected by
how we control for (No.Updates)q.
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Table A.6: Robustness Checks for reduced2 (Alternative Measures for Trial
Efforts)
Dependent Variable:
(No.DesignStyle)i,q (V ariations/Style)i,q
Conceptual Objectives
(No.Concepts)q 0.001 (0.003) 0.010 (0.006)
Concept Similarity −0.000 (0.001) −0.000 (0.003)
Execution Guidance
(No.GuideWords)q 0.006∗∗ (0.002) 0.028∗∗∗ (0.005)
Control Variables
(lenQ3/No.Concepts)q 0.001 (0.003) 0.011 (0.006)
(No.Designers)q −0.0004 (0.001) −0.006∗∗ (0.002)
(No.Updates)q 0.060∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.042∗ (0.019)
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Creator Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 11,757 11,757
R2 0.396 0.403
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.202
Residual Std. Error (df = 8795) 0.890 1.895
F Statistic (df = 2961; 8795) 1.949∗∗∗ 2.003∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A.7: Sub-Sample Tests Containing Only Contests that Did Not Have
Updates
Dependent Variables:
(No.Designers)q (No.Submissions)i,q
Conceptual Objectives
(No.Concepts)q −0.498∗ (0.196) −0.665∗∗∗ (0.173) 0.025 (0.013)
Concept Similarity 0.173· (0.095) 0.163∗ (0.077) 0.000 (0.006)
Very Short Objectives
(No.Concepts)q ∗ IShortCcptq −5.101 (2.708)
IShortCcptq 16.513∗ (7.822)
Execution Guidance
(No.GuideWords)q −0.016 (0.141) −0.042 (0.141) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.011)
Control Variables
(lenQ3/No.Concepts)q −0.087 (0.191) −0.002 (0.184) 0.019 (0.013)
(No.Designers)q 0.002 (0.005)
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Creator Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 260 260 6,968
R2 0.325 0.309 0.548
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.190 0.338
Residual Std. Error 9.505 (df = 219) 9.573 (df = 221) 3.056 (df = 4758)
F Statistic 2.632∗∗∗ 2.595∗∗∗ 2.614∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
A.9 Properties of Sgsr and S
ic
r
The following lemmas characterize Sgsr and Sicr .
Lemma A.9.1 If Sgsr exists, then it is unique and divides the number of conceptual objectives
the seeker discloses into two regions. Region 0: when Sr ≤ Sgsr , designers are willing to guess
and incorporate more than the disclosed objectives (i.e., Sr < r
g(N∗0 (Sr))); Region I: when
Sr > S
gs
r , designers do not guess and only incorporate from the disclosed objectives (i.e.,
Sr ≥ rg(N∗0 (Sr))).
Lemma A.9.2 There exists a unique Sicr . S
ic
r divides the number of conceptual objectives
the seeker discloses into two regions. Region I: when Sr ≤ Sicr , designers are willing to
incorporate all the disclosed objectives (i.e., Sr ≤ r(N∗2 (Sr))); Region II: when Sr > Sicr ,
designers incorporate only a subset of all the disclosed objectives (i.e., Sr > r(N
∗
2 (Sr))).
We prove Lemmas A.9.1-A.9.2 by: (A) Sicr exists, (B) S
ic
r is unique, (C) if S
gs
r exists, S
gs
r < Sicr
and Sgsr is unique.
(A) Existence of Sicr . We prove S
ic
r exists by showing:
113
Lemma A.9.3 (1) ∃Sr → 0 s.t. r¯(N∗2 (Sr)) ≥ Sr, and (2) ∃Sr > 0 s.t. r¯(N∗2 (Sr)) < Sr.
We now provide proofs for (1) and (2) in Lemma A.9.3. (1) By assumption, r∗ = Sr if Sr is
sufficiently small (see Section 2.3.3), hence we know that ∃Sr → 0 s.t. r¯(N∗2 (Sr)) ≥ Sr. (2) We
are interested in studying contests where N∗ > 1 (see Section 2.3.3); hence, under the problem
parameters we focus on, ∃Sr s.t. N∗(Sr) > 1. This implies when Sr is sufficiently small,
N∗ > 1, since when Sr increases, N∗ decreases (shown in Appendix A.1). On the other hand,
when Sr becomes extremely large, the number of participating designers approaches zero:
lim
Sr→∞
N∗(Sr) = 0 (both lim
Sr→∞
N∗1 (Sr) = 0, and lim
Sr→∞
N∗2 (Sr) = lim
Sr→∞
√
4Y (X+1)+X2−X
2Y =
0 (by L’Hopital’s Rule)). Hence, given continuity of N∗(Sr), ∃Sr > 0 s.t. N∗(Sr) = 1
(denoted as Sr,N=1). If the seeker discloses Sr,N=1 conceptual objectives, the number of
objectives designers are willing to incorporate is lim
Sr→Sr,N=1
r¯(N∗(Sr)) = lim
Sr→Sr,N=1
r¯(N∗=1) =
−∞, which implies r¯(N∗(Sr)) < Sr, and thus the number of participating designers in the
equilibrium is N∗2 . Hence, ∃Sr s.t. r¯(N∗2 (Sr)) < Sr.
(B) Uniqueness of Sicr . If there are multiple S
ic
r ’s s.t. S
ic
r = r¯(N
∗
2 (S
ic
r )), call the smallest
one among them S
ic(1)
r . Lemma A.9.3 implies that
∂r¯(N∗2 (Sr))
∂Sr
|
S
ic(1)
r
≤ 1. Next, at any point Sr,
we can compare the left and right limits of
∂r¯(N∗2 (Sr))
∂Sr
, namely left limit lim
Sr→S−r
∆r¯(N∗2 (Sr))
−
∆Sr
=
r¯(N∗2 (Sr))−r¯(N∗2 (Sr-∆Sr))
∆Sr
, and right limit lim
Sr→S+r
∆r¯(N∗2 (Sr))
+
∆Sr
=
r¯(N∗2 (Sr+∆Sr))−r¯(N∗2 (Sr))
∆Sr
. Note
that r¯(N∗2 (Sr)) is a function of Sr through the equilibrium number of participating designers
(N∗2 ). Hence, corresponding to the left and right limits, we can define the changes in N∗2
as ∆N∗−2 and ∆N
∗+
2 respectively. Algebra based on Equation (A.6) implies that,
∂N∗2
∂Sr
< 0
and
∂2N∗2
∂S2r
> 0, from which we know |∆N∗+2 | < |∆N∗−2 | (i.e., the number of participants
decreases with Sr at a decreasing speed). Based on the formula for r¯(N
∗
2 ), we can write ∆r¯
as a function of ∆N∗2 : ∆r¯ =
(
N∗−2 |∆N∗2 |−1)(N∗2 )2
(N∗−2 |∆N∗2 |)2(N∗2−1)
)
/(ln 1p). Now, we can compare lim
Sr→S−r
∆r¯−
∆Sr
and lim
Sr→S+r
∆r¯+
∆Sr
:
• When N∗2>2:
∂∆r¯
∂|∆N∗2 |>0. In this case, ∆r¯
+<∆r¯− since |∆N∗+2 |<|∆N∗−2 |. Hence,
lim
Sr→S+r
∆r¯+
∆Sr
< lim
Sr→S−r
∆r¯−
∆Sr
.
• When N∗2<2: r¯ increases with N∗2 , so decreases with Sr (∆r¯-<0, ∆r¯+<0).
So lim
Sr→S-r
∆r¯-
∆Sr
<0, lim
Sr→S+r
∆r¯+
∆Sr
<0.
The assessment of the left and right limits indicates that, ∂r¯∂Sr is either decreasing or negative.
Therefore, we have that ∀Sr > Sic(1)r , and ∂r¯∂Sr |Sr < 1. This suggests S
ic(1)
r is the only Sr,
s.t. r¯(N∗2 (Sr)) = Sr. This result, combined with Lemma A.9.3, suggests that Sicr divides
the number of conceptual objectives the seeker discloses Sr into two regions: Region I, when
Sr ≤ Sicr , Sr ≤ r(N∗2 (Sr)); Region II, when Sr > Sicr , Sr > r(N∗2 (Sr)).
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(C) Sgsr < Sicr , and S
gs
r is unique. If S
gs
r exists, S
gs
r < Sicr , since for any N
∗ = N , r¯g(N) <
r¯(N). We prove that Sgsr is unique by contradiction. Suppose there are multiple S
gs
r s, among
which the very first one is Sgs,1r (i.e., r¯g(N∗0 (S
gs,1
r )) = S
gs,1
r ). Then there should be S′r > S
gs,1
r ,
under which designers “guess”. However, r¯g(N∗0 (S′r)) < r¯g(N∗0 (S
gs,1
r )) = S
gs,1
r < S′r, which
suggests that designers cannot be “guessing” under S′r. Note the first inequality is from the
following facts. We know that S′r > S
gs,1
r and under both points designers “guess”, and we
also know that when designers “guess”, N∗0 increases with Sr; hence, N∗0 (S′r) > N∗0 (S
gs,1
r ).
We further know that r¯g is a decreasing function of N∗0 , hence, we get the first inequality.
A.10 Extensions
We extend our main model to allow for the following possibilities: (1) overlap/similarity across
conceptual objectives; (2) diminishing weights/importance among conceptual objectives. We
are able to show in both cases, the qualitative results from the model, hypotheses derived
from the model predictions, and the managerial implications (the optimal way of providing
problem specifications) remain intact.
A.10.1 Extension (I): Overlap Across Conceptual objectives
We extend our main model to consider the level of overlap across conceptual objectives.
For example, designers might consider “friendly” and “welcoming” more overlapping than
“friendly” and “professional”. Intuitively, satisfying multiple conceptual objectives with a
large overlap is likely to be easier than satisfying the same number of objectives with a small
overlap; on the other hand, if a design already satisfies one objective, satisfying another objec-
tive that overlaps a lot with the first one might only generate limited marginal improvement
to the design’s quality. To capture these effects, we make the following adjustments to the
main model. Given the level of overlap (denoted as 1 − α where α ∈ [0, 1], i.e., when α is
smaller, objectives overlap significantly), we assume that conditional on one objective being
satisfied, (1) the probability that another objective is satisfied by a random design concept
generated is pα (when objectives are more overlapping, pα is closer to 1); (2) the weight
carried by any additional objective is αw (when objectives are more overlapping, αw is closer
to 0). Correspondingly, when a designer incorporates r objectives, her cost of concept formu-
lation is (1/p)1+α(r−1); and the base quality of her designs is w(1+α(r− 1)). Another way to
think about this is that the number of “orthogonal” objectives is 1+α(r−1) (when objectives
are almost completely overlapping, the number of “orthogonal” objectives approaches 1; on
the other extreme, as the level of overlap goes to zero, the number approaches r). We solve
for designers’ equilibrium behavior, given the seeker’s problem specification (Sr, Sg, and α):
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Lemma A.10.1 In a crowdsourcing contest, where the equilibrium number of participating
designers equals Nα,∗, the unique symmetric equilibrium for rα,∗ and mα,∗ are as follows.
The equilibrium number of objectives a designer incorporates is rα,∗ =
{
rα,g if Sr<rα,g
Sr if rα,g≤Sr≤r
rα if Sr>rα
,
where rα,g =
ln(N
α,∗−1
(Nα,∗)2 ·
νw
µ
· A
c2
· 1
ln 1/p
·p1−α− cg
c2
1
ln(1/p)
·p1−α)
α ln 1
p
and r¯α =
ln(N
α,∗−1
(Nα,∗)2 ·
w
µ
· A
c2
· 1
ln 1/p
·p1−α)
α ln 1
p
; and
the equilibrium number of design trials each designer generates is mα,∗ = A(N
α,∗−1)
(Nα,∗)2c3 , where
c3 = h(Sg). The equilibrium number of participating designers (N
α,∗) first increases (when
Sr < r
α,g) and then decreases (when Sr ≥ rα,g) with more disclosed conceptual objectives Sr;
but Nα,∗ does not change with the amount of execution guidance Sg.
Lemma A.10.1 generalizes Theorem 2.3.1, and considers the level of overlap among concep-
tual objectives. This lemma has the same intuition as Theorem 2.3.1 — the direction of
the relationship between designers’ equilibrium behaviors and the number of conceptual ob-
jectives and execution guidelines in seekers’ problem specification remains unchanged; and
Takeaways 1-2 also remain intact. Note that this extension provides an additional insight:
when the number of disclosed conceptual objectives is moderate or large (designers do not
guess and incorporate undisclosed conceptual objectives), as α decreases (i.e., the level of
overlap increases), the number of participating designers increases (first strictly increases,
and then stays the same). We in fact find empirical support for this additional insight:
the number of participating designers in a contest increases with the semantic similarity
(Concept Similarity on a scale of 1-100) among the manually coded keywords for conceptual
objectives (see Table 2.2 Column (3) for the detailed regression results). Furthermore, our
recommendation that seekers should disclose as much execution guidance as possible, but
disclose conceptual objectives only up to a certain level stays the same (hence Takeaway 3
remain intact). The proofs are straight-forward generalization of proofs in Appendices A.1
and A.3, omitted to save space.
A.10.2 Extension (II): Descending Weights Among Conceptual Objectives
We extend our main model to consider the possibility that conceptual objectives could carry
different weights/importance to the seeker. Each conceptual objective (denoted as sr) carries
a weight of wsr , which represents the quality improvement of a design if this additional
objective sr is satisfied. The seeker’s objectives (sr = 1, ..., S¯r) are sorted in descending
importance, with smaller sr indicating more important objectives (i.e., wsr is decreasing
with sr). We assume wsr = wΦ
sr−1, where Φ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter Φ captures how
“skewed” the distribution of wsr is, i.e., when Φ is large, all the objectives are very similar
in terms of their importance to the seeker; whereas when Φ is small, the importance drops
quickly with sr, and only a small number of objectives are important. We assume that wsr is
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common knowledge. As objectives are equally difficult to achieve but of different importance,
the seeker would always want to disclose objectives in the order of decreasing importance (i.e.,
from the most important to the least important). Given the seeker’s problem specification
(Sr, Sg, and Φ) we solve for designers’ equilibrium behavior:
Lemma A.10.2 In a crowdsourcing contest, where the equilibrium number of participating
designers equals NΦ,∗, the unique symmetric equilibrium for rΦ,∗ and mΦ,∗ are as follows.
The equilibrium number of objectives a designer incorporates is rΦ,∗ =
{
rΦ,g if Sr<rΦ,g
Sr if rΦ,g≤Sr≤r
rΦ if Sr>rΦ
,
where rΦ,g =
ln(N
Φ,∗−1
(NΦ,∗)2 ·
νw
µ(1−Φ) · Ac2 ·
ln 1/Φ
ln 1/p
− cg
c2
· ln 1/Φ
ln 1/p
)
ln 1
pΦ
and r¯Φ =
ln(N
Φ,∗−1
(NΦ,∗)2 ·
w
µ(1−Φ) · Ac2 ·
ln 1/Φ
ln 1/p
)
ln 1
pΦ
; and the
equilibrium number of design trials each designer generates is mΦ,∗ = A(N
Φ,∗−1)
(NΦ,∗)2c3
, where c3 =
h(Sg). The equilibrium number of participating designers (N
Φ,∗) first increases (when Sr <
rΦ,g) and then decreases (when Sr ≥ rΦ,g) with more disclosed conceptual objectives Sr; but
NΦ,∗ does not change with the amount of execution guidance Sg.
Lemma A.10.2 generalizes Theorem 2.3.1, and considers the possible descending
weights/importance among conceptual objectives. It has the same intuition as Theorem 2.3.1:
the direction of the relationship between designers’ equilibrium behaviors and the numbers of
conceptual objectives and execution guidelines in the seeker’s problem specification remains
unchanged; and Takeaways 1-2 remain intact. Furthermore, our recommendation that it is
optimal for seekers to disclose as much execution guidance as possible stays the same, and
our suggestion that seekers should only disclose conceptual objectives up to a certain level
becomes even more salient (hence Takeaway 3 remain intact). Intuitively, as the importance
of the conceptual objectives decreases with sr, the quality improvement from incorporating
an additional objective is smaller (a lower “quality effect”). Yet, the negative “competition
effect” from disclosing more conceptual objectives remains (a higher cost for designers to
digest and incorporate disclosed conceptual objectives, which lowers the number of partici-
pating designers). The proofs are straightforward generalization of proofs in Appendix A.1
and Appendix A.3, which we omit here given the limited space.
A.11 Proof for Lemma A.3.1
We denote Πs in Scenario 1 (defined in Appendix A.3) as Π
1
s. In Scenario 1, all designers
incorporate all the disclosed objectives (Sr). In this case, the seeker solves the following
optimization problem:
max
Sr≤S¯r
Π1s(Sr;Sg) = max
Sr≤S¯r
w · Sr + µ lnA(1− 1N∗1 (Sr))− µ ln(h(Sg)), where N
∗
1 is from Equation (A.5).
(A.7)
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A.11.1 With Zero Cost for Designers to Digest Each Conceptual objective (i.e.,
c1 = 0)
We calculate the second derivative of Π1s(Sr;Sg|c1 = 0) with respect to Sr as follows:
∂2Π1s(Sr;Sg |c1=0)
∂Sr2
= −µc
2
2 ln
2 1
p
( 1
p
)Sr [c2(
1
p
)Sr+2s(1−B)]
4A2B3(B−1)2 < 0, where B=
√
c2(
1
p
)Sr+s
A =
1
N∗ ∈ (0, 1],
(A.8)
which shows Π1s(Sr;Sg|c1 = 0) is a concave function w.r.t Sr.
Maximum of Π1s (Sr;Sg|c1 = 0): For a concave function Π1s(Sr;Sg|c1 = 0), the global
maximum is reached when
∂Π1s(Sr;Sg |c1=0)
∂Sr
= 0. We can write this F.O.C. as [x ln 1pc2µ +
2w(s+ xc2)]
2 = 4w2A(s+ xc2), where x := (
1
p)
Sr . The roots for this quadratic function are:

x1 =
2[−
√
c22Aw2(Aw2+sµ2 ln
2 1
p
+2sµw ln 1
p
)+(c2w2(A−2s)−c2sµw ln 1p )]
c22(µ ln
1
p
+2w)2
;
x2 =
2[
√
c22Aw2(Aw2+sµ2 ln
2 1
p
+2sµw ln 1
p
)+(c2w2(A−2s)−c2sµw ln 1p )]
c22(µ ln
1
p
+2w)2
.
(A.9)
Because c2
2Aw2(Aw2 + sµ2 ln2 1p + 2sµw ln
1
p)− (c2w2(A− 2s)− c2sµw ln 1p)2 = c22sw2(A−
s)(µ ln 1p − 2w)2 > 0, we know that x1 < 0, x2 > 0. Hence, x2 is the unique maximum (by
definition, x = (1p)
Sr is positive). Therefore, the optimal number of conceptual objectives to
disclose is S1∗r,c1=0 = min{Sr, lnx2ln (1/p)}, where x2 is from Equation (A.9).
A.11.2 With Positive Cost for Designers to Digest Each Conceptual Objective
(i.e., c1 > 0)
The Seeker’s Profit Π1s is Eventually Decreasing with Sr. As mentioned in Section
2.3.3, we are interested in studying contests where N∗ > 1; hence, under the problem param-
eters we focus on, ∃Sr s.t. N∗(Sr) > 1. This implies when Sr is sufficiently small, N∗ > 1,
since when Sr increases, N
∗ further decreases (shown in Appendix A.1). Also, when Sr is
sufficiently small, specifically, Sr ≤ Sicr , the equilibrium number of participating designers is
N∗1 , and thus N∗1 > 1. On the other hand, when Sr becomes extremely large, N∗1 is approach-
ing zero: lim
Sr→∞
N∗1 (Sr) = 0. Hence, given continuity of N∗1 (Sr), ∃Sr > 0 s.t. N∗1 (Sr) = 1 (we
denote it as Sr,N∗1 =1).
While Sr increases and approaches Sr,N∗1 =1, the seeker’s profit is approaching to negative
infinity, i.e., lim
Sr→Sr,N∗1 =1
Π1s(Sr;Sg) = lim
Sr→Sr,N∗1 =1
w ·Sr+µ lnA(1− 1N∗1 (Sr))−µ ln(h(Sg)) = −∞.
Therefore, the seeker profit Π1s is eventually decreasing with a high enough Sr, which suggests
S1∗r <∞, i.e., the seeker should not always disclose all of his conceptual objectives in Scenario
1 (i.e., even if designers are “required” to incorporate all the disclosed conceptual objectives).
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Optimal Number of Conceptual Objectives to Disclose (S1∗r ) is Bounded Above by
S1∗r,c1=0. We first show that the seeker’s profit always decreases with the unit cost for designers
to frame the design problem (i.e., a higher c1).
∂Π1s(Sr;Sg)
∂c1
=
∂Π1s(Sr;Sg)
∂N∗1
∂N∗1
∂c1
< 0 (according
to Equation (A.7)). Hence, Π1s(Sr;Sg|c1 > 0) < Π1s(Sr;Sg|c1 = 0), i.e., the seeker’s profit
is always lower when there is positive cost for designers to frame the design problem. In
addition, based on algebra, we have
∂
∂Π1s(Sr ;Sg)
∂Sr
∂c1
= −µ ln′(1- 1N∗1 )
∂
1/N∗1
∂Sr
∂c1
< 0, suggesting
∂Π1s(Sr;Sg |c1≥0)
∂Sr
≤ ∂Π1s(Sr;Sg |c1=0)∂Sr . (A.10)
Recall that, Π1s(Sr;Sg|c1 = 0) is concave and maximized at S1∗r,c1=0; thus,
∂Π1s(Sr;Sg |c1=0)
∂Sr
|Sr>S1∗r,c1=0 < 0. Combining this with Equation (A.10), we have
∂Π1s(Sr;Sg |c1≥0)
∂Sr
|Sr>S1∗r,c1=0 ≤
∂Π1s(Sr;Sg |c1=0)
∂Sr
|Sr>S1∗r,c1=0 < 0. In other words, when Sr is greater
than S1∗r,c1=0, the seeker’s profit is always decreasing with Sr. Hence, the global maximum of
Π1s(Sr;Sg) is bounded above by S
1∗
r,c1=0
. Furthermore, based on simulations in Appendix A.3,
we find that S1∗r is not very sensitive to c1, suggesting that the maximum S1∗r,c1>0 is relatively
close to S1∗r,c1=0.
A.12 Proof of Lemma A.3.2
We denote Πs in Scenario 2 (defined in Appendix A.3) as Π
2
s. In Scenario 2, designers
incorporate the equilibrium subset (r) of all the disclosed objectives. In this case, the seeker
solves the following optimization problem:
max
Sr≤S¯r
Π2s(Sr;Sg) = max
Sr≤S¯r
[w · r¯(N∗2 (Sr)) + µ ln (m∗(Sg, N∗2 (Sr)) ·N∗2 (Sr))],
where N∗2 is from Equation (A.6), and m
∗ and r are from Theorem 2.3.1.
(A.11)
Now we show ∂Π
2
s
∂Sr
< 0, i.e., Π2s(Sr;Sg) is monotonically decreasing w.r.t Sr. Note that,
Π2s(Sr;Sg) is a function of Sr only through N
∗
2 ; hence, we can write
∂Π2s
∂Sr
= ∂Π
2
s
∂N∗2
· ∂N∗2 (Sr)∂Sr , (A.12)
in which we know that
∂N∗2 (Sr)
∂Sr
≤ 0 (see the proof in Appendix A.1). Now we show ∂Π2s∂N∗2 > 0:
∂Π2s
∂N∗2
= w
∂r¯(N∗2 )
∂N∗2
+ µ 1
(N∗2 )2−N∗2 =
1
(N∗2 )2−N∗2 ·
w
ln(1/p) · (µ ln(1/p)w + 2−N∗2 ). (A.13)
Based on Equation (A.6), the last term in Equation (A.13) can be re-written as µ ln(1/p)w +2−
N∗2 =
1
X + 2−
√
4Y (X+1)+X2−X
2Y , which can be shown to be positive using algebra. With all
the terms in Equation (A.13) being positive (by assumption, N∗2 > 1),
∂Π2s
∂N∗2
≥ 0. Combining
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∂N∗2 (Sr)
∂Sr
≤ 0 and ∂Π2s∂N∗2 ≥ 0, we have
∂Π2s
∂Sr
≤ 0 (Equation (A.12)). That is, the seeker profit is
monotonically decreasing with respect to the number of disclosed objectives in the problem
specification in Scenario 2.
120
APPENDIX B
Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1 Image Comparison Algorithm – SIFT
SIFT is an algorithm used to detect and describe local features in images proposed by Lowe
(1999). Broadly speaking, the algorithm consists of four steps: (1) Extracting SIFT Feature
Vectors: From a pair of design images (A and B), we extract descriptors of the key points
by identifying SIFT feature vectors in scale space, which robustly capture the structural
properties of the images1. (2) Matching SIFT Feature Vectors: For each feature vector DAi
in image A, we calculate its shortest Euclidean distance (d(DAi , D
B
j )) to each of the SIFT
feature vector in image B (DBj ). Features D
A
i and D
B
k are defined as a matched pair if and
only if the ratio
d(DAi ,D
B
k )
d(DAi ,D
B
j )
is less than 2/3 for all j2. (3) Computing the Similarity Ratio:
After obtaining the number of matched feature-vector pairs, we can calculate the percentage
of matched SIFT features relative to the total number of SIFT features in images A and B
as γA,B =
NmA,B
min{NA,NB} , where N
m
A,B is the number of matched pairs between image A and
image B, and NA (NB) is the total number of feature vectors extracted from image A (B).
(4) Classifying the Image Pair as Similar or Different: Finally, we classify the image pair
(image A and image B) as either similar or different based on the Similarity Ratio, γA,B.
The higher the ratio is, the more similar the two images are. If the ratio is 1, the two images
are exactly the same. In our empirical analysis, we classify a pair of submissions as similar if
γA,B ≥ 0.4.
Figure B.1 provides an example of the computed Similarity Ratios among six images
(sourced from Microsoft Word’s clip art). As we can see, the images that are relatively similar
to each other have higher pairwise similarity ratios (0.600, 0.524, and 0.424 respectively).
1The scale-invariant features are efficiently identified by a staged filtering approach. In the first
stage, the algorithm identifies key locations in scale space by looking for locations that are maxima
or minima of a difference-of-Gaussian function. Then, each point is used to generate a feature vector
that describes the local image region sampled relative to its scale-space coordinate frame.
2This is the default threshold in Lowe’s paper (1999). The approach described here is essentially
the nearest-neighbor approach.
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Figure B.1: Similarity Ratio Matrix for Six Designs
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B.2 Data Evidence and Reduced-form Results
B.2.1 Descriptive Regressions and Regression Results
We use descriptive regression analysis to explore how disclosed ratings are associated with
creators’ participation behavior. We classify creators into “new entrants” and “existing cre-
ators”/“incumbents”, and test separately whether the number of new entrants, and incum-
bents’ follow-up actions, are affected by the ratings that the seeker has disclosed by the end
of the previous day (Equations B.1 and B.2, respectively). In Section 3.3.2, we briefly discuss
the observations from these descriptive regressions. We now provide details.
In the first regression (Equation B.1), we regress the number of entrants joining contest
q on day t (∆(No. Creators)qt) on the numbers of 1-star, 2-star,..., 5-star ratings disclosed
up to day t − 1 ((No. 1-Star)qt−1, (No. 2-Star)qt−1,..., (No. 5-Star)qt−1), while controlling
for the number of creators already in the contest ((No. Creators)qt−1) and the cumulative
number of submissions made by all existing participants ((No. Submissions)qt−1) up to day
t− 1, as well as the time dummies and contest-level fixed effects.
In the second regression (Equation B.2), we apply a multinomial logit regression model
to incumbents’ follow-up action choices. The dependent variable is a nominal variable de-
noting incumbent i’s choice Actioniqt among redesign, revise, do-both, or do-nothing, where
the reference category is do-nothing. We include three main sets of independent variables
in this multinomial logit regression: (1) the individual-level variables, including the number
of submissions that the focal creator has made previously ((No. Submissions)iqt−1), and
among all her previous submissions her best rating ((Best Rating)iqt−1), second-best rating
((SecondBest Rating)iqt−1), and average rating ((Avg Rating)iqt−1), (2) the contest-level
rating variables, including (No. 1-Star)qt−1, (No. 2-Star)qt−1... (No. 5-Star)qt−1, and (3)
control variables, including (No. Submissions)qt−1 and (No. Creators)qt−1. Additional con-
trols include the amount of award for the contest (Awardq in $) and time dummies. To
simplify our notation, we group independent variables into three vectors
Wqt := {(No. Creators)qt, (No. Submissions)qt};
Yqt := {1, (No. 1-Star)qt, (No. 2-Star)qt, ..., (No. 5-Star)qt};
Ziqt := {(No. Submissions)iqt, (Avg Rating)iqt, (Best Rating)iqt, (SecondBest Rating)iqt}.
∆(No. Creators)qt = βYqt−1 + ΨWqt−1 + φq + δt + µqt (B.1)
ln
Pr(Actioniqt = k)
Pr(Actioniqt = do-nothing)
= ΓkZiqt−1 + ΛkYqt−1 +αkWqt−1 + ζkAwardq + ρt + νiqtk,
where k = redesign, revision, or do-both.
(B.2)
123
We also provide the results from these descriptive regressions in Table B.1 and Table B.2
as follows.
Table B.1: Regression of the Number of Entries
Dependent Variable: ∆Creatorqt
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.026∗∗ (0.008)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.022∗ (0.010)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.000 (0.008)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 −0.021 (0.012)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 −0.149∗∗∗ (0.022)
Control Variables
(No. Submissions)qt−1 −0.004 (0.006)
(No. Creators)qt−1 −0.202∗∗∗ (0.015)
Contest-Level Fixed Effects Yes
Time Dummies Yes
Observations 5,607
R2 0.166
Adjusted R2 0.142
F Statistic 136.369∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001; the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors
Table B.2: Multinomial Logit Regression of the Incumbent Follow-up Ac-
tion Choice
Depend Variable: Actioniqt
re-design revision do-both
Individual-Level Variables
(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.011 (0.014) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.009)
AvgRatingiqt−1 0.099 (0.135) 0.101 (0.074) 0.139 (0.120)
BestRatingiqt−1 0.269∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.352∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.188∗ (0.076)
SecondBestRatingiqt−1 −0.095 (0.088) −0.033 (0.051) −0.076 (0.081)
Contest-Level Variables
Awardq($) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.010∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.009∗∗ (0.003) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.003)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.005 (0.003) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.006∗ (0.003)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.002 (0.004) 0.005∗ (0.003) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 −0.012 (0.009) −0.027∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.030∗∗∗ (0.008)
(No. Submissions)qt−1 −0.007∗ (0.003) −0.002 (0.002) −0.007∗ (0.003)
(No. Creators)qt−1 0.005 (0.006) −0.018∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.009 (0.006)
Time Dummies Yes
Observations 24,085 Log Likelihood -14,783.050
R2 0.040 LR Test 1,247.014∗∗∗ (df = 54)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001; the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
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B.2.2 Descriptive Patterns in Creator Behavior
Creators’ Dynamic Behavior Over the Contest Horizon. We provide the summary
statistics of creators’ dynamic behavior over the 7-day contest horizon (Table B.3). Note that,
these statistics show that creators enter a contest throughout the entire contest period, and
also provide evidence that creators do make follow-up submissions throughout the contest
horizon.3
Table B.3: Summary Statistics Over 7-Day Contests
Day-1 Day-2 Day-3 Day-4 Day-5 Day-6 Day-7
Number of Entrants 6.469 3.825 3.060 2.961 3.296 3.509 7.162
Cummulative Number of Entrants 6.469 10.294 13.354 16.315 19.612 23.120 30.282
Cummulative Number of Incumbents - 6.469 10.294 13.354 16.315 19.612 23.120
Number of Submissions 12.636 11.305 9.891 9.513 10.618 11.504 23.043
Number of Submissions (from Entrants) 12.636 7.194 5.476 5.303 5.799 6.645 15.649
Number of Submissions (from Incumbents) - 4.111 4.416 4.210 4.819 4.859 7.394
Cumulative Number of Submissions 12.636 23.941 33.832 43.344 53.962 65.466 88.509
Number of Submission Per Incumbent - 0.635 0.429 0.315 0.295 0.248 0.320
Number of Ratings 7.032 8.055 7.741 6.875 7.448 7.167 11.629
Ratio of Rated Submissions 0.557 0.632 0.679 0.709 0.717 0.724 0.672
Cumulative Number of Ratings 7.032 15.087 22.829 29.704 37.152 44.318 55.947
Cumulative Ratio of Rated Submissions 0.557 0.713 0.783 0.723 0.701 0.623 0.505
The Number of Submissions With and Without Receiving Feedback. We compare
the number of submissions submitted per day with and without receiving feedback, and find
that the average number of designs submitted by a creator on a day (irrespective of whether
she has received feedback on her previous design(s) or not) is 0.37, but the submission number
increases to 0.709 on the day after she receives feedback on her previous design(s). This result
provides evidence that feedback does affect creators’ subsequent submission behavior, and
creators tend to become more active after receiving feedback.
Entry Score Distribution Over Time. As shown in Figure B.2, the rating distributions
(conditional on being rated) of new entrants in the three contest periods is quite similar,
providing empirical evidence that creators do not learn from existing design submissions to
the contest.
3Nonetheless, these summary statistics are averages across all contests in the sample, and cannot
capture the dynamic nature of the contests or the interaction among creators. For more thorough
understanding about how feedback affects creators’ behavior, please refer to our descriptive regression
in Section 3.3.2 and Appendix B.2.1.
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Figure B.2: New Entrants’ Rating Distribution (Conditional On Being
Rated) Over the Three Periods
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B.2.3 Seeker Learning
It is possible that seekers do not know what kind of designs they like the most beforehand,
and that there exists seeker learning in crowdsourcing contests for creative products.
There are two possible forms of seeker learning: (i) the seeker discovers new options he
likes after seeing more submissions; (ii) the seeker updates his preferences after seeing more
submissions (e.g., his evaluation of the same design changes as he sees more submissions).
Between these two forms of seeker learning, Form (i) is already captured by our model.
Consider a hypothetical contest. In the first period, there are two fine submissions, and the
seeker gives them a 3-star and a 4-star respectively. In the second period, a new creator
enters the contest and submits a design; the seeker likes the new submission a lot and gives it
a 5-star rating. This process of seeker discovering new designs he likes better is fully captured
by our model.
Form (ii) learning – seekers’ preferences change as they see more designs – is not captured
by our model. For example, a seeker receives a design in the first period; he likes it and gives
it a 5-star rating (based on his imperfect prior belief about what he wants). After seeing more
designs and learning about his own preferences, the seeker thinks this design is only worth a
2-star rating. If such learning exists in seekers’ behavior, we expect to observe cases in which
(a) the seeker picks a design that is not the top-rated as the winner of the contest (e.g., a
4-star design submitted later in a contest is preferred to an earlier 5-star submission), or (b)
similar designs submitted in different periods receive inconsistent ratings, or (c) the seeker
rates a design and then later changes the rating he gave to that design. All of (a), (b) and
(c) are very rare in our data. For (a), we find that in the data, the winning design is almost
always the highest rated design (92% of contests in our sample). As for (b), we identify all
pairs of very similar logo designs (SIFT Similarity Ratio ≥ 0.9) that were submitted in two
different periods within the same contest (i.e., image A at t=1, image B at t=2; image A at
t=2, image B at t=3; or image A at t=1, image B at t=3), and compare the seeker’s ratings
for each pair of designs. We find that the ratings of designs in a pair are rarely very different
– only in 4.9% of the cases the seeker rates image A lower than (higher than) 3-star, and later
rates a very similar design B higher than (lower than) 3-star. This percentage is significantly
smaller than the percentage for any randomly generated pair of designs submitted to the
same contest (20.1%) (Here, we use 3-star as the cutoff, as it is the middle value of the rating
scale.) The difference in ratings between image A and a very similar image B is 0.69, which is
again significantly smaller than the average rating difference (1.75) between any random pair
of designs submitted to the same contest. As for (c), the platform allows seekers to change
ratings for a design, but it happens extremely rarely – in 96% cases, designs are rated only
once and the rating is not changed afterwards.
The above data evidence indicates that in our research setting, Form (ii) learning is
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unlikely to exist in seekers’ behavior. That said, it is perhaps interesting to consider what
might happen in other settings for which Form (ii) seeker learning does exist (i.e., the seeker
can only give out meaningful ratings after seeing enough designs). For such settings, our
intuition is that the main finding of our paper (i.e., the late feedback policy performs better
than the commonly used full feedback policy) would remain. To the extent that early feedback
is meaningless and this is known to the creators, it is a waste of time for the seeker to provide
it and hence the late feedback policy becomes more attractive.
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B.2.4 Empirical Evidence for the Independence of Creator Action-Specific
State Transition Probabilities and the Contest-Level State
Recall that in our model, opponents’ states, summarized by the contest-level state st, affect
the focal creator’s state transition probability (p(xi,t+1|xi,t, st)), through affecting her action
choice ai,t. Specifically,
p(xi,t+1|xi,t, st) =
∑
ai,t
Prt(ai,t|xi,t, st) · p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t, st),
where Prt(ai,t|xi,t, st) is the probability of choosing action ai,t in Period t, given individual-
level state xi,t and contest-level state st. We assume that p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t, st) =
p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t). That is, conditional on the chosen action, we assume that the contest-level
state st does not significantly affect creators’ state transition. This assumption is supported
by the data.
We test whether creator i’s choice-specific transition probability p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t) is af-
fected by the elements of the contest-level state, st (i.e., the numbers of 1-, 2-, ... , 5-Star
submissions in the contest). Specifically, for each type of non-null action (i.e., revision, re-
design and do-both), we regress incumbent creators’ individual state in a period on their
previous period state and the elements of the previous period contest-level state. The regres-
sion results are reported in Table B.4. As can be seen in the table, none of the elements of
the contest-level state significantly affects the choice-specific state transitions associated with
each follow-up action. This suggests that given creators’ actions, the individual-level state
transition probabilities do not depend on the contest-level state st. This is not surprising,
because the differences in the action-specific quality transition probabilities already reflect
the different levels of improvement each action could produce, hence, conditional on the cho-
sen action, individuals’ quality-transition probabilities should not be significantly affected by
opponents’ states.
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Table B.4: Action-Specific Transition Not Affected by Opponent States
Dependent Variable:
Next Period Individual-Level State: BestRatingiqt
revision re-design do-both
Individual-Level State
BestRatingiqt−1 = 2 0.666∗∗∗ (0.135) 0.856∗∗∗ (0.161) 1.225∗∗∗ (0.292)
BestRatingiqt−1 = 3 1.440∗∗∗ (0.125) 1.601∗∗∗ (0.154) 1.268∗∗∗ (0.257)
BestRatingiqt−1 = 4 2.221∗∗∗ (0.124) 2.432∗∗∗ (0.154) 1.958∗∗∗ (0.254)
BestRatingiqt−1 = 5 3.035∗∗∗ (0.132) 3.249∗∗∗ (0.184) 2.702∗∗∗ (0.280)
Contest-Level State
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 −0.002 (0.007) −0.010 (0.011) 0.002 (0.019)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 −0.010 (0.007) −0.019 (0.013) −0.011 (0.019)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 −0.006 (0.006) −0.006 (0.009) −0.002 (0.016)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.004 (0.007) −0.005 (0.013) 0.007 (0.021)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 0.019 (0.010) 0.029 (0.016) 0.047 (0.025)
Creator-Level Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,526 889 700
R2 0.730 0.719 0.583
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.201 0.118
F Statistic 170.611∗∗∗ (df = 9; 568) 70.819∗∗∗ (df = 9; 249) 22.051∗∗∗ (df = 9; 142)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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B.3 Deriving Equilibrium CCP (Equations (3.7) and (3.8))
In the proposed structural model, a strategy σ∗ = {ρ∗, λ∗} representing a MPE equilibrium
is characterized by, at any t, for any incumbent i:
ρ∗i,t = argmaxai,t
{
Ui,t(ai,t, i,t)
+ β
∑
xi,t+1,st+1
[∫
V σ
∗
i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1, i,t+1)pd(i,t+1)
]
pσ
∗
(xi,t+1, st+1|xi,t, st; ai,t)
}
,
and for any potential entrant j:
λ∗j,t = argmax
dj,t
{
U ej,t(dj,t, εj,t) + I(dj,t = Enter)·
β
∑
xj,t+1,st+1
[∫
V σ
∗
j,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1, j,t+1)pd(j,t+1)
]
pe,σ
∗
(xj,t+1, st+1|st)
}
,
where pσ(xi,t+1, st+1|xi,t, st; ai,t) = p(xi,t+1|xi,t; ai,t) · p(x-i,t+1|x-i,t;σ) (let x-i,t := st \
xi,t) and p
e,σ(xj,t+1, st+1|st) = pe(xj,t+1) · p(x-j,t+1|x-j,t;σ), in which p(x-i,t+1|x-i,t;σ) =∑
a-i,t,dt
p(x-i,t+1|x-i,t; a-i,t, dt) ·Pr(a-i,t, dt|σt;x-i,t) (let a-i,t = at \ ai,t) and p(x-j,t+1|x-j,t;σ) =∑
at,d-j,t
p(x-j,t+1|x-j,t; at, d-j,t) · Pr(at, d-j,t|σt;x-j,t) (let d-j,t = dt \ dj,t).
Representing MPE in probability space4 (Milgrom and Weber, 1985), we get equilibrium
CCP P∗ as a fixed point P∗ = Γ(P∗), where the function Γ is the creators’ best response
probability function, with the tth element being Γt(P) = {Γt(P),Γet (P)} (with and without
superscripts “e” denoting potential entrants’ entry choices and incumbents’ follow-up choices
respectively). For incumbents, Γt = {Γi,t(P)}i∈Nt , where Γi,t(P) = {Γi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st; P \
Pi,t)|ai,t ∈ A}, in which,
Γi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st; P \ Pi,t) =
∫
I(ai,t = argmax
ai,t
{vPi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t) + i,t(ai,t)})p(i,t)di,t, (B.3)
where vPi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t) = −c(ai,t) + β
∑
xi,t+1,st+1
V˜ Pi,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1) ·
p(xi,t+1, st+1|xi,t, st; ai,t,P−i,t) is incumbent i’s choice specific value function. Similarly, for
potential entrants, Γet = {Γej,t(P)}j∈Mt , where Γej,t(P) = {Γej,t(dj,t|st; P \ Pj,t)|dj,t ∈ D}, in
4Associated with σt we can define a set of CCP for incumbents and potential entrants in period
t, Pσt = {{Pσi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st)}, {Pσj,t(dj,t|st)}|i ∈ Nt, j ∈Mt} such that,
Pσi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) =
∫
I{ρi,t(xi,t, st, i,t) = ai,t}p(i,t)di,t, and
Pσj,t(dj,t|st) =
∫
I{λj,t(st, εj,t) = dj,t}pε(εj,t)dεj,t.
Note that the probabilities Pσi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) and Pσj,t(dj,t|st) represent the expected behavior of a
creator from the point of view of the rest of the creators when this creator follows strategy σt.
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which,
Γej,t(di,t|st; P \ Pj,t) =
∫
I(dj,t = argmax
dj,t
{ve,Pj,t (st; dj,t) + εjt(dj,t)})pε(εj,t)dεj,t, (B.4)
where ve,Pj,t (st; dj,t) = −ce(dj,t) + I(dj,t = Enter) · β
∑
xj,t+1,st+1
V˜ Pj,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1) ·
p(xj,t+1, st+1|st; P−j,t, dj,t = Enter) is the potential entrants’ choice specific value function.
Assuming both incumbents’ private shock (i,t) and potential entrants’ private shock (εj,t)
follow i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution (Rust, 1987), we can get a closed-form solution
for the equilibrium CCP (P∗), i.e., incumbent i follows Equation (3.7), and potential entrant
j follows Equation (3.8).
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B.4 Conditional Independence
Conditional Independence (CI) is a conventional assumption made in structrual dynamic
game models, such as in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Srisuma (2013), Igami (2016),
Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011), Egesdal et al. (2015), among others.5
Despite CI being an assumption that is conventional and challenging to relax, it could
nonetheless be helpful to discuss the motivation for and the implication of the CI assumption
in our setting, and show the robustness of our results to the assumption. CI corresponds
to two assumptions; quoting from Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) (the notation they use is
different from ours, but the analogue to our notation is straightforward):
“1. Assumption CI-X (Conditional Independence of Future x): Conditional on the
current values of the decision and the observable state variables, next period ob-
servable state variables do not depend on current : i.e., CDF (xi,t+1|ait, xit, it) =
Fx(xi,t+1|ait, xit).
2. Assumption IID (i.i.d Unobservables): The unobserved state variables in it are
independently and identically distributed over agents and over time with CDF G(it)
which has finite first moments and is continuous and twice differentiable in it.”
We discuss the implications of these two assumptions in our setting below.
Assumption (1) CI-X:
First, we discuss the economic meaning of the CI-X assumption and provide the rationale
for assuming CI-X in our research context. Recall that the last term (i,t(a)) in the creator
utility function is a random shock to her current period utility from choosing an action
among revision, redesign, do-both, and do-nothing. Those action-specific shocks i,t(a) capture
unobserved factors that affect creators’ preference toward each action in a particular period.
For example, if a creator is unusually busy in a period, this will be reflected in a positive
shock specific to the do-nothing action; if a creator is in the mood to try new design styles,
this will be reflected in a positive shock specific to the redesign action; if certain external
events taking place in a period make a creator feel more like staying in her comfort zone, this
will be reflected in a positive shock specific to the revision action; etc. With the economic
meaning of the action-specific shocks in mind, let us see what the CI-X assumption implies
in our setting. In general, CI-X refers to the assumption that i,t(a) is independent of xi,t
and all state variables in the past periods, and i,t(a) is only correlated to xt+1 through the
choice variables ait (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010). In our research setting, although the
action-specific shock i,t(a) changes its corresponding action’s cost and thus affects a creator’s
5For example, Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011) argues that “this assumption (CI) is standard in
virtually all dynamic discrete choice papers”; and Srisuma (2013) states that “(CI is one of) the key
restrictions commonly imposed on the class of games in this literature.”
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action choice (ait), conditional on ait, i,t(a) is not likely to influence the size of the quality
improvement. Therefore, we think CI-X is a reasonable assumption in our setting.
Assumption (2) IID:
Next, we perform the following Monte Carlo analysis to show the robustness of our parameter
estimates to the presence of serially correlated unobserved state variables.
We follow the Robustness to serially correlated unobservables Section in Pakes et al. (2007)
closely. The idea here is to show the robustness of our estimation results with respect to serial
correlation in the shocks by testing the performance of our estimation technique — which
ignores serially correlated shocks — in a setting where we know for sure that there are serially
correlated shocks. Specifically, we first compute the equilibrium strategies (a mapping from
states and shocks to player actions) of our dynamic game with an additional serially correlated
state variable, γi,t, which shifts follow-up action costs from period to period. Next, we use
the equilibrium strategies we just computed to simulate data for contests in which creators’
actions are determined by the state described by four variables (xit, st, γi,t, it). Finally, we
“pretend” that this data is generated from a model with the state described by only three
variables (xit, st, it) (without the serially-correlated unobservables) and estimate the utility
parameters assuming that the misspecified three-state-variable model is the true model.
In the first two steps of this investigation (solving for the equilibrium and simulating
contest data), we incorporate the serial correlation as follows. In each period t, focal incum-
bent i’s action costs (ca, ∀a ∈ {redesign, revision, do-both}) are all subjected to a serially
correlated shock γi,t which takes on three values: a positive shock which increases all costs
by 20%, a negative shock which decreases all costs by 20%, and a “zero” shock which leaves
all costs unchanged. If in period t, creator i receives a positive or negative shock, then in
period t + 1, she will receive a shock with the same value with .75 probability, and a shock
with a value of 0 with .25 probability. If in period t, creator i’s shock has a value of 0, then
in period t+ 1, she will receive a shock with a value of 0 with .5 probability, and positive or
negative shock with .25 probability.
Table B.5 presents the results of this analysis, comparing the true parameters used to
generate the data and the estimated parameters recovered from the generated data assuming
the misspecified model. The results are encouraging. In particular, in large data sets (the
generated data set consists of 1799 contests, 52,439 contest-creator combinations), all of the
parameter estimates of the misspecified model are within 3% from the true parameter values.
We therefore conclude that there is reason to believe that the size of the bias caused by
serially correlated unobservables is quite small in our sample.
The above discussion on the CI-X and IID assumptions implies that our results are robust
to the conventional Conditional Independence (CI) assumption.
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Table B.5: Sensitivity to Serial Correlation
True Parameter
with known serial correlation
Estimate of the Misspecified Model
which ignores serial correlation
Error of the Estimate
α 0.034 0.035 2.94%
c(redesign) 2.790 2.803 0.47%
c(revise) 2.205 2.201 -0.18%
c(do-both) 3.319 3.292 -0.81%
ce1(enter) 4.958 4.904 -1.09%
ce2(enter) 4.326 4.315 -0.25%
ce3(enter) 3.599 3.599 0.00%
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B.5 Alternative Improvement Specification Beyond 5-Star
We use Equations (3.9b) to describe how xtruei,t transitions after the creator gets a 5-star
rating. Although the state transition beyond 5-star occurs rarely, it is an important element
that makes our model complete.
Data evidence for quality improvement from actions taken after creators receive
a 5-star rating We first provide data evidence for whether and how much the winning
probability increases with the number of revisions/redesigns after an individual has received
her first 5-star rating. We find that after getting a 5-star, the probability of winning is
20.8% for creators who do not take any further follow-up action, 22.0% for those who make
additional submissions (i.e., take either the revision, redesign, or do-both action) in one period,
and 28.3% for those who make additional submissions in two periods. The differences are
statistically significant. This confirms that, after a creator receives her first 5-star rating, the
winning probability increases as the number of follow-up actions increases, which provides
evidence that everything else equal, creators’ best design quality increases with the number
of follow-up actions they take.6
Robustness checks for alternative improvement specifications beyond 5-star First,
note that the assumption implied by Equation (3.9b) is that every time the focal creator
takes an non-zero action (i.e., revision, redesign, or do-both), the resulting improvement
(max(0, ξ
(n)
a )) is drawn from the same action-specific distribution, and quality improvements
are additive. For example, the improvement from the first revision and that from the second
revision (after getting a 5-star) are drawn from the same distribution (for the revision action)
and the total quality improvement equals the sum of the improvements resulting from each of
these two revisions. (Later, we will show the robustness of our empirical results with respect
to this assumption.) This assumption is necessary for the following reason. Estimating the
exact functional form of quality improvement requires a sufficient number of observations of a
creator receiving a 5-star in the first period, and taking follow-up actions in both the second
and third periods. Unfortunately, we only have 46 such observations out of the 965 cases
where a creator receives a 5-star(s) in the first period. The linear and additive assumption
avoids model overfitting and weak estimation results. Hence, we decide to use the most
parsimonious model – the linear additive model – in our main analysis.
However, one might think the marginal quality improvement an additional submission can
contribute is decreasing or increasing with the number of follow-up actions the same creator
has taken. We now check the robustness of our paper’s key finding, the policy simulation
6Also note that what we identified here is the relationship between a creator’s follow-up actions
after she receives her first 5-star rating and her probability of winning. The direct relationship between
the follow-up actions and quality improvement may look different, because (1) the probability of
winning is not linear with respect to the quality improvement; (2) in addition to a creator’s quality
improvement, also others’ quality improvements are involved in determining her probability of winning.
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results, with respect to assuming decreasing marginal quality improvement and increasing
marginal quality improvement.7 Specifically, we examine cases in which the second follow-up
action is assumed to be 80% and 120% as effective as the first. Mathematically, we adjust
Equation (3.9b) on Page 51 as:
xtruei,t = 5 + max(0, ξ0) + max(0, ξ
(1)
a ) + 80% ∗max(0, ξ(2)a ), if xi,t = 5
or as:
xtruei,t = 5 + max(0, ξ0) + max(0, ξ
(1)
a ) + 120% ∗max(0, ξ(2)a ), if xi,t = 5
With the new “decreasing/increasing marginal quality improvement” specifications, we re-
estimate our model and re-conduct our policy simulations. As shown in Figure B.3, the
qualitative nature of the policy simulation results remains the same, and the late feedback
policy still outperforms other feedback policies.
(a) The Second Follow-up Action Is 80% Effective As the First One
(b) The Second Follow-up Action Is 120% Effective As the First One
Figure B.3: Different Performance Measures (Left: Maximum Quality, Mid-
dle: The Number of Top Performers, Right: The Number of Participants)
for Contest Outcomes under Each Policy using Different Model Specifica-
tion of Equation (3.9b)
7As we discussed before, because it is very rare that a creator receives a 5-star in the first period,
and take follow-up actions in both the second and third periods, our modeling assumptions made on
the unobserved quality improvement process beyond the 5-star rating have very little impact on the
estimates of the parameters in creators’ utility function.
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B.6 Estimation Details
B.6.1 Computing MPE Given Candidate Model Parameters
We solve for the MPE of our finite-horizon dynamic game using backward induction. The
following pseudo code details how we solve for a Best Response Mapping (BRM) in period
t. Note that the algorithm stops only when the actions of all creators (both incumbents and
potential entrants) in the current iteration is the best response to their opponents’ actions in
the iteration.
Computing MPE for Incumbents and Entrants under a given contest-level state st
1: procedure best response mapping
2: initialize iteration counter n = 0
3: initialize entry CCP P 0j,t(dj,t=Enter|st) := 12
[
Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) + Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st)
]
4: initialize incumbent CCP P 0i,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) := 1/4 for ∀xi,t, ∀ai,t ∈ A
5: repeat
6: for each incumbent i ∈ Nt do
7: best response P
′
i,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) := Γi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st; Pn-i)
8: update incumbent CCP
9: Pn+1i,t (ai,t|xi,t, st) := Pni,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) + αn ·
[
P
′
i,t(ai,t|xi,t, st)− Pni,t(ai,t|xi,t, st)
]
10: end for
11: new entrant’s best response P
′
j,t(dj,t|st) := Γej,t(dj,t|st; Pn-j)
12: if P
′
j,t(dj,t=Enter|st) ≥ Pnj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) then
13: Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) := Pnj,t(dj,t=Enter|st)
14: else
15: Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) := Pnj,t(dj,t = Enter|st)
16: end if
17: update entry CCP Pn+1j,t (dj,t=Enter|st) := 12
[
Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) + Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st)
]
18: n := n+ 1
19: until |Pni,t(ai,t|xi,t, st)− P
′
i,t(ai,t|xi,t, st)| < 1; |Pnj,t(dj,t|st)− P
′
j,t(dj,t|st)| < 2
20: end procedure
21: MPE: P ∗j,t(dj,t|st) := Pnj,t(dj,t|st), P ∗i,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) := Pni,t(ai,t|xi,t, st), ∀ai,t ∈ A, ∀dj,t ∈ D, ∀xi,t
• αn is the step size for searching the alternative best response.
• Pn-i (P
n
-j) summarizes all incumbent and entrant, except focal incumbent i (entrant j),
players’ conditional choice probability (CCP) in the nth iteration.
• Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) is the highest possible probability for potential entrants to enter a
contest. It is calculated as the entry probability when the potential entrant believes the
contest will contain no one else but this period’s group of new entrants. Mathematically,
it is calculated with: Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) = Pr{−cet (dj,t=Enter) + εj,t(dj,t=Enter) +
βR/
[|M | ∗ Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st)] > 0}.
• Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) is the lowest possible probability for potential entrants to enter
the contest. It is calculated as the entry probability when a potential entrant be-
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lieves there is no chance for them to win. Mathematically, it is calculated with:
Pj,t(dj,t=Enter|st) = Pr{−cet (dj,t=Enter) + εj,t(dj,t=Enter) > 0}.
• Incumbent i’s best response to Pn-i is given by
Γi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st; Pn-i) =
exp(v
Pn-i
i,t (xi,t, st; ai,t))∑
a′i,t
exp(v
Pn-i
i,t (xi,t, st; a
′
i,t))
, (B.5)
where the choice specific value function is given by
v
Pn-i
i,t (xi,t, st; ai,t) = −c(ai,t)+β
∑
xi,t+1,st+1
V˜ P
∗
i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1)·p(xi,t+1, st+1|xi,t, st; ai,t,Pn-i).
(B.6)
• Entrant j’s best response to Pn-j is given by
Γej,t(dj,t|st; Pn-j) =
exp(v
e,Pn-j
j,t (st; dj,t))∑
d′j,t
exp(v
e,Pn-j
j,t (st; d
′
j,t))
, (B.7)
where
v
e,Pn-j
j,t (st; dj,t) =− ce(dj,t) + I(dj,t = Enter)
· β
∑
xj,t+1,st+1
V˜ P
∗
j,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1) · p(xj,t+1, st+1|st; Pn-j , dj,t = Enter).
(B.8)
V˜ P
∗
i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1) is the integrated value function under equilibrium play from period t+ 1.
B.6.2 KW Interpolation
When solving for creator i’s period-t best response, we need V˜ P
∗
i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1). Solving
for period-3 best responses is relatively easy – we can directly use the exact values for
V˜ P
∗
i,4 (xi,4, s4), as period 4 is the terminal period. However, when solving for her period-2 best
response, it is computationally burdensome to compute V˜ P
∗
i,3 (xi,3, s3) by backward induction
due to the “curse of dimensionality”; we therefore approximate the value using KW inter-
polation (literature using KW interpolation in solving dynamic game includes: Arcidiacono
and Miller (2013); Richards-Shubik (2015); Fowlie et al. (2016); Zhou (2016)). Specifically,
we first sample a subset of frequently visited state points (xi,3, s3); for each of these sampled
state points, we compute V˜ P
∗
i,3 (xi,3, s3) exactly using backward induction; using these exact
values at the sampled state points, we fit a regression model with a third-order polynomial
of state variables (xi,3, s3), and use this fitted model to interpolate the value function at the
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non-sampled period-3 state points. Similarly, when solving for a period-1 best response, we
sample a subset of period-2 state points (xi,2, s2) and compute the corresponding V˜
P∗
i,2 (xi,2, s2)
by backward induction, and interpolate the value function at the non-sampled period-2 state
points. The above-mentioned interpolation method provides a good approximation for the
value functions. As we can see from Figure B.4, the out-of-sample R-squares can be as high
as 95% (92%) for second (third) period’s value functions when the number of sampled exact
points is sufficiently large. Here, we sample 600 exact points for the interpolation. Note that
we get a higher out-of-sample R-square in the second-period interpolation. This is because
the number of possible state combinations in the second period is much smaller than that
in the third period – with the same number of sampled exact points, we are computing the
“exact” value functions for proportionally more points for the second period.
(a) t=2 (b) t=3
Figure B.4: Out-of-sample R-square for Value Function Interpolation
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B.7 Identification
B.7.1 Structure of the Identification Proof in Online Appendix B.7.2
.
Let us recall the key assumptions made in our model:
• Assumption-1: We assume that  and ε follow an extreme value distribution and are
i.i.d .
• Assumption-2: We make the “outside good” assumption (or normalization assump-
tion), that is, the single-period utility associated with “not-enter” and “do-nothing”
action is zero.
For the purpose of identification, the population choice probabilities P (a|x, s) is assumed
to be known, which can be empirically estimated from the data. Also, the proof builds on the
Hotz and Miller inversion, which provides the correspondence between the first difference of
the choice-specific value functions and the first difference of logarithms of conditional choice
probabilities. Below, we clarify the steps to identify our model. The equation references
below refer to the body of the paper and Online Appendix B.7.2.
1. Identifying Terminal-Period’s Value Function (V˜i,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1)): In the termi-
nal period (i.e., the reward period, or Period T + 1, value function V˜i,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) =
Ui,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) = αR ·Pr(i wins|xi,T+1, sT+1) (Equations (3.1) and (3.5) in Section 3.4).
As soon as α is identified (by exploiting the variation in award level), value function V˜i,T+1
can be directly calculated, and therefore, identified.
2. Identifying Last-Action-Period’s Null-Action-Specific Value Function
(vi,T (xi,T , sT ; ai,T=0)): The null-action-specific value function vi,T (xi,T , sT ; ai,T=0) can be
identified for the last action period T (according to Equation (B.16)). Note that the ex-
pectation in Equation (B.16) is taken over (xi,t+1, st+1). Given ai,t = 0, xi,t+1 = xi,t; and
P (st+1|st) can be calculated based on P (a|x, s) and the action-specific state transition prob-
abilities, both of which have been estimated directly from the data (in the first stage of the
estimation process).
3. Identifying Null-Action-Specific Value Function For All Periods
(vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t=0) for all t = 1, ..., T ): From our data, we can em-
pirically estimate the choice probabilities Pi,t+1(ai,t+1=0|xi,t+1, st+1). From Step 2, we also
know that vi,T (xi,T , sT ; ai,T=0) is identified. Then we can use Equation (B.17) to calcu-
late vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) for all periods before the last action period (t < T ) backwards.
The entrant’s null-action-specific value function is always zero (Equation (B.15)). That is,
vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t=0) are identified for all t = 1, ..., T .
4. Identifying Action-Specific Value Function For All Actions and All Periods
(vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t = d) for all k ∈ A, d ∈ D, and all t = 1, ..., T ): With
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the identified null-action-specific value functions (i.e., vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t=0))
for all t = 1, ..., T , based on Equation (B.10), we can identify action-specific value functions
(i.e., vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t = d)) for all k ∈ A, d ∈ D, and all t = 1, ..., T , given
vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t=0) identified in the previous step and Pi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) and
Pi,t(di,t|st) directly estimated from the data.
5. Identifying Ex-Ante Value Function For (All Periods V˜i,t(xi,t, st) and V˜
e
j,t(st)):
Building on Step 4, the ex-ante value functions (V˜i,t(xi,t, st) and V˜
e
j,t(st)) can be identified by
Equations (B.14a)-(B.14b) given that we have identified the choice-specific value functions
(vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t = d)).
6. Identifying Per-Period Utility Functions (u(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and u
e(st; dj,t = d)):
Based on the definition of the action-specific value function vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) (specified
in the paragraph after Equations (3.7)-(3.8) in Section 3.4.3), we can write the per-period
utility as the difference between the action-specific value function (vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k)) and
the discounted next-period ex-ante value function (βE[V˜i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1)|xi,t, st; ai,t = k]) in
Equation (B.18). Since both terms on the right hand side of Equation (B.18) are known from
Steps 4 and 5, u(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and u
e(st; dj,t = d) are identified.
7. Identifying Cost of Actions: Since our per-period utility is only a function of creators’
own action, but not opponents’ actions, we can identify cost of actions.
Here we briefly point out how our paper relates to Bajari et al. (2015), which we closely
follow by adapting their proof to a finite-horizon game. We want to highlight the fact that, in
general, under Assumptions 1 and 2, ui(ai,t, xi,t, st) (with a−i,t integrated out) can be iden-
tified. Cost-shifters come in to play only in identifying ui(ai,t, a−i,t, xi,t, st) (pii(ai,t, a−i,t, st)
in Bajari et al. (2015)’s notation8) from ui(ai,t, xi,t, st) (pii(ai,t, st) in Bajari et al. (2015)’s
notation) (see page 14 of Bajari et al. (2015) for details). In our case, opponents’ actions
a−i,t do not affect the focal creator’s single period utility ui, hence ui(ai,t, xi,t, st) is all we
need to back out the utility parameters. Therefore, we do not need cost-shifters.
B.7.2 Proof of Identification for Parameters in Creators’ Utility Function
.
In this appendix, we show that it is possible to uniquely recover the deterministic part in the
creator per-period utility, which then allows identification of the cost parameters (discussed
in Section 3.5.1.3). Note that the choice probabilities, ex-ante value functions and choice-
specific value functions all depend on the award amount R, and hence depend on αR; in
this proof, we show the identification of creator cost parameters for a given αR value. Note
that, the difference in creators behavior among contests with different award amounts in the
data, which correspond to different values of single-period utility for the same action-state
combination (u(xit, st; ait)), contributes to the identification of α.
8In Bajari et al. (2015)’s notation, st is not just opponent state, but everyone’s states
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Per Section 3.4, the equilibrium choice probabilities and the choice-specific value functions
are related through:
Pi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) = exp(vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t))∑
a′i,t
exp(vi,t(xi,t, st; a′i,t))
, ai,t ∈ A(= {0, redesign, revise, do-both}),
Pj,t(dj,t|st) =
exp(vej,t(st; dj,t))∑
d′j,t
exp(vej,t(st; d
′
j,t))
, dj,t ∈ D(= {0, enter}).
(B.9)
For simplicity, we have indexed the actions do-nothing (in A) and not-enter (in D) as 0 in this
identification discussion. The choice-specific value functions (vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t)
are defined in Section 3.4.3).9
From the data, we observe conditional choice probabilities Pi,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) and Pj,t(dj,t|st).
We first take the log of both sides of Equation (B.9). Algebra implies that
log(Pi,t(ai,t=k|xi,t, st))− log(Pi,t(ai,t=0|xi,t, st)) = vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=k)− vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0),
log(Pej,t(dj,t = d|st))− log(Pej,t(dj,t=0|st)) = vej,t(st; dj,t = d)− vej,t(st; dj,t=0).
(B.10)
These equations show that we are able to recover the choice-specific value functions up to a
first difference, once we know the empirical population choice probabilities.
Having identified the first differences of the choice-specific value functions, we next turn
to the problem of identifying the choice-specific value functions. To do that, we define the
ex-ante value functions for incumbents and potential entrants, denoted as V˜i,t(xi,t, st) and
V˜ ej,t(st) respectively, as the following:
V˜i,t(xi,t, st) = EVi,t(xi,t, st, i,t) =
∫
i,t
Vi,t(xi,t, st, i,t)p(i,t)di,t, and
V˜ ej,t(st) = EV ej,t(st, εj,t) =
∫
εj,t
V ej,t(st, εj,t)p(εj,t)dεj,t, where
(B.11)
Vi,t(xi,t, st, i,t) and V
e
j,t(st, εj,t) are defined in Equations (3.5)-(3.6) in Section 3.4.2. We can
write the relationship between the ex-ante value functions (V˜i,t(xi,t, st) and V˜
e
j,t(st)) and the
9Note that the ex-ante value functions and the choice-specific value functions depend on opponents’
strategies, σ-i. In the estimation, we assume creators are playing the equilibrium strategies (σ
∗
i ),
and therefore the value functions are those that correspond to the scenario where opponents are
playing equilibrium strategies. For simplicity, we suppress σ∗i in the choice-specific value functions (in
Equations (B.9)-(B.10)), and the ex-ante value functions (in Equation (B.11)).
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choice-specific value functions (vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t) as:
V˜i,t(xi,t, st) = Ei,t maxai,t
[vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t) + (ai,t)], and
V˜ ej,t(xi,t) = Eεj,t max
dj,t
[vej,t(st; dj,t) + ε(di,t)].
(B.12)
Based on Equation (B.12), and properties of the multinomial logit specification (derived,
for example, in Train (2009)), we are able to get:
V˜i,t(xi,t, st) = Ei,t maxai,t
[vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t) + (ai,t)] = log
(∑
k∈A
exp[vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=k)]
)
= log
(∑
k∈A
exp[vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=k)− vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0)]
)
+ vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0);
(B.13a)
similarly, for potential entrants,
V˜ ej,t(st) = log
(∑
d∈D
exp[vej,t(st; dj,t=d)− vej,t(st; di,t=0)]
)
+ vej,t(st; dj,t=0). (B.13b)
Using Equation (B.10), Equations (B.13a)-(B.13b) can also be written as:
V˜i,t(xi,t, st)
= log
(∑
k∈A
exp[log(Pi,t(ai,t=k|xi,t, st))− log(Pi,t(ai,t=0|xi,t, st))]
)
+ vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0)
= −log(Pi,t(ai,t=0|xi,t, st)) + vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0);
(B.14a)
and
V˜ ej,t(st) = −log(Pej,t(dj,t=0|st)) + vej,t(st; dj,t=0). (B.14b)
Equations (B.14a)-(B.14b) show that the ex-ante value functions (V˜i,t(xi,t, st) and V˜
e
j,t(st))
are known as soon as the choice-specific value functions (vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t=0))
are.
Next, we will show how to identify the choice-specific value functions. Based on the
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Bellman Equation, we can write vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t=0) recursively as:
vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) = u(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) + βE[V˜i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1)|xi,t, st; ai,t=0], and
vej,t(st; dj,t=0) = u
e(st; dj,t=0) + I(dj,t=Enter) · βE[V˜j,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1)|st].
vej,t(st; dj,t=0) = u
e(st; dj,t=0) + 0.
(B.15)
The expectations are taken over current-period private shocks of opponents, as well as future
values of the state variables and private shocks of both the focal creator and her opponents.
Recall that we normalize the costs of “do-nothing” action and “not enter” ac-
tion as zero, hence, u(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) = −c(ai,t=do-nothing) = 0 and ue(st; dj,t=0) =
−cet (dj,t=not-enter) = 0, which allows further simplification of Equation (B.15) as:
vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) = βE[V˜i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1)|xi,t, st; ai,t=0], and
vej,t(st; dj,t=0) = 0.
(B.16)
The value functions related to the “not-enter” action for potential entrants
(vej,t(st; dj,t=0)) are identified trivially. Next, we discuss how we achieve identification of the
incumbents’ value functions related to “do-nothing” starting from the last action period (T )
in our finite-horizon dynamic game. According to Equations (3.1) and (3.5) in Section 3.4 of
the paper, the terminal period value function is V˜i,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) = Ui,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) =
αR · Pr(i wins|xi,T+1, sT+1). Therefore, based on Equation (B.16), vi,T (xi,T , sT ; ai,T=0) are
identified. For all the periods before T (t < T ), we can further combine Equations (B.14a)-
(B.14b), and write Equation (B.16) as:
vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) = βE[V˜i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1)|xi,t, st; ai,t=0]
= βE[−log(Pi,t+1(ai,t+1=0|xi,t+1, st+1))
+ vi,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1; ai,t+1=0)|xi,t, st; ai,t=0]
= βE[−log(Pi,t+1(ai,t+1=0|xi,t+1, st+1))|xi,t, st; ai,t=0]
+ βE[vi,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1; ai,t+1=0)|xi,t, st; ai,t=0].
(B.17)
From our data, we can empirically estimate the choice probabilities
Pi,t+1(ai,t+1=0|xi,t+1, st+1). We also know that vi,T (xi,T , sT ; ai,T=0) is identified for
the last action period. Then we can use Equation (B.17) to calculate vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) for
all periods before the last action period (t < T ) backwards. That is, vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and
vej,t(st; dj,t=0) are identified for all t = 1, ..., T .
With these identified vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t=0), vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and
vej,t(st; dj,t = d) are identified for all k ∈ A and d ∈ D by substituting vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t=0) and
vej,t(st; dj,t=0) into Equation (B.10). Also note that the ex-ante value functions (V˜i,t(xi,t, st)
and V˜ ej,t(st)) can be identified by Equations (B.14a)-(B.14b) given that we have identified the
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choice-specific value functions (vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and v
e
j,t(st; dj,t = d)). Using the recursive
nature of the value function in our dynamic setting, we have:
u(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) = vi,t(xi,t, st; ai,t = k)− βE[V˜i,t+1(xi,t+1, st+1)|xi,t, st; ai,t = k], and
ue(st; dj,t = d) = v
e
j,t(st; dj,t = d)− βE[V˜j,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1)|st; dj,t = d].
(B.18)
Since both terms on the right hand side of Equation (B.18) are known, u(xi,t, st; ai,t = k)
and ue(st; dj,t = d) are identified. Given u(xi,t, st; ai,t = k) and u
e(st; dj,t = d), since our
per-period utility is only a function of creators’ own action, but not opponents’ actions, we
can identify cost of actions.
As a final note, creators’ behavior, more specifically, their conditional choice probabilities,
may vary with the award amount (R). If this is true, the identification procedure described
above will yield different sets of value functions for different R values. Because the cost
parameters and the per-period utility function in periods 1...T do not vary with R, any
difference in the conditional choice probabilities observed in the data and their implied value
functions across contests with different R’s, can only be attributed to the difference in αR,
which affects the value functions through the terminal-period utility function (Equation (1)).
Since R is observed, the magnitude of the variation of creators’ behavior across contests with
different award amount identifies α.
B.7.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our estimation method, we conduct Monte Carlo experi-
ments on a simulated sample. In what follows, we first describe the data-generating process
and then present the estimation results on the simulated data.
We simulate 30,000 independent contests with the same horizon. For each empirically
observed award level, we first numerically solve for the equilibrium strategies of creators
and the corresponding conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) under possible combinations
of individual-level state and contest-level state for each period. For each simulated contest,
we sample an award-level from the empirical distribution of award-levels, and then use its
numerically computed equilibrium CCPs to simulate creator actions for that simulated contest
– in particular, we draw actions based on Equations (7)-(8), which depend on the state
variables (xit, st).
10 In addition, we use the same state transition probabilities estimated
from our data to simulate the evolution of the individual- and contest-level states.
10Alternatively, we can also sample the unobserved state variables (i.e.,  and ε) for each creator in
each period of each contest, and then use the equilibrium strategy σ∗ to determine the creator actions
in each period of each contest. Under the assumption that  and ε are i.i.d. and follow the Type
I extreme value distribution, this alternative approach is equivalent to the “CCP” based approach
described above. The CCP based approach is more convenient to use.
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We then use the simulated data to estimate the structural parameters in the creator’s util-
ity function (i.e., α, c(redesign), c(revise), c(do-both), ce1(enter), c
e
2(enter), and c
e
3(enter))
with the four-step estimation approach described in Section 5.1.2. Table B.6 summarizes the
estimation results. These results demonstrate that our approach can successfully back out
the model primitives.
Table B.6: Monte Carlo Results
True Parameter Recovered Estimates
α 0.0340 0.0307
c(redesign) 2.7900 2.8139
c(revise) 2.2050 2.1969
c(do-both) 3.3190 3.3296
ce1(enter) 4.9580 5.0935
ce2(enter) 4.3260 4.3072
ce3(enter) 3.5990 3.5788
B.7.4 Identification for Action-Specific State Transition Probabilities Be-
yond 5-Star
The only difference between cases beyond 5-star (governed by θ12) and those within 5-star
(governed by θ11) is that, we do not directly observe the quality state (measured by star
ratings), when it goes beyond 5-star. Yet, we can infer the distribution of quality state
from the empirical probability of winning (Pr(i win)) (given the actions creators take after
receiving their first 5-star rating).
In both cases, we can observe creators’ action and the quality improvement (directly if the
quality is below 5-star and indirectly if the quality is greater or equal to 5-star) associated
with this action from the data. This information (the connection between an action and
the associated action-specific quality improvement) does not depend on parameters in the
utility function (e.g., the cost of action). Hence, we can separately estimate the parameters
governing the transition probabilities conditional on actions.
A Numerical Example for Cases beyond 5-Star. To provide further detail for interested
readers, we construct a simplified numerical example to help illustrate the spirit of how the
estimation of θ12 works. For simplicity, this example is similar to, but simpler than, our
main model. In particular, we consider contests with 2 creators (i = 1, 2) and 3 action
periods (T = 3). For simplicity, we assume that both players join in the very first period;
and at the beginning of the second period, both players are rated 5-star. We assume in
this example that the players’ “true” design qualities are xi,t=2 ∼ N(5, 1) (i = 1, 2). (Note
that this assumption about the distribution of the true design quality is different from the
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assumption made in our main model; see later in this paragraph for a detailed discussion
about this difference and its implications.) In the next two periods, the creators can choose
from two actions – make a follow-up submission (ai,t = 1) or not (ai,t = 0). If a creator i
chooses to follow-up, her individual state evolves to reflect the quality improvement of her
best design(s) – in particular, we assume xi,t+1 = xi,t + ∆i and ∆i ∼ N(µ, σ) when ai,t = 1;
when ai,t = 0, xi,t+1 = xi,t. In the award period, the creator with the highest individual state
xi,T (i.e., best design quality) wins the reward R, and everyone else gets nothing.
11 Note that
the transition process in this example model is simplified from our main model in the paper
as well. In order to obtain a closed-form representation of the probability of winning (see
Equation (B.19)), this example assumes the “true” quality of the first 5-star rating follows a
normal distribution (centered around 5), instead of a truncated normal distribution as in our
main model; similarly, the quality improvements are assumed to follow a normal distribution
instead of a truncated normal distribution. (The exact state transition process beyond 5-star
is described by Equations (3.9a)-(3.9b) in the paper.) However, these differences (i.e., with
or without “truncation”, and two vs. four alternative follow-up actions) do not affect the
logic behind the estimation and identification of the parameters governing the state transition
process, but only affect the exact formula of quality distributions at the end of the contest
and the exact formula of the winning probabilities predicted by the model.
We can now write a creator i’s probability of winning (Pr(i wins)) under differ-
ent scenarios. (The scenarios are defined based on the two creators’ chosen actions
ai=1,t=2, ai=2,t=2, ai=1,t=3 and ai=2,t=3.) To simplify the notation, we define random vari-
ables z0-act, z1-act, and z2-act to capture the best design quality resulting from all actions
a player takes in periods 2 and 3, when the player takes follow-up action in zero, one,
and two of these periods, respectively: z0-act ∼ (5, 1), z1-act ∼ (5 + µ,√1 + σ2), and
z2-act ∼ (5 + 2µ,√1 + 2σ2).
Prscn-1(i wins) = 0.5, scn-1:
∑
t ai=1,t =
∑
t ai=2,t;
Prscn-2(i wins) = Pr(z2-act > z1-act) = Φ( µ√
2+3σ2
), scn-2:
∑
t ai=1,t = 2 and
∑
t ai=2,t = 1;
Prscn-3(i wins) = Pr(z2-act > z0-act) = Φ( 2µ√
2+2σ2
), scn-3:
∑
t ai=1,t = 2 and
∑
t ai=2,t = 0;
Prscn-4(i wins) = Pr(z1-act > z0-act) = Φ( µ√
2+σ2
), scn-4:
∑
t ai=1,t = 1 and
∑
t ai=2,t = 0;
Prscn-5(i wins) = 1− Prscn-4(i wins), scn-5:∑t ai=1,t = 0 and ∑t ai=2,t = 1;
Prscn-6(i wins) = 1− Prscn-3(i wins), scn-6:∑t ai=1,t = 0 and ∑t ai=2,t = 2;
Prscn-7(i wins) = 1− Prscn-2(i wins), scn-7:∑t ai=1,t = 1 and ∑t ai=2,t = 2;
(B.19)
In our empirical setting, creators’ actions and the corresponding winning probabilities are
observed. Therefore, we are able to identify the parameters governing the state transition
11Note that, we define the individual state beyond 5-star using continuous variables. Thus, the
probability that there is a draw is zero.
148
probability (i.e., those that describe the distribution of z·) by matching the predicted and
observed probability of winning for each of these scenarios. Specifically, the equations from
scenario-2 through scenario-7 help identify the µ and σ. Note that, we actually have more
variations to identify these parameters (governing the improvement distribution) in the real
data: we can observe contests with different numbers of creators, and each scenario in different
contests would generate a likelihood function that is a non-linear function of the parameters
in θ12.
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B.8 Estimates for Action-Specific State Transition Probabilities
B.8.1 Frequency Estimates Within 5-star
Frequency estimates for the rating distribution of new entrants’ first submission(s) and the
action-specific state transition probabilities among states up to 5-star are reported below.
Table B.7: New Entrants Rating
Distribution
NA 1-Star 2-Star 3-Star 4-Star 5-Star
0.23 0.109 0.172 0.265 0.172 0.052
Table B.8: Rating Improvement
Resulting from “Revise” Action
Post Rating
NA 1-Star 2-Star 3-Star 4-Star 5-Star
B
a
se
R
a
ti
n
g
NA 0.869 0.035 0.026 0.044 0.026 0
1-Star 0 0.615 0.187 0.121 0.066 0.011
2-Star 0 0 0.659 0.239 0.09 0.012
3-Star 0 0 0 0.785 0.177 0.038
4-Star 0 0 0 0 0.861 0.139
5-Star 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table B.9: Rating Improvement
Resulting from “Redesign” Ac-
tion
Post Rating
NA 1-Star 2-Star 3-Star 4-Star 5-Star
B
a
se
R
a
ti
n
g
NA 0.771 0.032 0.039 0.087 0.055 0.016
1-Star 0 0.639 0.132 0.118 0.083 0.028
2-Star 0 0 0.649 0.235 0.095 0.021
3-Star 0 0 0 0.783 0.158 0.059
4-Star 0 0 0 0 0.869 0.131
5-Star 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table B.10: Rating Improvement
Resulting from “Do-both” Action
Post Rating
NA 1-Star 2-Star 3-Star 4-Star 5-Star
B
a
se
R
a
ti
n
g
NA 0.679 0.038 0.094 0.094 0.038 0.057
1-Star 0 0.551 0.192 0.167 0.077 0.013
2-Star 0 0 0.523 0.189 0.212 0.076
3-Star 0 0 0 0.607 0.301 0.092
4-Star 0 0 0 0 0.783 0.217
5-Star 0 0 0 0 0 1
B.8.2 State Transition Probability Estimates Beyond 5-Star
The estimation results for θ12, the set of parameters governing the distribution of the unob-
served quality improvements beyond 5-star, are displayed in Table B.11. Notice that we fix
ξ0 to follow the standard normal distribution to achieve identification for other elements of
θ12.
12 The estimation results suggest that after creators receive at least one 5-star rating,
exploratory actions (redesign) are less likely to bring positive quality improvements, but the
variance of these quality improvements is larger; by contrast, exploitative actions (revise)
are more likely to bring positive quality improvements, but the variance in these quality im-
provements is smaller. Combining both exploratory and exploitative actions, do-both leads
to a medium-level chance of positive quality improvements, but the variance of these quality
improvements is very large.
12We are not able to simultaneously identify the distributions for ξ0, ξredesign, ξrevise, ξdo-both, since
shifting all ξa distributions horizontally or making them flatter/thinner simultaneously will not affect
how we rationalize the winning realizations observed in the data.
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Table B.11: Estimates for θ12, Parameters Governing Quality Improvements
beyond 5-Star
Mean of ξa Estimate S.t.d of ξa Estimate
µ(ξ0) Fixed to 0 σ(ξ0) Fixed to 1
µ(ξredesign) −0.052 (0.008) σ(ξredesign) 1.351 (0.003)
µ(ξrevise) 0.230 (0.006) σ(ξrevise) 0.517 (0.008)
µ(ξdo-both) 0.022 (0.005) σ(ξdo-both) 1.426 (0.010)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. Recall in Equation (3.9b),
max(ξa, 0) represents the quality improvement beyond 5-star resulting from action a.
B.9 Details for Cross-Validation on Contestant Actions
We use 4-fold cross-validation to examine the ability of our model to predict creators’ partic-
ipation behavior. We partition the data randomly into four subsets and perform four rounds
of cross-validation. In each round, we compare the prediction generated by the model es-
timated using three subsets of data (training set) with the fourth subset of observed data
(testing set). We rotate the choice of the training and testing sets. After running all four
rounds of cross-validation, we average the validation results over the rounds. This validation
is done for all actions: new entry, revise, redesign, do-both, and do-nothing.
We first compare incumbents’ actions predicted by the model estimated using the training
data set with the observed actions in the testing data set. Let P∗i,t(ai,t = a′|xi,t, st) be the
probability of creator i choosing action a′, which is calculated by solving the dynamic game
based on the model estimated using the training set. Then for any incumbent i in period t in
contest q observed in the testing set, having state (xi,t, st), the incumbent’s predicted action
apredicti,t is then drawn from the P
∗
i,t(ai,t|xi,t, st) distribution. Hence, the predicted number of
incumbents taking action a′ in period t in contest q is mpredictqt (a′) =
∑
i∈Nqt P
∗
i,t(ai,t = a
′)
(As a reminder, Nqt denotes the set of all incumbents in contest q in period t; also note
that, for readability, we are suppressing the state variables here and in the rest of this
Appendix B.9). Let aobservei,t denote the observed action by incumbent i in period t, and
mobserveqt (a
′) =
∑
i∈Nqt I(a
observe
i,t = a
′) is the actual number of incumbents taking action a′ in
period t in contest q. Let us use N (N =
∑
q
∑
t ||Nqt||) to denote the sum of the numbers
of incumbents over all periods and all contests observed in the testing set. (Note that N is
different from the total number of participants who have ever submitted designs to a contest.
For example, a creator who joins the contest at t = 1 will be counted twice in N , as she
is an incumbent in both period t = 2 and period t = 3.) Following Aks¸in et al. (2013), we
consider the estimated model’s relative and absolute errors in predicting incumbent actions
in the hold-out sample (testing set) as the performance metrics for the cross-validation. The
151
relative and absolute errors in predicting action a′ are defined as:
relative errora′ =
|∑q∑tmpredictqt (a′)−∑q∑tmobserveqt (a′)|∑
q
∑
tm
observe
qt (a
′)
, a′ ∈ A,
absolute errora′ =1/N · |
∑
q
∑
t
mpredictqt (a
′)−
∑
q
∑
t
mobserveqt (a
′)|, a′ ∈ A,
where A = {revise, redesign, do-both, do-nothing}. For potential entrants’ actions, we com-
pare the number of entries predicted by the model estimated using the training set with
the observed number of entries in the testing set. For potential entrant j in period t,
let P∗j,t(dj,t = Enter|st) denote the probability of j entering the contest predicted by the
model estimated using the training set, and dobservej,t denote the observed entry decision by
j. As for incumbents, we denote the predicted number of entries in period t in contest q as
me,predictqt (Enter) =
∑
j∈Mqt P
∗
j,t(dj,t = Enter), and the actual number of entries in period t
in contest q is me,observeqt (Enter) =
∑
j∈Mqt I(d
observe
j,t = Enter) (as a reminder, Mqt denotes
the set of all potential entrants in contest q in period t). Let M (M =
∑
q
∑
t ||Mqt||) denote
the total number of potential entrants; we have
relative errorEntry =
|∑q∑tme,predictqt (Enter)−∑q∑tme,observeqt (Enter)|∑
q
∑
tm
e,observe
qt (Enter)
,
absolute errorEntry = 1/M · |
∑
q
∑
t
me,predictqt (Enter)−
∑
q
∑
t
me,observeqt (Enter)|.
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B.10 Overview of the Robustness Checks
We designed our main model to be parsimonious but effective. To ensure that our empirical
results are robust to our modeling choices and assumptions, we conduct a series of robustness
checks.
B.10.1 Myopic Creators
We consider two alternative models of creator behavior: i) fully myopic and ii) partially
myopic. In the “fully myopic” model, we assume that creators make decisions based only
on the current-period expected utility. In the “partially myopic” model, we assume every
creator makes her decision, believing that she is the last one in the contest to act. Using the
two alternative models, we estimate the parameters of interest and compute the simulated
log likelihood of observing the actual choices in the data. Both alternative models yield a
considerably poorer fit in comparison with the strategic model, suggesting no evidence for
the myopic models being superior (details are reported in Online Appendix B.11.1).
B.10.2 Heterogeneity in Creator Ability/Experience and Interest
In the main model, we assume creators are ex-ante homogeneous; that is, the heterogeneity
among creators is captured by their realized ratings, and before the ratings of their submis-
sions are disclosed, they are homogeneous. To ensure that our results are not sensitive to
this homogeneity assumption, we perform the following robustness check with respect to two
most likely types of creator heterogeneity — heterogeneity in (1) creator ability/experience
and (2) creator interest in the contest.
We use creators’ Reputation Level (on a scale of 0− 100) the platform assigns to creators
to measure their ability/experience level.13 If a creator’s Reputation Level is above or equal
to 70, she is classified as high-reputation (H); otherwise, she is classified as low-reputation
(L).14 First, we conduct regression analyses and show there is little evidence for heteroge-
neous entry or follow-up action behavior between the high-reputation and the low-reputation
creators, indicating that creators’ participation behavior is not significantly affected by their
ability/experience. Second, we re-estimate our structural model using stratified samples –
High-Reputation Concentrated Contests, Low-Reputation Concentrated Contests, and Bal-
anced Contests, based on the percentage of high-reputation creators in the contest. We
13Reputation Level is computed by the platform and is displayed on every creator’s profile page,
and it summarizes the ratings of the creator’s past submissions, her level of participation, her history
on the platform, and her community behavior (e.g., frequencies of visiting the site, reporting problems,
and participating in the forums).
14We use 70 as the cutoff score, because 70 is the starting-point score assigned to a new creator who
just joined the platform, from where the system adjusts the creator’s score upwards or downwards
according to her performance and activity level.
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compare the estimation results and are able to conclude that creator ability/experience het-
erogeneity does not meaningfully affect our estimation results. (The complete description of
the regression procedure/results and stratified sample test can be found in Online Appen-
dices B.11.2.1-B.11.2.3.) We find these results intuitive. First, the logo design contest we are
studying is likely to be a so-called “ideation project” (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008), where the
impact of participants’ endowed expertise is attenuated by the fact that the notion of qual-
ity is highly subjective – it is based on seekers’ private tastes rather than objective quality
measures, as indicated by a popular platform: “These ratings are subjective. A star rating
doesn’t reflect your design skill – it indicates the personal preferences of the contest holder.”
Hence, a creator who performs well in other design contests, or has participated in a large
number of contests, does not necessarily have an advantage in a new contest she chooses to
participate in. Second, even though the creator population on the platform is highly diverse
in their experience level and background, those who frequently participate in contests and
thus contribute more to the model estimation are relatively homogeneous.
One may be concerned that the heterogeneity in creator interest in a contest may affect
creators’ state and their actions simultaneously. To test if creators’ heterogeneous “interest”
in a contest impacts their follow-up decisions, we perform a reduced-form empirical analysis.
In this analysis, a creator i’s interest in contest q is measured by the percentage of contests
creator i participated in (throughout the sample period) that fall in the same industry as
contest q. With this measure, we re-run the multinomial logit regression model of incumbents’
follow-up action choices, and find little evidence for heterogeneity in creators’ interest that
affects their follow-up decisions. (The complete description of the analysis and results can be
found in Online Appendix B.11.2.4.)
B.10.3 Strategic Waiting
We consider another alternative model that allows for the possibility that creators might
strategically wait to participate in a contest. In this alternative model, the number of po-
tential entrants in a particular period is endogenously determined as the number of active
creators on the platform minus the number of creators who have already joined the focal con-
test; and these potential entrants can strategically wait — they will decide between entering
the contest in the current period and waiting for another period. The estimation results of
this alternative model show that the qualitative nature of our empirical findings remains the
same under this alternative assumption on the entry process. We also provide reduced-form
empirical evidence showing our main model (as opposed to the alternative model where the
creator can strategically wait) is more consist with the data. (The complete description of
the alternative model and the corresponding estimation results, as well as the reduced-form
analysis can be found in Online Appendix B.11.3.)
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B.10.4 Including Non-Monetary Incentives
Another assumption we make in our main model is that the positive utility a creator receives
in the terminal period only comes from the financial reward given by the seeker (see Equation
3.1). One might argue that creators can also get non-monetary rewards (e.g., learning by
participating, pure joy of designing, and building up design portfolios) from participating in
these design contests. To see whether our main estimation results are robust to the inclusion
of non-monetary incentives, we revise the utility function for the rewarding period (T + 1) as
follows.
Ui,T+1(xi,T+1, sT+1) = αR · Pr(i wins|xi,T+1, sT+1) +Rnm, (B.20)
where Rnm is the additional non-monetary reward creator i receives in the terminal period.
Note that the financial reward R is only received when a creator wins the contest, while any
creator receives the non-monetary reward Rnm as long as she participates. The estimation
results of the revised model suggestion that the inclusion of the non-monetary incentives has
little effect on the estimates of the utility parameters. (See Table B.19 in Online Appendix.)
B.10.5 Robustness with Respect to the Discount Factor β, the Number of
Potential Entrants ||Mt||, and the SIFT Cutoff
We further test the sensitivity of the estimation results with respect to the discount factor β,
the number of potential entrants ||Mt||, and the SIFT cutoff. Not surprisingly, most of the
cost estimates increase with β, because a higher β increases the expected utility from future
periods, and hence the model needs larger cost estimates to rationalize the observed patterns
of entry, redesign, revision, and do-both. Additionally, entry costs for all periods increase with
the assumed number of potential entrants, as models that assume more potential entrants
need higher entry costs to rationalize the number of entrants observed in the data. Lastly,
the cost of revision increases and the cost of redesign decreases as we tune up the SIFT
cutoff; since higher SIFT cutoff categorizes more actions into redesign, the model needs a
lower redesign cost estimate and a larger revision cost estimate to rationalize the observed
patterns in creators’ follow-up actions. Overall, the qualitative nature of the results are the
same under different assumptions for the discount factor, the number of potential entrants,
and the SIFT cutoff. (See Table B.23 in Online Appendix.)
155
B.11 Detailed Discussion and Results for Robustness Checks
To ensure that our empirical results are robust to our modeling choices and assumptions,
we conduct a series of robustness checks. The findings from these checks are summarized
in Online Appendix B.10. Below we provide the detailed results for each of the robustness
checks.
B.11.1 Performance of the Strategic Model Compared with Myopic Mod-
els
We consider two alternative models of creator behavior: i) fully myopic and ii) partially
myopic. In the “fully myopic” model, we assume that creators make decisions only based on
the current-period expected utility. In the “partially myopic” model, we assume every creator
makes her decision, believing that she is the last one in the contest to act. Using the two
alternative models, we estimate the parameters of interest and compute the simulated log
likelihood of observing the actual choices in the data. Table B.12 reports the fit of each model.
As can be seen in Table B.12, both alternative models (fully myopic and partially myopic)
yield a considerably poorer fit in comparison with the strategic model, suggesting no evidence
for the myopic models being superior. Specifically, The Akaike information criterion (AIC)
is 29512.08 for the fully myopic model, and 28966.97 for the strategic model; the difference
of two AICs (29512.08 − 28966.97 = 545.11) represents the information loss experienced if
we use the myopic model rather than the strategic model. This loss is of considerable size
– according to rough guidelines (Raftery, 1996), greater than 10 difference in AIC indicates
the myopic model has essentially no support.
Table B.12: Alternative Models
Simulated Log Likelihood AIC
Strategic Model -14476.49 28966.97
Fully Myopic Model -14749.04 29512.09
Partially Myopic Model -14625.05 29264.10
B.11.2 Robustness Checks With Respect to Heterogeneity
We conduct several tests to ensure the robustness of our results with respect to the ex-
ante homogeneity assumption, namely, the high- and low-reputation creators do not behave
differently in the same contest.
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B.11.2.1 Reduced-form Test for Heterogeneity
pointer:original:reg
We first regress the percentage of the high-reputation creators among all creators joining
contests on day t (%∆Hqt =
∆(No. High Type Creators)qt+1
∆(No. Creators)qt+1
15) on Wqt and Yqt (defined in On-
line Appendix B.2.1), to test whether the high-reputation creators are more/less likely to
join contests that are more/less competitive. The estimation results of this regression sug-
gest that neither the number of existing submissions with high ratings, nor the number of
existing submissions with low ratings has a significant effect on %∆Hqt, and that the model
is not significant with F -Stats = 1.244 (df = 7;n = 4793).16 In other words, there are not
disproportionately high- or low-reputation creators joining a contest when more high or low
ratings are disclosed. Therefore, there is little evidence for any heterogeneous entry behavior
between the high-reputation and the low-reputation creators.
Next, we test whether the high-reputation and low-reputation creators differ in their
decisions on follow-up actions by estimating a variant of Equation (B.2), in which two ad-
ditional independent variables – the focal creator’s type dummy (I(H)i)
17 and the per-
centage of high-reputation creators among all existing creators in contest q on day t − 1
(Hqt−1 =
(No. High Type Creators)qt+1
(No. Creators)qt+1
). The results of this multinomial regression suggest that
I(H)i is not significantly correlated with the probabilities of revision and do-both, and is only
marginally significantly correlated with redesign; %Hqt−1 is not significantly correlated with
any of the follow-up actions. This indicates that neither the focal incumbent creator i’s type
nor the percentage of high-reputation creators in the contest significantly affects creator i’s
choice of follow-up actions, after controlling for the individual-level and contest-level state
variables. This finding, along with the results for the previous regression, supports our ar-
gument that creators’ participation behavior is not significantly affected by either their own
ability/experience, or that of their rivals. The complete regression results can be found in
Tables B.13 and B.14.
15We added 1 to both the numerator and the denominator to avoid un-defined numbers.
16Among all independent variables, the only significant one is (No. Submissions)qt−1: it is only
marginally significant (p-value = 0.028) with a small magnitude (0.001).
17I(H)i = 1, if ReputationLeveli ≥ 70; otherwise I(H)i = 0.
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Table B.13: Regression of The Percentage of High Type Among New En-
trants
Dependent variable: %∆Hqt
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 −0.001 (0.001)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 −0.0003 (0.001)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.0002 (0.001)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 −0.001 (0.001)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 0.001 (0.002)
(No. Submissions)qt−1 0.001∗ (0.0005)
(No. Creators)qt−1 −0.002 (0.001)
Time Dummies Yes
Contest-level Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 5,607 R2 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.002 F Statistic 1.244 (df = 7; 4793)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001; the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
Table B.14: Multinomial Logit Regression of Incumbent Follow-up Actions
Depend Variable: Actioniqt
Re-design revision do-both
Heterogeneity Variables
I(H)i −0.162∗ (0.076) −0.043 (0.048) −0.008 (0.075)
%Hqt−1 0.322 (0.307) 0.045 (0.188) −0.092 (0.291)
Individual-Level Variables
(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.011 (0.014) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.009)
AvgRatingiqt−1 0.121 (0.135) 0.108 (0.075) 0.140 (0.120)
BestRatingiqt−1 0.271∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.352∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.189∗ (0.076)
SecondBestRatingiqt−1 −0.101 (0.088) −0.034 (0.051) −0.077 (0.081)
Contest-Level Variables
Awardq($) 0.001 (0.0004) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003)
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.010∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.009∗∗ (0.003) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.005 (0.003) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.006∗ (0.003)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.002 (0.004) 0.005∗ (0.003) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 −0.012 (0.009) −0.027∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.030∗∗∗ (0.008)
(No. Submissions)qt−1 −0.007∗ (0.003) −0.002 (0.002) −0.007∗ (0.003)
(No. Creators)qt−1 0.005 (0.006) −0.018∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.010 (0.006)
Time Dummies Yes
Observations 24,085 R2 0.041
Log Likelihood -14,771.670 LR Test 1,250.716∗∗∗ (df = 60)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001; the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
B.11.2.2 Alternative Reduced-form Test for Heterogeneity (with Two Sep-
arate Regressions for High/Low Reputation Creators)
pointer:new:reg
We separately analyze the potential entrants’ entry decision and the incumbents’ follow-
up action choice, and study whether high-reputation and low-reputation creators behave
differently.
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We start with the potential entrants’ entry decision. We regress the number of high-
and low-reputation entrants separately on the state variables. Note that we cannot directly
regress the number of high- and low-reputation entrants separately on the state variables
and compare the estimated coefficients in these two regressions, because the magnitude of
the coefficients are significantly affected by the number of active high- and low-reputation
creators on the platform. For example, if the majority of active creators belong to the high
type, then the estimated coefficients in the regression for the high-reputation creators would
be larger in magnitude, even if the probability of a high- and low-reputation creator join-
ing a contest is identical. Hence, we divide the number of high-reputation (low-reputation)
entrants by the total number of times high-reputation (low-reputation) creators appear in con-
tests held on the platform during the study period (i.e., the denominator for high-reputation
is
∑
q∈∀Contest
∑
j∈Mq I(j is a high-reputation), and the denominator for low-reputation is∑
q∈∀Contest
∑
j∈Mq I(j is a low-reputation)), and use the “adjusted” entry number as the de-
pendent variable in these regressions. Table B.15 compares the results for the low-reputation
creators and those for high-reputation creators. As can be seen in the table, the significance
and signs of the two sets of coefficients are mostly the same. To formally test whether the
two sets of coefficients are significantly different, we perform a Z-test (Clogg et al., 1995; Pa-
ternoster et al., 1998) for the coefficients of each independent variable in the two regressions
(e.g., for (No. 1-Star)qt-1, we test with H0 : β
High
(No. 1-Star)qt-1
= βLow(No. 1-Star)qt-1) and report the
results in Table B.16. Except for (No. 3-Star)qt-1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for
the coefficient of any other independent variable, indicating that the two sets of coefficients
are not significantly different. The significant difference in the coefficients of (No. 3-Star)qt-1
between the two regressions, is not very concerning, because (No. 3-Star)qt-1 is individually
insignificant in both regressions (Table B.15).
Next, we regress the high- and low-reputation incumbents’ follow-up action deci-
sions on the state variables. Table B.17 compares the results for the high- and low-
reputation incumbents (for example, “redesign:(No. Submissions)iqt−1” stands for the effect
of (No.Submissions)iqt−1) on creator i’s probability of choosing redesign). As can be seen in
the table, between the two sets of coefficients, the signs and sizes are mostly the same, but the
significance level varies. To formally test whether the two sets of coefficients are significantly
different, again we perform a Z-test for the coefficients of each independent variable in the two
regressions and report the results in Table B.18. Except for revision:(No.Submissions)iqt−1,
we do not find the coefficients of the other 38 independent variables are significantly different
between the two regressions.
Moreover, combining this set of results with those presented in Table B.14, we find no
systematic pattern indicating the creator ex-ante heterogeneity affects their participation
behavior (e.g., systematic pattern indicating heterogeneity could be the two sets of tests
consistently suggest that the vast majority of independent variable(s) have similar effects on
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different types of creators’ behavior): in the earlier test presented in Table B.14, the only sig-
nificant variable is re-design:I(H)i (I(H)i in the regression for the redesign action); whereas
in the test presented in Table B.17, the only variable that has significantly different coeffi-
cients between the low- and high-reputation regressions is revision:(No. Submissions)iqt−1
((No. Submissions)iqt−1 in the regression for the revision action). Therefore, the marginal
significance of the coefficient of 1 (out of 39) independent variables in Table B.18 is likely due
to randomness. It would be more concerning if the results from these two sets of regressions
display systematic patterns.
However, we are aware that this set of results cannot completely rule out the possible
effect of ex-ante heterogeneity on creator behavior, especially for the incumbents. That is
why we conducted the following additional stratified sub-sample test, discussed next.
Table B.15: Separate Regressions of the Number of Entries for High- and
Low-Type Creators (Adjusted by The Overall Entries by H- and L- Type
Creators on The Platform)
Dependent variable :
∆Lqt(adjusted) ∆Hqt(adjusted)
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 1.971∗ (0.931) 1.131∗∗ (0.424)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 1.309 (1.129) 1.084∗ (0.514)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 −1.776 (0.930) 0.672 (0.424)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 −2.705∗ (1.355) −0.525 (0.617)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 −7.345∗∗ (2.492) −8.113∗∗∗ (1.135)
(No. Submissions)qt−1 0.048 (0.693) −0.300 (0.316)
(No. Creators)qt−1 −8.556∗∗∗ (1.670) −11.528∗∗∗ (0.760)
Contest-Level Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5,607 5,607
R2 0.036 0.185
Adjusted R2 −0.127 0.047
F Statistic (df = 7; 4793) 25.869∗∗∗ 155.623∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table B.16: Difference of The Coefficients (Separate Regressions for Entries
by High- and Low-Type Creators)
coefH coefL seH seL |coefH -coefL | t-value p-value
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 1.971 1.131 0.931 0.424 0.840 0.821 0.412
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 1.309 1.084 1.129 0.514 0.225 0.181 0.856
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 -1.776 0.672 0.930 0.424 2.448 ∗ -2.395 0.017
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 -2.705 -0.525 1.355 0.617 2.180 -1.464 0.143
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 -7.345 -8.113 2.492 1.135 0.768 0.280 0.779
(No. Submissions)qt−1 0.048 -0.300 0.693 0.316 0.348 0.457 0.648
(No. Creators)qt−1 -8.556 -11.528 1.670 0.760 2.972 1.620 0.105
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Table B.17: Regressions of Incumbent Actions on Feedback by Creator
Type
Dependent variable:
Incumbents Follow-up Action Choice: Actioniqt
(High Reputation) (Low Reputation)
redesign:Intercept -4.5877*** 0.2439 -4.0970*** 0.2892
revision:Intercept -3.9091*** 0.1519 -4.3582*** 0.2003
do-both:Intercept -4.1477*** 0.2304 -4.5415*** 0.285
redesign:(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.0098 0.0167 0.007 0.0262
revision:(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.0714*** 0.0074 0.1038*** 0.0112
do-both:(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.0712*** 0.0112 0.0851*** 0.0176
redesign:AvgRatingiqt−1 0.045 0.1686 0.2212 0.2273
revision:AvgRatingiqt−1 0.0429 0.0925 0.2228 0.1273
do-both:AvgRatingiqt−1 0.0652 0.1472 0.2643 0.209
redesign:BestRatingiqt−1 0.3267** 0.1019 0.1925 0.1326
revision:BestRatingiqt−1 0.3728*** 0.0599 0.3051*** 0.082
do-both:BestRatingiqt−1 0.2326* 0.0945 0.126 0.1277
redesign:SecondBestRatingiqt−1 -0.0705 0.1086 -0.14 0.1492
revision:SecondBestRatingiqt−1 -0.0095 0.0624 -0.0693 0.0891
do-both:SecondBestRatingiqt−1 -0.0345 0.0988 -0.1536 0.1428
redesign:Awardq($) 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
revision:Awardq($) 0.0015*** 0.0003 0.0007 0.0004
do-both:Awardq($) 0.0016*** 0.0004 0.0008 0.0005
redesign:(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.0091** 0.0035 0.0111* 0.005
revision:(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.0114*** 0.0024 0.0073* 0.0033
do-both:(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.0148*** 0.004 0.0052 0.0047
redesign:(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.0068 0.0043 0.0133* 0.0054
revision:(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.0069* 0.0027 0.0094** 0.0035
do-both:(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.0098* 0.0044 0.0142** 0.0049
redesign:(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.0012 0.0036 0.0097* 0.0045
revision:(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.0076*** 0.0022 0.0081** 0.0027
do-both:(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.0099** 0.0037 0.0012 0.0041
redesign:(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.0008 0.0056 0.0045 0.0075
revision:(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.0048 0.0033 0.0043 0.0042
do-both:(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.0079 0.0056 0.0192*** 0.0056
redesign:(No. 5-Star)qt−1 -0.0216 0.0111 0.0039 0.0146
revision:(No. 5-Star)qt−1 -0.0285*** 0.0062 -0.0206* 0.0087
do-both:(No. 5-Star)qt−1 -0.0315** 0.0107 -0.0262 0.0143
redesign:(No. Submissions)qt−1 -0.0027 0.0034 -0.0137** 0.0046
revision:(No. Submissions)qt−1 -0.0029 0.0021 -0.001 0.0028
do-both:(No. Submissions)qt−1 -0.0071* 0.0035 -0.0066 0.004
redesign:(No. Creators)qt−1 -0.0001 0.0077 0.0135 0.0101
revision:(No. Creators)qt−1 -0.0187*** 0.0048 -0.0148* 0.0064
do-both:(No. Creators)qt−1 -0.0193* 0.0079 0.0044 0.0093
Time Dummies Yes
Observations 15,424 8,661
R2 0.0408 0.0452
Log Likelihood −9,605.70 −5,134.21
LR Test (df = 54) 817.4216∗∗∗ 485.8946∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table B.18: Difference in Coefficients between Regressions of Incumbents’
Actions for Low- and High- Type Creators
coefH coefL seH seL |coefH -coefL | t-value p-value
redesign:Intercept -4.588 -4.097 0.244 0.289 0.491 -1.297 0.195
revision:Intercept -3.909 -4.358 0.152 0.200 0.449 1.787 0.074
do-both:Intercept -4.148 -4.542 0.230 0.285 0.394 1.075 0.283
redesign:(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.010 0.007 0.017 0.026 0.003 0.090 0.928
revision:(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.071 0.104 0.007 0.011 0.032 -2.414 0.016 *
do-both:(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.071 0.085 0.011 0.018 0.014 -0.666 0.505
redesign:AvgRatingiqt−1 0.045 0.221 0.169 0.227 0.176 -0.623 0.534
revision:AvgRatingiqt−1 0.043 0.223 0.093 0.127 0.180 -1.143 0.253
do-both:AvgRatingiqt−1 0.065 0.264 0.147 0.209 0.199 -0.779 0.436
redesign:BestRatingiqt−1 0.327 0.193 0.102 0.133 0.134 0.802 0.422
revision:BestRatingiqt−1 0.373 0.305 0.060 0.082 0.068 0.667 0.505
do-both:BestRatingiqt−1 0.233 0.126 0.095 0.128 0.107 0.671 0.502
redesign:SecondBestRatingiqt−1 -0.071 -0.140 0.109 0.149 0.070 0.377 0.706
revision:SecondBestRatingiqt−1 -0.010 -0.069 0.062 0.089 0.060 0.550 0.582
do-both:SecondBestRatingiqt−1 -0.035 -0.154 0.099 0.143 0.119 0.686 0.493
redesign:Awardq($) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.128 0.898
revision:Awardq($) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.600 0.110
do-both:Awardq($) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 1.249 0.212
redesign:(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.009 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.002 -0.328 0.743
revision:(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.011 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.004 1.005 0.315
do-both:(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.015 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.010 1.555 0.120
redesign:(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.007 -0.942 0.346
revision:(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.566 0.572
do-both:(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.010 0.014 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.668 0.504
redesign:(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.009 -1.475 0.140
revision:(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.144 0.886
do-both:(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.009 1.575 0.115
redesign:(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.004 -0.395 0.693
revision:(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.094 0.925
do-both:(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.011 -1.427 0.154
redesign:(No. 5-Star)qt−1 -0.022 0.004 0.011 0.015 0.026 -1.390 0.164
revision:(No. 5-Star)qt−1 -0.029 -0.021 0.006 0.009 0.008 -0.739 0.460
do-both:(No. 5-Star)qt−1 -0.032 -0.026 0.011 0.014 0.005 -0.297 0.767
redesign:(No. Submissions)qt−1 -0.003 -0.014 0.003 0.005 0.011 1.923 0.054
revision:(No. Submissions)qt−1 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.543 0.587
do-both:(No. Submissions)qt−1 -0.007 -0.007 0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.094 0.925
redesign:(No. Creators)qt−1 0.000 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.014 -1.071 0.284
revision:(No. Creators)qt−1 -0.019 -0.015 0.005 0.006 0.004 -0.488 0.626
do-both:(No. Creators)qt−1 -0.019 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.024 -1.942 0.052
B.11.2.3 Stratified-Sample Analysis
pointer:stratify
To further demonstrate that our estimation results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of
creator ex-ante heterogeneity in their ability/experience, and that not incorporating creator
ex-ante heterogeneity does not affect the nature of our estimation results, we re-estimate
the main model using stratified sub-samples. Operationally, we stratify contests in the
complete sample into High-Reputation Concentrated Contests, Low-Reputation Concentrated
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Contests, and Balanced Contests, based on the percentage of high-reputation creators in the
contest,18 and we estimate our structural model using High-Reputation Concentrated and
Low-Reputation Concentrated Contests separately, and compare the estimation results based
on the two sub-samples with the full-sample results.
As we can see in Table B.19, the High-Reputation Concentrated Contests and Low-
Reputation Concentrated sub-samples yield similar structural estimates, and both sets of
estimates are very similar to our main estimation results. We conclude that creator abil-
ity/experience heterogeneity does not meaningfully affect our estimation results.
Table B.19: Results for Stratified-Sample Analysis and the Alternative
Model with Non-Monetary Incentives
Parameter Main Model High-Reputation Low-Reputation With Non-Monetary
Concentrated Concentrated Incentive
α 0.034 (0.002) 0.034 (0.001) 0.033 (0.001) 0.028 (0.001)
c(redesign) 2.790 (0.010) 2.790 (0.044) 2.790 (0.011) 2.784 (0.008)
c(revise) 2.205 (0.021) 2.157 (0.027) 2.254 (0.035) 2.204 (0.006)
c(do-both) 3.319 (0.031) 3.313 (0.023) 3.324 (0.023) 3.293 (0.010)
ce1(enter) 4.958 (0.028) 4.919 (0.030) 5.016 (0.053) 5.032 (0.097)
ce2(enter) 4.326 (0.043) 4.388 (0.016) 4.411 (0.014) 4.466 (0.025)
ce3(enter) 3.599 (0.014) 3.814 (0.032) 3.490 (0.020) 3.814 (0.020)
Rnm – – – 0.233 (0.007)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
B.11.2.4 Reduced-form Test for Hetereogeneity in Creator Interest
One may be concerned that the heterogeneity in creator interest in a contest may affect
creators’ state and their actions simultaneously. To test if creators’ heterogeneous “inter-
est” in a contest impacts their follow-up decisions, we perform the following reduced-form
empirical analysis. In this analysis, we record how many times a creator participates in
contests in each industry within the sampled period (e.g., retailing, software engineering,
banking, etc.), and measure creator i’s interest in contest q using (No. Contest Same IndustryNo. All Contest )iq,
i.e., the percentage of contests creator i participated in (throughout the sample period)
that fall in the same industry as contest q. With this measure for a creator’s interest
in a contest, we re-run the regression reported in Online Appendix B.2.1 Table B.2 — a
multinomial logit regression model of incumbents’ follow-up action choices. Specifically, the
dependent variable is a nominal variable denoting incumbent i’s choice Actioniqt among re-
design, revise, do-both, and do-nothing, where the reference category is do-nothing. We add
(No. Contest Same IndustryNo. All Contest )iq as an independent variable, in addition to the three main sets of
independent variables in the original version of the multinomial logit regression (reported in
18High-Reputation Concentrated Contests: contests with a high proportion (≥ upper quartile of the
proportion observed in all contests in the data) of high ability creators; Low-Reputation Concentrated
Contests: contests with a low proportion (≤ lower quartile of the proportion observed in all contests
in the data) of high ability creators; and Balanced Contests: the remaining contests.
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Table B.2): (1) the individual-level variables, including the number of submissions that the
focal creator has made previously ((No.Submissions)iqt−1), and among all her previous sub-
missions her best rating ((BestRating)iqt−1), second-best rating ((SecondBestRating)iqt−1),
and average rating ((Avg Rating)iqt−1), (2) the contest-level rating variables, including
(No. 1-Star)qt−1, (No. 2-Star)qt−1... (No. 5-Star)qt−1, and (3) control variables, includ-
ing (No. Submissions)qt−1 and (No. Creators)qt−1, the amount of award for the contest
(Awardq in $) and time dummies. We report the estimation results in Table B.20. As can
be seen from the table, (No. Contest Same IndustryNo. All Contest )iq, the proxy for the creator interest, does
not significantly affect her choice among redesign, revise, do-both and do-nothing (after con-
trolling for the individual- and contest-level states captured in the original model). To sum
up, we find little evidence for heterogeneity in creators’ interest that affects their follow-up
decisions.
Table B.20: Is Creator Interest Affecting the Incumbent Follow-up Action
Choice – Multinomial Logit Regression
Depend Variable: Actioniqt
re-design revision do-both
Creator Interest
(No. Contest Same Industry
No. All Contest
)iq −0.042 (0.164) 0.015 (0.102) 0.133 (0.149)
Individual-Level Variables
(No. Submissions)iqt−1 0.011 (0.014) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.009)
AvgRatingiqt−1 0.099 (0.135) 0.101 (0.074) 0.139 (0.119)
BestRatingiqt−1 0.269∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.353∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.190∗ (0.076)
SecondBestRatingiqt−1 −0.096 (0.088) −0.033 (0.051) −0.076 (0.081)
Contest-Level Variables
Awardq($) 0.001 (0.0004) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003)
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.010∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.009∗∗ (0.003) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.003)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.005 (0.003) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.006∗ (0.003)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 0.002 (0.004) 0.005∗ (0.003) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 −0.012 (0.009) −0.027∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.030∗∗∗ (0.008)
(No. Submissions)qt−1 −0.007∗ (0.003) −0.002 (0.002) −0.007∗∗ (0.003)
(No. Creators)qt−1 0.005 (0.006) −0.018∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.009 (0.006)
Time Dummies Yes
Observations 24,085 Log Likelihood -14,782.610
R2 0.040 LR Test 1,247.877∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001; the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
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B.11.3 Alternative Model Allowing for Creators’ Strategic Waiting Be-
havior
B.11.3.1 Alternative Model of Strategic Waiting
We consider an alternative model that allows for the possibility that creators might strategi-
cally wait to join a contest. In this alternative model, the number of potential entrants in a
particular period is endogenously determined. In particular, this new model differs from the
main model (presented in the paper’s Section 4) in the following ways: (1) We now assume
that contests start with a fixed number of potential entrants (defined as all active creators on
the platform on each day), and in each period, the potential entrants are those in the fixed
pool who have not yet joined the contest. In other words, the number of potential entrants
in any given period equals the number of all active creators on the platform (|Mt|), minus
those who are already participating in the focal contest (i.e., |Mt| = |M1|− |Nt|) (Recall that
|Nt| is the number of incumbents in period t.) (2) We also assume that potential entrants
can strategically wait – they will decide between entering the contest in the current period
and waiting for another period. To incorporate (2) in our model, we assign a continuation
payoff (i.e., a value function) to a potential entrant who decides “not to enter” in the current
period. That is, a potential entrant j will decide whether to enter or not (dj,t) based on
Equation (B.22) (as opposed to Equation (B.21) in the main model).
V e,σj,t (st, εj,t) = max
dj,t
{
U ej,t(εj,t; dj,t) + I(dj,t = Enter) · βEV σj,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1, j,t+1)
}
. (B.21)
V e,σj,t (st, εj,t) = max
dj,t
U
e
j,t(εj,t; dj,t) + βEV σj,t+1(xj,t+1, st+1, j,t+1), if dj,t = Enter
0 + βEV e,σj,t+1(st+1, εj,t+1), if dj,t = NotEnter.
(B.22)
We estimate this new model, and report the estimation results in Table B.21. As we
can see from Table B.21, the estimation results of the utility parameters are similar to our
main estimation results, and the qualitative conclusions remain unchanged. In particular,
we still find that the entry costs are decreasing over time, suggesting that the decline in the
entry cost estimates in time (t) is not driven by how we model potential entrants’ decisions
and that allowing for potential entrants’ strategic waiting does not meaningfully affect our
estimation results. However, we do notice that the rate at which the entry cost decreases
is slightly slower under this alternative model. This suggests that strategic waiting and a
smaller number of potential entrants in later periods can partially explain the entry patterns,
but only to a limited degree.
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Table B.21: Results for Stratified-Sample Analysis and the Alternative
Model with Non-Monetary Incentives
Parameter Main Model Strategic Waiting
α 0.034 (0.002) 0.030 (0.002)
c(redesign) 2.790 (0.010) 2.722 (0.073)
c(revise) 2.205 (0.021) 2.155 (0.042)
c(do-both) 3.319 (0.031) 3.252 (0.080)
ce1(enter) 4.958 (0.028) 4.649 (0.052)
ce2(enter) 4.326 (0.043) 4.244 (0.030)
ce3(enter) 3.599 (0.014) 3.531 (0.017)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
B.11.3.2 Reduced-form Evidence for Strategic Waiting
Next, we use a reduced-form analysis to show which one of the following two assumptions is
more likely to be true – (1) the number of potential entrants is endogenous (as in the strategic
waiting model); (2) the number of potential entrants is fixed (as in our main model). The
probability of any potential entrant entering the focal contest in period t is a function of the
contest-level state at the beginning of the current period (st). Suppose (1) is true, then the
number of potential entrants in a period t (|Mt|) would be affected by the number of actual
entrants from the previous period t − 1, and |Mt| would depend on the contest-level state
at the beginning of the previous period (st−1) as well. As a result, the number of actual
entrants in period t (∆Creatorqt) – the product of the number of potential entrants and the
probability of entering – would be a function of the contest-level state of both the previous
period and the current period (i.e., st−1 and st). By contrast, if (2) is true, then the number
of actual entrants in period t (∆Creatorqt) would be a function of only the current period
contest-level state st, but not the previous period contest-level state st−1.
To test which one of (1) and (2) is more consistent with our data, we run the fol-
lowing analysis. We regress the number of actual entrants in contest q in period t
(∆Creatorqt) on both the current-period state variables st (measured by (No. 1-Star)qt,
(No. 2-Star)qt, (No. 3-Star)qt, (No. 4-Star)qt, (No. 5-Star)qt, (No. Submissions)qt and
(No.Creators)qt), and the previous-period state variables st−1 (measured by (No.1-Star)qt−1,
(No.2-Star)qt−1, (No.3-Star)qt−1, (No.4-Star)qt−1, (No.5-Star)qt−1, (No.Submissions)qt−1
and (No. Creators)qt−1). The results are reported as Model 1 in Table B.22. (Model 0 only
contains the set of variables describing the current period state.) From the results, we can see
that most variables describing the previous period state are not significant (the only excep-
tion is (No. 3-Star)qt−2), suggesting that assumption (2) seems to be more consistent with
the data.
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Table B.22: Regression of the Number of Entries With One v.s. Two Lags
Dependent variable: ∆Creatorqt
(Model 0) (Model 1)
Current-Period State Variables st
(No. 1-Star)qt−1 0.026∗∗ (0.008) 0.015 (0.013)
(No. 2-Star)qt−1 0.022∗ (0.010) 0.034∗ (0.016)
(No. 3-Star)qt−1 0.0002 (0.008) 0.026 (0.014)
(No. 4-Star)qt−1 −0.021 (0.012) −0.049∗ (0.020)
(No. 5-Star)qt−1 −0.149∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.121∗∗ (0.038)
(No. Creators)qt−1 −0.202∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.203∗∗∗ (0.023)
(No. Submissions)qt−1 −0.004 (0.006) 0.007 (0.009)
Earlier-Period State Variables st−1
(No. 1-Star)qt−2 0.012 (0.015)
(No. 2-Star)qt−2 −0.021 (0.018)
(No. 3-Star)qt−2 −0.039∗ (0.016)
(No. 4-Star)qt−2 0.032 (0.021)
(No. 5-Star)qt−2 −0.039 (0.042)
(No. Creators)qt−2 −0.014 (0.024)
(No. Submissions)qt−2 −0.005 (0.010)
Observations 5,607 5,607
R2 0.166 0.169
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.027
F Statistic 136.369∗∗∗ (df = 7; 4793) 69.650∗∗∗ (df = 14; 4786)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
B.11.4 Summary Table for Sensitivity Analysis for β, ||Mt||, and SIFT-
cutoff
.
Table B.23: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to β, ||Mt||, and SIFT cutoff
Main β =0.95 β =0.85 ||Mt|| =350 ||Mt|| =250 SIFT 0.35 SIFT 0.45
||Mt|| 300 300 300 350 250 300 300
β 0.9 0.95 0.85 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
SIFT cutoff 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.35 0.45
α 0.034 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.030 0.031 0.029
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
c(redesign) 2.790 2.792 2.790 2.788 2.789 2.997 2.590
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
c(revise) 2.205 2.205 2.204 2.205 2.212 2.047 2.217
(0.021) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.015) (0.031) (0.052)
c(do-both) 3.319 3.298 3.296 3.297 3.294 3.476 3.267
(0.031) (0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.183) (0.059)
ce1(enter) 4.958 5.070 4.811 5.100 4.736 4.932 4.933
(0.028) (0.023) (0.018) (0.029) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022)
ce2(enter) 4.326 4.292 4.270 4.483 4.148 4.291 4.245
(0.043) (0.023) (0.025) (0.010) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026)
ce3(enter) 3.599 3.578 3.593 3.722 3.407 3.571 3.555
(0.014) (0.027) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022) (0.033)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
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B.12 Policy Simulation
B.12.1 Policy Simulation Model Specification
In policy simulations, the four feedback disclosure policies correspond to four different infor-
mation structures. Here is how we reflect these differences in the creators’ behavioral model
for each alternative feedback policy.
No Feedback Policy Under the no feedback policy, a creator only gets to see prior
actions taken by existing creators, but not the realized ratings. Each creator can only be
characterized by the actions she has taken so far, and therefore, we define incumbent i’s
individual-level state variable under the no feedback policy as her actions up to the beginning
of the current period (t) (denoted as xNFi,t ). Operationally, x
NF
i,t is simply a vector recording
all the actions that have been taken by creator i in each period since she entered the contest.
For example, if a creator i enters in Period 1 and takes the “redesign” action in Period 2,
her individual-level state at the beginning of Period 3 is then xNFi,3 = (enter, redesign). The
contest-level state is then redefined as sNFt , which summarizes the number of creators whose
individual-level state is xNFi,t for all possible values of x
NF
i,t . x
NF
i,t transitions deterministically
into xNFi,t+1 by simply appending ai,t, i.e.,
xNFi,t+1 = (x
NF
i,t , ai,t). (B.23)
Everything else is modeled in the same way as in the main model, except that we now
have to update the calculation of creators’ winning probabilities conditional on the newly de-
fined state variables (Pr(i wins|xNFi,T+1, sNFT+1), more specifically, Pr(i wins|xNFi,t=4, sNFt=4) in our
3-period model). Like in the main model, to calculate the creator i’s winning probability, we
need a mapping between the creator’s state variable (xNFi,4 ) and the quality of her best design
(xtruei,4 ). We calculate the distribution of x
true
i,4 |xNFi,4 based on the distribution of the rating of
creators’ first submission and the action-dependent per-period state transition probabilities
estimated from the data. For example, if xNFi,4 = (enter, redesign), then the cummulative
distribution function of xtruei,4 is as follows:
Pr(xtruei,4 ≤ x|xNFi,4 ) =
∑x
y≤x
∑y
l≤y p
e(l)p(xi,4=y|xi,3=l, redesign) , ∀x ∈ {nan, 1, 2, 3, 4};
Pr(xtruei,4 ≤ 4|xNFi,4 )+∑5
l≤5 p
e(l)p(xi,4=5|xi,3=l, redesign)
p(5+max{0, ξ0}+max{0, ξ(1)redesign} ≤ x) ,∀x ≥ 5.
(B.24)
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Late Feedback Policy Under the late feedback scenario, feedback is turned on after the
second period. Hence, the late feedback scenario consists a “no-feedback” stage (t = 2) and
a “with-feedback” stage (t = 3).19 We define state variables differently for the two stages.
During the “no-feedback” stage (t = 2), creators only observe their own and other contest
participants’ actions, similar to the no feedback case. We thus define the state variable (xLFi,2 )
as whether a creator enters the focal contest in the first period or not. The contest-level state
(sLF2 ) is defined correspondingly as the number of entrants in the first period.
Once the seeker discloses the performance feedback at the beginning of Period 3, the
individual-level state variable, xLFi,3 , is the observed individual best rating.
It is worth pointing out how the “no-feedback” stage and “with-feedback” stage are
connected. The distribution of the best rating (xLFi,3 ), which will be revealed at the beginning
of Period 3, is calculated using on the distribution of the rating of creators’ first submission
and the action-dependent per-period state transition probabilities estimated from the data.
We use these ingredients corresponding to the focal creator’s entering time and any follow-up
action. Specifically, if creator i enters in Period 2, xLFi,3 is characterized by Equation (B.25a);
if creator i enters in Period 1, then xLFi,3 is characterized by Equation (B.25b).
Pr(xLFi,3 = x|di,2=enter) = pe(x);
(B.25a)
Pr(xLFi,3 = x|di,1=enter, ai,2)
=

∑x
l≤x,l 6=5 p
e(l)p(xi,3=x|xi,2=l, ai,2) , ∀x ∈ {nan, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
pe(5) , ∀x = (5, ai,2).
(B.25b)
Note that, as explained in Section 3.4.4, in the second line of Equation (B.25b), we record
in xLFi,3 the follow-up action(s) after a creator receives her first 5-star to recover the true best
quality of her submissions truncated at 5-star.
Early Feedback Policy Under the early feedback policy, creators observe seeker ratings
at the beginning of the second period, but not the third period. Hence, like the late feedback
scenario, the early feedback scenario also consists of a “with-feedback” stage (t = 2) and a
“no-feedback” stage (t = 3). We define state variables differently for the two stages.
In the “with-feedback” stage (t = 2), the information structure is the same as that under
the full feedback policy, i.e., incumbent i’s state variable (xEFi,2 ) is defined as her observed
best rating at the beginning of the second period.
The feedback is turned off after the second period. That is, no rating is disclosed at
19Note that, the “state” in period t is defined as the rating/action information at the beginning
of period t; and in the very first stage (t = 1), since there has been no activity, the individual-level
state is always empty, and the contest-level state (counting the number of creators with all possible
individual-level states) is always a vector of zeros.
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the end of Period 2, or equivalently, the beginning of Period 3. In this “no-feedback” stage
(t = 3), creators have to make decisions based on the available information, including the
realized ratings disclosed at the beginning of the second period (xi,2), and participants’ actions
in the second period (ai,2). Accordingly, we define an incumbent i’s individual-level state
variable in the third period as a vector of all the available information, i.e., xEFi,3 = (xi,2, ai,2).
The contest-level state is redefined as sEFt , which summarizes the number of creators whose
individual-level state is xEFi,t for all possible values of x
EF
i,t .
In order to compute creator i’s winning probability (Pr(i wins|xEFi,T+1, sEFT+1), more specif-
ically, Pr(i wins|xEFi,4 , sEF4 ) in our 3-period setting) in the early feedback case, we need to
establish a mapping between the creator’s state variable (xEFi,4 ) and the true quality of her
best design (xtruei,4 ). Suppose creator i entered in the first period. We calculate the distribu-
tion of xtruei,4 |xEFi,4 based on i’s realized rating at the beginning of the second period, as well
as the period-2 and period-3 action-dependent state transition probabilities estimated from
the data. The cumulative distribution function for xtruei,4 |xEFi,4 is:
Pr(xtruei,4 ≤ x|xEFi,4 )
=

∑x
y≤x
∑y
l≤y p(xi,3=l|xi,2, ai,2)p(xi,4=y|xi,3=l, ai,3) ,∀x ∈ {nan, 1, 2, 3, 4};
Pr(xtruei,4 ≤ 4) + p(xi,3=5|xi,2, ai,2)p(5+ max{0, ξ0}+ max{0, ξ(2)ai,3} ≤ x)
+
∑4
l≤4{p(xi,3=l|xi,2, ai,2)p(xi,4=5|xi,3=l, ai,3)p(5+ max{0, ξ0} ≤ x)}
,∀x ≥ 5,∀xi,2 ∈ {nan, 1, 2, 3, 4};
p(5+ max{0, ξ0}+ max{0, ξ(1)ai,2}+ max{0, ξ(2)ai,3} ≤ x) ,∀x ≥ 5,∀xi,2 = 5.
(B.26)
B.12.2 State Transition Probabilities in Policy Simulation
In this appendix, we clarify our assumptions on state transition probabilities in the coun-
terfactuals. The high-level summary is as follows: (1) we model the quality-transition
probabilities as being dependent on creators’ actions; (2) our counterfactual simulations
capture the change in quality-transition probabilities via the equilibrium action choices
(i.e., Prt(ai,t|xi,t, st)), which depend on the feedback policy. The upshot is that the over-
all quality transition probabilities (with action integrated out, i.e., p(xi,t+1|xi,t, st) =∑
ai,t
Prt(ai,t|xi,t, st) ·p(xi,t+1|xi,t, ai,t)) will be different across the feedback scenarios. Below
we provide more details.
We model quality-transition probabilities as being dependent on creators’ ac-
tions. In our model, creator i chooses her action ai,t based on her individual and contest-level
state variables. Given her action choice, the action-specific quality-transition probabilities
no longer depend on the contest-level state. This is not surprising, because the differences in
action-specific quality transition probabilities already reflect the different levels of improve-
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ment each action could produce (note that creators’ action choice in our model can also be
viewed as their choice of effort level in a discrete space, and therefore, the action-specific tran-
sition probabilities captures the mapping between effort and quality improvement, which can
be reasonably assumed to be the same under different feedback policies); hence, conditional
on the chosen action, individuals’ quality-transition probability should not be significantly
affected by opponents’ states. Empirical evidence supports this argument. Details of the
data evidence are provided in Table B.4 in Online Appendix B.2.4.
To summarize, in our model the quality-transition probabilities depend on creators’ ac-
tions, but not opponents’ states, and these action-specific quality-transition probabilities
remain the same for all feedback policies. In the simulation for alternative feedback policies,
we model the change in creators’ strategies/actions (both for the focal creator and for her
opponents) resulting from different information availability, but keep the quality-transition
probabilities conditional on the chosen actions constant. (We provide details of how we model
creators’ strategies across different feedback policies in the next point.)
Our counterfactual simulations capture the effect of opponent behavior. Here is
how we capture in our counterfactual analyses how different information structures under
different feedback policies might lead to different creators’ behaviors. Operationally, the
state variables are defined differently in different feedback scenarios based on the information
structure in each particular case – early feedback: xEFi,t and s
EF
t ; late feedback: x
LF
i,t and s
LF
t ;
no feedback: xNFi,t and s
NF
t ; and in the full feedback case, states variables are directly based
on quality state variables, i.e., xtruei,t and s
true
t . These x
•
i,t and s
•
t are mapped to the quality
states xtruei,t and s
true
t , with the assumption that creators have rational expectations. (See
Online Appendix B.12.1 for a detailed explanation of how we model each feedback scenario.)
With this modification, we can use the same BRM algorithm as explained in Section 3.5.1.2
in the paper to solve for the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities (i.e. P∗i,t(ai,t|x •i,t, s •t ),
where ai,t ∈ {revision, redesign, do-both, do-nothing}), for each combination of (x •i,t, s •t ) in each
feedback scenario. Therefore, we are not keeping the unconditional transition probabilities
fixed; instead, we solve for creators’ corresponding equilibrium actions under different feed-
back policies, keeping the action-specific transition probabilities, which reflect the quality
improvement resulting from the creators actions, fixed. As mentioned above, we provide em-
pirical evidence that the quality-transition probabilities depend on creators’ actions, but not
opponents’ states, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the action-specific quality-
transition probabilities remain the same for all feedback policies.
Note that there may be efficiency loss when the creator acts without knowing the ratings
under some alternative feedback policies. For example, a top performer, without knowing
she has already been given a 5-star rating, might sub-optimally choose the redesign action
or choose the do-nothing option; a low-performing creator, without knowing her previous
designs are not favored by the buyer, might choose the revision action and continue working
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on her unsuccessful design style. That is, although the quality-transition probabilities are
the same conditional on a specific action being chosen, the feedback policy might affect
which action is chosen. Our model captures the effect that more feedback can better guide
contestants’ exploration and exploitation actions. In fact, as can be seen from the policy
simulation results in Figure 3.4 on page 63 in the body of the paper, the no feedback policy
performs very poorly in almost all performance measures. However, under late feedback this
inefficiency is less severe and is offset by the positive effect of reduced competition, as is also
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
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APPENDIX C
Appendices to Chapter 3
C.1 A Proof for Lemma 4.2.1
We now prove that under “Assumption 1-Perceived Utility” and “Assumption 2-Monotone 
Increasing Clicking Probability”, controlling for product features Xs, pbij and p
b
ik are inde-
pendent conditional on pbi,−j−k, if and only if ˜ij and ˜ik in Equation (4.1) are independent 
conditional on ˜i,−j−k, i.e.,
pbij⊥pbik|pbi,−j−k,X ⇐⇒ ˜j⊥˜k|˜i,−j−k,X .
The proof utilizes the following two lemmas for independent variables:
Lemma C.1.1 Let R1 and R2 denote two random variables, and f1 and f2 be functions of
R1 and R2, respectively. If R1 and R2 are independent, then f1(R1) and f2(R2) are also
independent, i.e.,
R1⊥R2 ⇐⇒ f1(R1)⊥f2(R2), ∀f .
Lemma C.1.2 Let R1, R2 and T denote random variables, and f(·) be a strictly monotonic
function. If R1 and R2 are independent conditional on T , i.e., R1⊥R2|T , then R1 and R2
are independent conditional on f(T ), i.e.,
R1⊥R2|T ⇐⇒ R1⊥R2|f(T ), ∀ a strictly monotonic f .
Lemma C.1.1 suggests functions of independent variables also independent. Lemma C.1.2
suggests if two random variables are independent conditional on a third variable, then they
are also independent conditional on any strictly monotonic function of the third variable.
Proofs for Lemmas C.1.1 and C.1.2 are provided in Appendix C.1.1 and C.1.2, respectively.
According to Assumption 1, given product features Xs, ubij |X = h(uij − ui0;X) =
fh(˜ij ;X), where fh is a strictly increasing function. According to Assumption 2, given
product features Xs, pbij |X = g(ubij) = g(fh(˜ij ;X)). Since both fh(.) and g(.) is strictly
increasing, the composite function H(x) = g(fh(x)) is also strictly increasing. Therefore,
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pbij |X = H(˜i.;X), i.e., pbij strictly increases with ˜ij , after controlling for X. We refer to this
as Observation 1.
Combining Observation 1 with Lemma C.1.1, we have ˜ij⊥˜ik|˜i,−j−k,X ⇐⇒
H(˜ij)⊥H(˜ik)|˜i,−j−k,X ⇐⇒ pbij⊥pbik|˜i,−j−k,X . Then combining Lemma C.1.1, we have
pbij⊥pbik|˜i,−j−k,X ⇐⇒ pbij⊥pbik|H˜i,−j−k,X ⇐⇒ pbij⊥pbik|pbi,−j−k,X . Therefore, summarizing the
above-mentioned two steps, we have ˜ij⊥˜ik|˜i,−j−k,X ⇐⇒ pbij⊥pbik|pbi,−j−k,X .
C.1.1 A Proof for Lemma C.1.1
For any two measurable sets Ai, i = 1, 2, Ti ∈ Ai if and only if Ri ∈ Bi, where Bi are the
sets {s : fi(s) ∈ Ai}. Hence, since the Ri are independent, Pr(T1 ∈ A1, T2 ∈ A2) = Pr(T1 ∈
A1) ∗ Pr(T2 ∈ A2). Thus, the Ti are independent.
C.1.2 A Proof for Lemma C.1.2
We know that R1⊥R2|T Since f(.) is strictly monotone, we have Pr(f(T )) = Pr(T ) and
Pr(F (T )|X) = Pr(T |X),∀X. With that, we can write down the probability of both R1 and
R2 conditional on T using the following two forms. First,
Pr(R1 ∩R2|T ) = Pr(R1|T ) Pr(R2|T )
Pr(R1 ∩ T )
Pr(T )
Pr(R2 ∩ T )
Pr(T )
Pr(T |R1) Pr(R1)
Pr(T )
Pr(T |R2) Pr(R2)
Pr(T )
Pr(R1|F (T )) Pr(R2|F (T ));
(C.1)
Or,
Pr(R1 ∩R2|T ) = Pr(R1 ∩R2 ∩ T )
Pr(T )
=
Pr(F (T )|R1 ∩R2) Pr(R1 ∩R2)
Pr(F (T ))
= Pr(R1 ∩R2|F (T )).
(C.2)
Since the above mentioned two forms in Equations (C.1) and (C.2) equal each other. We
have Pr(R1 ∩R2|F (T )) = Pr(R1|F (T )) Pr(R2|F (T )).
C.2 Log Likelihood
We show that negative log-likelihood is L(Z|X; Φb) = trSzzΦb − logdetΦb.
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f(Z|X;βb,Σ) = (2pi)−J2 det(Σ)−12 e−12 (Z−βbX)TΣ−1(Z−βbX)(Normal distribution)
f(Z|X;βb,Φb) = (2pi)−J2 det(Φb)12 e−12 (Z−βbX)TΦb(Z−βbX)
ln f(Z|X;βb,Φb) = N
2
ln det(Φb)− 1
2
N∑
i=1
(zn − βbxn)TΦb(zn − βbxn) + const
(C.3)
Taking its derivative w.r.t. βb and setting it to zero we have βˆb = SxzS
−1
xx , where Sxz =
1
N
∑N
i=1(zi− z¯)(xk− x¯)T and Sxx = 1N
∑N
i=1(xi− x¯)(xi− x¯)T. Szz = 1N
∑N
i=1[(zi− βˆbxi)(zi−
βˆbxi)
T].
Rewrite the log-likelihood using “trace trick”1 w.r.t. Φb, we have:
log f(Z|X; Φb) = N
2
log det(Φb)− 1
2
N∑
i=1
(zi − βˆbxi)TΦb(zi − βˆbxi) + const
∝ N
2
log det(Φb)− 1
2
N∑
i=1
tr
(
(zi − βˆbxi)(zi − βˆbxi)TΦb
)
=
N
2
log det(Φb)− 1
2
tr
(
N∑
i=1
[(zi − βˆbxi)(zi − βˆbxi)T]Φb
)
= log det(Φb)− tr
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
[(zi − βˆbxi)(zi − βˆbxi)T]Φb
)
= log det(Φb)− tr
(
SzzΦ
b
)
(C.4)
Therefore, we have L(Z|X; Φb) = − ln f(Z|X; Φb) = tr (SzzΦb)− log det(Φb).
C.3 Algorithms
Step 1: We regress consumer i’s clicking decision for product j on product features for
all available products (pk and Xik for all k). The estimates for pk and Xik are denoted
as αˆbk and βˆ
b
k respectively for each product k ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. In particular, the vector
summarizing all estimates is: βˆb = SxzS
−1
xx , where Sxz =
1
N
∑N
i=1(zi − z¯)(Xk − X¯)T and
Sxx =
1
N
∑N
i=1(Xi − X¯)(Xi − X¯)T.
Step 2: We obtain the residuals (denoted at eij) from the clicking regression above—
we subtract the the predicted clicking level from the actual click, i.e., eij = zij − zˆij =
zij −
∑J
k=1(αˆ
b
jkpk + βˆ
b
jkXik).
1The “trace trick” is that xTAx = tr[xTAx] = tr[xTxA], where the first equality follows from the
fact that xTAx is a scalar.
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Step 3: We compute the empirical covariance of these residual terms, which is a J ∗ J
matrix Szz among the J available products, in particular,
Szz =
1
N
N∑
i=1
eie
T
i =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[(zi − βˆbXi)(zi − βˆbXi)T], (C.5)
where ei is a vector, summarizing the residual terms of all J products (i.e., ei =
(ei1, ei2, ..., eiJ)).
Step 4: Lastly, we use the Graphical Lasso algorithm (Friedman et al., 2008; Rothman
et al., 2008) and form an estimator based on Equation (4.3) to learn a sparse precision
matrix Φb.
C.4 Description of Tuning Parameter Selection Methods
We discuss three commonly used methods for tuning parameter selection: cross-validation
(CV), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and adaptive methods.
CV: A common method to choose the tuning parameter λ is cross-validation. Specifically,
given a grid of penalties and K folds of the data, CV estimates the model based on K − 1
folds of the data, and score the performance on Kth fold; after doing these repeatly, CV
determines the best λ that minimizes the mean errors.
BIC: An alternative to cross-validation are models based on information criteria. Cross-
validation is effective especially when the objective is the prediction accuracy. However, it
may select too many variables when the primary interest is model selection. To obtain a more
sparse model for the purpose of inference, we would rely on Bayesian information criterion
(BIC). It leads to asymptotically consistent model selection in the setting with fixed number
of variables and growing sample size (Schwarz et al., 1978; Foygel and Drton, 2010).2
EBICκ = −nL(Szz; Σb) + |E(Szz)| · log(n), (C.6)
where L(Szz; Σb) denotes the log-likelihood (MLE) between the estimated and sample co-
variance. L(Szz; Σb) = trSzzΦb − logdetΦb. |E(Szz)| denotes number of estimated edges or
non-zeros in Szz.
Adaptive methods: Another approach is the two-step adaptive Lasso (Zhou et al., 2011;
Meinshausen, 2007). Specifically, we start with an initial sparse estimate Σˆb,0, based on which
we can derive a new penalization matrix (Λ) using data dependent weights W (Equation
(C.7)). In the second step, we use this new penalty to refit the graphical lasso based on the
2Our setting does not fall into the category where are far more variables relative to the number
of observations (p >> n). Therefore, Extended BIC proposed by Foygel and Drton (2010) reduces to
the conventional BIC, with κ = 0 in EBIC.
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new penalization matrix Λ. This second step refitting can be done with either CV or BIC.
Λjk = λ ·Wjk, where Wjk = Wkj > 0 for all (j, k), j 6= k (C.7)
where the data-dependent weights (W ) can be computed given the coefficient σˆb,0jk in the
initial sparse estimate Σˆb,0, using either (1) “inverse” method: Wjk =
1
|σˆb,0jk |
for non-zero
coefficients and Wjk = max{ 1
σˆb,0jk
} for the zero-valued coefficients, or (2) “inverse-squared”
method: Wjk =
1
(σˆb,0jk )
2
for non-zero coefficients and Wjk = max{ 1
(σˆb,0jk )
2
} for the zero-valued
coefficients. In sum, with these two weighting approaches and two re-fitting methods, there
are four options within adaptive methods: Adaptive CV inverse, Adaptive CV inverse-square,
Adaptive BIC inverse, Adaptive BIC inverse-square. In general, adaptive graphical lasso
yields more sparser solutions and can be used to further reduce the number of false positives.
While we test all four adaptive methods, we find squared inverse has better performance
(lower false positive and lower false negative rates), so we only display results with square
inverse weights in the table.
C.5 Alternative Clicking Assumptions
C.5.1 Alternative Functional Forms for the Clicking Probability
We evaluate whether the performance of the stage-1 is robustness with respect to the func-
tional form assumption we had in the base case of our simulation, i.e., the Sigmoid function.
Specifically, in simulation scenario (6), we consider two alternative types of functions for
the clicking probability. In other words, we consider two alternative relationships between
(uij − ui0) and pb.
Alternative-1: we assume consumer i clicks product j with probability pbij = H(uij−ui0),
where H() is a cumulative density function of a normal distribution. In particular, we assume
the mean of this normal distribution equals 80th quartile of uij , and the standard deviation
of this normal distribution equals std(uij), where std(uij) is the sample standard deviation
of the latent utilities. The results are robust to alternative levels of means and standard
deviations.
Alternative-2: we assume consumer i clicks product j with probability pbij = H(u˜ij),
where H() is a linear function. In particular, we assume pbij =
u˜ij−min(u.)
max(u.)−min(u.) , where min(u.)
is the minimum among all uij (∀i, ∀j) and max(u.) is the maximum among all uij (∀i, ∀j).
To further avoid some extreme values of u., which might lead to p
b
ij clustering around 0.5,
we make some adjustments to set max(u.) as the 95
th quartile of uij and min(u.) as the
5th quartile of uij ; and to ensure p
b falls into the range of 0 to 1, we refine pbij as p
b
ij =
min
(
1,max
(
0,
u˜ij−min(u.)
max(u.)−min(u.)
))
.
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C.5.2 Uncertainties in Consumers’ Clicking Decisions
In reality, whether a customer clicks a product or not could potentially be a noisy process.
We want to demonstrate the robustness of our approach to those noises. We model some
potential forms of noises when generating the synthetic data, and assess to what extend our
step-1 estimation results are affected by those noises. Specifically, when modeling customers
clicking process in the synthetic data, we allow for an type of uncertainty that may arise from
potential behavioral factors. When deciding which product to click, a customer i might not
be able to assess the utility of purchasing product j accurately. To model this possibility, we
assume the perceived utility when making the clicking decision is
ubij = h(uij − ui0 + ξij), (C.8)
where the added term ξij reflects the deviation from the “true” product utility.
We generate two sets of data with two levels of this uncertainty. In particular, we assume
uncertainties in customers’ perceived utilities follow a normal distribution N(0, 1.409) or
N(0, 2.818), where ξij ∼ N(0, 1.409) or ξij ∼ N(0, 2.818) in Equation (C.8). We then estimate
parameters from these two sets of “noisy” data using our model to assess the robustness of
our approach with respect to this uncertainty. All other simulation primitives are same as
the ones in the base setting in Table 4.1. The stage-1 estimation results are represented in
the last two rows in Table 4.1.
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C.6 Summary Statistics for Product Features in the Empirical Setting
price display score
Product mean std mean std mean std
1 300.881 (2.697) 0.002 (0.001) 0.542 (0.244)
2 181.159 (2.969) 0.015 (0.003) 0.331 (0.186)
3 109.681 (4.549) 0.800 (0.054) 0.339 (0.370)
4 141.551 (1.268) 0.259 (0.029) 0.319 (0.168)
5 337.945 (6.956) 0.002 (0.000) 0.571 (0.233)
6 552.103 (0.982) 0.060 (0.008) 0.274 (0.079)
7 236.036 (5.697) 0.002 (0.000) 0.589 (0.273)
8 555.674 (7.388) 0.038 (0.016) 0.216 (0.338)
9 205.237 (0.889) 0.002 (0.001) 0.429 (0.247)
10 185.715 (4.743) 0.075 (0.013) 0.223 (0.120)
11 130.216 (3.552) 0.032 (0.007) 0.242 (0.132)
12 95.908 (4.431) 0.037 (0.024) 0.275 (0.250)
13 401.052 (2.847) 0.013 (0.004) 0.287 (0.180)
14 316.881 (2.659) 0.063 (0.017) 0.345 (0.132)
15 140.362 (1.136) 0.371 (0.049) 0.165 (0.159)
16 275.299 (1.728) 0.027 (0.014) 0.261 (0.152)
17 364.121 (5.913) 0.047 (0.028) 0.034 (0.058)
18 191.915 (5.119) 0.061 (0.020) 0.287 (0.098)
19 345.325 (1.442) 0.346 (0.090) 0.156 (0.167)
20 200.428 (3.887) 0.004 (0.000) 0.490 (0.240)
21 249.567 (7.998) 0.009 (0.001) 0.217 (0.307)
22 215.134 (13.891) 0.016 (0.005) 0.182 (0.154)
23 163.751 (4.653) 0.022 (0.004) 0.213 (0.178)
24 213.474 (4.099) 0.001 (0.000) 0.500 (0.298)
25 364.034 (4.285) 0.003 (0.001) 0.317 (0.133)
26 152.176 (2.214) 1.000 0.000 0.471 (0.463)
27 204.280 (8.330) 0.004 (0.005) 0.495 (0.259)
28 177.244 (4.028) 0.095 (0.017) 0.200 (0.146)
29 279.407 (5.222) 0.031 (0.003) 0.360 (0.196)
30 361.226 (10.249) 0.033 (0.016) 0.121 (0.156)
31 128.851 (3.758) 0.006 (0.004) 0.436 (0.203)
32 251.615 (2.862) 0.746 (0.054) 0.170 (0.243)
33 373.471 (5.131) 0.012 (0.004) 0.474 (0.134)
34 120.223 (1.254) 0.004 (0.001) 0.454 (0.229)
35 274.252 (5.548) 0.007 (0.003) 0.336 (0.240)
36 296.588 (5.698) 0.001 (0.000) 0.436 (0.291)
37 133.319 (2.145) 0.072 (0.054) 0.258 (0.143)
38 167.758 (1.607) 0.255 (0.061) 0.354 (0.175)
39 343.022 (2.872) 0.064 (0.008) 0.275 (0.095)
40 1129.432 (39.665) 0.300 (0.101) 0.077 (0.100)
41 171.460 (0.774) 0.107 (0.027) 0.262 (0.213)
42 119.093 (6.584) 0.018 (0.007) 0.339 (0.180)
43 374.354 (1.940) 0.051 (0.003) 0.342 (0.088)
44 189.722 (7.315) 0.023 (0.009) 0.130 (0.253)
45 188.957 (4.466) 0.035 (0.009) 0.309 (0.118)
Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Product Features in the Empirical Setting
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